DELIVERED THROUGH THE EXPERT ADVISORY CALL-DOWN SERVICE (EACDS) LOT B:
STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE TO CRISES

EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES GUIDANCE NOTE

CAMBRIDGE EDUCATION

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STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE TO CRISSES

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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AET .......................... Africa Education Trust
ASER .......................... Annual Status of Education Report
BRAC .......................... Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
BRACED .................... Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disaster
CFS ............................ Child Friendly Spaces
CRRF ......................... Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSO .......................... Civil Society Organisation
DFID .......................... Department for International Development
DRC ............................ Democratic Republic of Congo
EC ............................. European Commission
ECW .......................... Education Cannot Wait Fund
EGMA ........................ Early Grade Mathematics Assessment
ECLA  Early Grade Reading Assessment
EiE  Education in Emergencies
EMIS  Education Management Information System
FONDEN  Mexico Natural Disaster Fund
GBV  Gender Based Violence
GCPEA  Global Coalition for Protection of Education from Attack
GESS  Girls Education in South Sudan
GPE  Global Partnership for Education
HC  Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT  Humanitarian Country Team
HNO  Humanitarian Needs Overview
ICT  Information Communication Technology
IDMC  Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP  Internally Displaced Person/People
IEG  Independent Evaluation Group
INEE  Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organisation
IP  Implementing Partner
IRC  International Rescue Committee
MDTF  Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MEHE  Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoE  Ministry of Education
NARIC  National Recognition Information Centre
NFE  Non-Formal Education
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC  Norwegian Refugee Council
NSS  National Security Strategy
OCHA  Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI  Overseas Development Institute
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PMU  Programme Management Unit
PSEA  Protection, Sexual Exploitation & Abuse
RACE  Reaching All Children with Education
SDSR  Strategic Security and Defence Review
SMS  Short Message Service
SOMDEL  Somali Distance Education and Literacy programme
SRP  Strategic Response Planning
SSSSAMS  South Sudan School Attendance Monitoring System
TLC  Teacher Learning Circle
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNWRA  United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
VfM  Value for Money
WASH  Water, Sanitation & Hygiene
1 INTRODUCTION

The nature of crises is changing. More countries experienced violent conflict in 2016 than at any other time in nearly 30 years. Conflicts now last an average of 26 years against less than 10 in 1970.¹ There are an estimated 125 million people globally in need of humanitarian aid. By the end of 2016, over 65 million people were displaced by conflict, violence and/or persecution, and over 19 million were displaced by natural disasters. Natural disasters are now far more frequent: there were 153 in 2015.² More than 80% of refugee crises last for more than ten years: two in five last for more than twenty years.³ Around 90% of humanitarian funding goes to recurrent and protracted crises.

This guidance note aims to begin bridging the gap between evidence and programming by pulling together in one place the most robust evidence available to date, and combining this with DFID adviser experience of programming in three different emergency contexts:

1. **Protracted conflict** – intense violence, often armed, causing instability and displacement of people; which is frequently protracted.
2. **Refugee crises** – significant populations are displaced across international borders for prolonged periods.
3. **Natural disasters** in non-conflict settings – floods, earthquakes and epidemics resulting in breakdown of services and the internal displacement of people.

Six evidence briefs have been developed by a small team of researchers⁴ and these have been utilised in the drafting of this guidance note. The evidence briefs are available as separate standalone documents⁵ and the references are included as annexes to this guidance note. Promising practices in this guidance note are drawn from available evidence (hyperlinks in the footnotes show where the evidence has been found), and where no references are given, the promising practice has been drawn from DFID adviser experience. The evidence briefs are organised around the same six thematic areas that are used to structure each of the three contexts in this guidance note. These are described in the following Table 1.

Table 1: The six thematic areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political settlements</th>
<th>Establishing consensus between governments, multi-lateral, bi-lateral and I/NGOs on inclusion of education in the crisis response. This involves maximising international commitments and resolutions to forge effective national and regional EiE responses.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Strengthening education systems (including state and non-state) to ensure equitable and effective education services for all children and young people and avoiding the unnecessary establishment of ad hoc, temporary or parallel delivery systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost-effective delivery</td>
<td>Promoting good value for money through effective coordination with all partners – humanitarian and development - in financing, designing and implementation of education programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality and learning</td>
<td>Ensuring education is of good quality, responsive and relevant to the needs of affected children and young people. This includes addressing key issues of teachers, language of instruction, learning assessment and accreditation, in changing and often volatile contexts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection and inclusion</td>
<td>Ensuring schools and other places of learning are safe and inclusive spaces offering protection for all children. Girls are particularly vulnerable in times of crisis and more likely than boys to discontinue their education. Children with disabilities are highly likely to be excluded.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, World Bank, 2017
² *DFID Humanitarian Policy Consultation*, DFID, 2016
³ *Protracted displacement: uncertain paths to self-reliance in exile*, ODI, 2015
⁴ The research team at Cambridge Education was led by Dr. Sharon Tao and included Emma van Muelen and Sarah Watson.
⁵ *EiE Evidence Briefs 1-6*, developed by Cambridge Education for DFID, 2017
The six evidence briefs have been complemented by interviews with eight DFID education advisers all currently working in crisis-affected countries or regions, as well as three DFID humanitarian advisers. Advisers were asked to use their current and previous experiences to:

- Describe the challenges faced in EiE programme design and delivery.
- Identify aspects of their work that showed promise and had worked well, and not so well.
- Offer specific insights into the six thematic areas, described above.

1.1 BACKGROUND: UK AID EDUCATION AND COUNTRIES IN CRISIS

The UK has been shifting its aid expenditure to fragile states (i.e., states with weak capacity or weak legitimacy) for a number of years. The UK Aid Strategy and Strategic Security and Defence Review (SDSR) commits to spending at least 50% of DFID’s budget in fragile states. The UK National Security Strategy (NSS) places development assistance at the core of the UK’s response to instability and crises. The 2016 Bilateral Development Review6 sets out a new UK approach to conflict and refugee crises, promoting integration of development, humanitarian and stabilisation approaches; and increasing the focus on delivering shock-responsive essential services, jobs and economic development. The recently refreshed Building Stability Framework7 captures much of the approach to this and is being rolled out across the organisation. The framework points to the need to address the underlying causes of instability, and highlights the ways in which aid can contribute to stability. This includes taking a long-term, conflict-sensitive approach, rather than the conventional humanitarian response, with a focus on inclusive economic growth and effective, legitimate institutions to support stability in fragile and conflict-affected states.

The UK has until now, retained a focus on humanitarian response, but is seeking to take a new and different approach. The recently finalised Humanitarian Reform Policy8 reinforces themes within the Building Stability Framework, including multi-year funding in support of systems building for essential services, private sector and livelihoods interventions to stimulate job creation in protracted crises. It also includes an important focus on the reform of the international humanitarian system itself, including delivering against the Grand Bargain commitments on efficiency that were made at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. Additionally, the policy includes efforts towards realising the New Ways of Working (NWOW)9 initiative, which was also agreed at the 2016 summit. The NWOW initiative looks at how humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors can work in a more joined up way on joint analysis of need, planning and response in the form of working towards “collective outcomes”, ensuring that EiE interventions are aligned, as far as possible, with national systems. In addition to this, the DFID protracted crises discussion paper calls to adopt development approaches wherever possible and humanitarian ones only where necessary. It recommends promoting longer-term investments in essential services, livelihoods and jobs, collaborative approaches that cut across sectors, and portfolio and programme management approaches that cater for changing risks and spikes in needs.

Education has become a more prominent feature in emergency response, especially in situations where there are protracted refugee crises, such as those caused by the Syria conflict. However, the review conducted for this guidance note confirms there is limited evidence on how to programme education to address the needs of refugees, or indeed of populations caught up in conflict. The response to natural disasters is even less

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6 Rising to the challenge of ending poverty: The Bilateral Development Review 2016, DFID, 2016
7 Building Stability Framework, DFID, 2016
8 Saving lives, building resilience, reforming the system: the UK Government’s Humanitarian Reform Policy, DFID, 2017
9 New way of working initiative, Agenda for Humanity, 2017
researched and little is known about how to make education services more resilient to shocks, and how to help the system to bounce back quickly after a disaster. DFID is working to address the evidence gaps through new research programmes, but these will take some time to yield results.

Box 1: Impact of conflict and disaster on education

- Globally, the education of 80 million children and young people is affected by conflict or disaster.
- Less than 2% of humanitarian aid is spent on education.
- 37 million school-aged children in conflict-affected countries are without an education.

Fragile states have, on average, poorer education outcomes than non-fragile states for multiple reasons (lower investments, larger financial barriers, less accountability). Lower education outcomes can increase the population’s vulnerability in crises. Less inclusive societies can also increase the likelihood of conflict. Recurrent and protracted crises often take place against a backdrop of poor education services as a starting point. In conflict, direct targeting of the education system (e.g., Nigeria) further weakens already poorly functioning systems. Meanwhile, in refugee crises, barriers such as refugees’ rights to access national systems, a lack of qualification recognition, and language and cultural barriers, combined with low national capacity, often constrains children’s access to education.

Despite the shortage of evidence on best practice, a range of bilateral and multilateral programming supported by DFID has been operating in crisis situations. Examples include Girls Education in South Sudan (GESS), the No Lost Generation Initiative work responding to the Syria Crisis, and bilateral programming for South Sudanese refugees in Uganda. DFID is also a major contributor to the recently established Education Cannot Wait Fund, which aims to be a global platform for advocacy, delivery and reform of EiE. However, programming in these contexts faces particular challenges. These are summarised in Box 2 below.

Box 2: The challenge of education in conflict and disaster

- Getting the politics and policies right in order to trigger an early response in the education sector – the humanitarian response fails to prioritise education, neither does the development response kick in.
- Finding the right balance between immediate needs and longer-term system building – by its nature, education needs a long-term resilience approach to withstand and recover from shocks.
- Keeping the focus on learning for all when populations are displaced and access is the overriding priority.
- Ensuring schools are safe from attack in conflict and protected from natural hazards including floods and disease, as well as recognising education’s contribution in peace-building.
- Getting the right information to inform policy and programmes when systems are disrupted.
- Finding cost effective solutions to the delivery of the education response in different sub-sectors (primary, secondary, TVET), and ensuring education is affordable.

1.2 HOW IS THE EMERGENCY EDUCATION RESPONSE CURRENTLY COORDINATED?

The United Nations has instituted a coordination system that aims to enhance predictability, accountability and partnership amongst all organisations working in an emergency. Ideally, the Education Cluster brings together all organisations involved in EiE. Its core functions at country level include:

- Support service delivery by providing a platform for agreeing approaches and eliminating duplication.
- Inform strategic decision-making of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) by coordinating needs assessment, gap analysis, and prioritisation.
- Plan and develop strategy, including cluster plans, adherence to standards, and funding needs.

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10 The fierce urgency of now: delivering children’s right to education during crises, Global Campaign for Education, 2015
11 Education Cannot Wait, 2017
12 Education in emergencies and protracted crises, ODI, 2015
• Advocate to address concerns on behalf of cluster participants and affected populations.
• Monitor/report on the cluster strategy and results, and recommend corrective action where necessary.
• Undertake contingency planning, preparedness, or capacity building where needed.
• Mainstream protection and integrate early recovery from the outset of the humanitarian response.

The Education Cluster’s Lead Agencies are UNICEF and Save the Children. They are meant to ensure that:
• Coordination mechanisms are established and properly supported for the sector.
• They act as the first point of call for the Government and the Humanitarian Coordinator.
• They are the provider of last resort in their respective cluster.

Cluster coordinators are responsible for ensuring that cluster-specific concerns are raised and properly discussed, and that strategic decisions are shared and implemented at operational level. The Global Education Cluster (which includes INEE, UNESCO, UNHCR, GPE, etc.) is an international structure that provides Education Clusters with guidelines and standards for the implementation of EiE responses.

The Education Cluster can and should liaise with the Ministry of Education, the Education Donor Group, and other Sector Clusters (such as health, protection, etc.) in order to organise, coordinate and implement a robust EiE response. However, the efficacy of these structures and relationships can vary depending on context. Education tends to be overlooked in the humanitarian response in favour of meeting more immediate needs such as shelter, food and health care. It can thus be difficult to access humanitarian funding.

1.3 HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE GUIDANCE

Some highlights from the guidance across each of the three contexts is summarised below.

**Table 2: Summary of key lessons learnt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Key lessons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protracted conflict</td>
<td>• <strong>Politics: Support stronger Education Cluster leadership on the ground.</strong> In South Sudan, the Education Donor Group was able to refresh and problem-solve for the Cluster, including refining and nuancing their messaging. This enabled the Cluster to become more assertive when dealing with OCHA and the Humanitarian Country Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Systems: Agree and stick to core principles.</strong> In 2014-15, humanitarian and development actors agreed on core principles to be applied to state schools in stable areas, and in schools located in camps (rather than set up parallel or different standards for schools in camps).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>VfM: Understand the different institutional arrangements and financing options of other active donors.</strong> This is often complex and hampers coordination and planning. Some donors (e.g., EU and US) maintain separate humanitarian and development teams with distinct portfolios, remits and reporting lines. Others have integrated humanitarian and development structures at capital level, but not necessarily within country offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Quality: Work to support systems to keep teachers in place and teaching.</strong> Support teachers during times of crisis, particularly when the MoE fails to pay salaries or when salaries are worthless due to inflation (e.g., South Sudan). In another crisis, 10,000 teacher stipends have kept over 700 schools open, reaching a third of the children in opposition held areas. Support volunteer or contract teachers as essential temporary measures to keep school open.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <strong>Protection: Focus attention on the traumatic effects of conflict on children.</strong> Psychosocial programmes can promote resilience and better cognitive function in children and young people affected by crises. Promising interventions include teacher training in DRC on “Learning to Read in a Healing Classroom” and creating extra-curricular clubs in state schools that use teachers or community members to emulate the aims, activities and outcomes of child friendly spaces often found in camps.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Refugee crises

- **Data:** Promote data and information sharing amongst actors. Good relationships with partners enable sharing of factual accounts and information in the absence of formal, reliable data. There are a number of tools (e.g., ASER, EGRA, EGMA) that can be adapted to contexts to measure learning and assess needs.

- **Politics:** Support from the highest levels can catalyse rapid action and innovation. The Jordan Compact resulted in a high degree of collaboration between major donors; political support coming from the highest levels catalysed rapid action and innovation in integrating refugees into the host education system.

- **Systems:** Work to avoid parallel systems as far as possible – experience in Lebanon and Jordan show how this can be done, building on existing systems and programmes.

- **VfM:** Support and fund key coordination groups (e.g., the intersectoral group in Lebanon), including NGO coordination platforms. Take a whole-sector view, do not just focus on coordination of the emergency. The Jordan Compact and Education Cannot Wait fund are good examples of high-level and effective coordination.

- **Quality:** Consider double-shifting as a strategy for rapid integration. Double-shifting can kick-start the integration process (e.g., Lebanon) but carries risks with reduced time on task. School-based, peer support helps less experienced teachers, as do scripted materials. Early integration of children aids in language learning. In Bangladesh, teachers are being deployed who are able to speak a dialect understood by Rohingya refugees.

- **Protection:** Support a range of strategies to make schools safe and accessible for vulnerable groups, including chaperoned walking to school (e.g., Jordan) village and female volunteers (e.g., Afghanistan). Work with specialist actors (e.g., Handicap International and Mercy Corps) to include children with disabilities. Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) Better Learning Programme (in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon) reduces the effects of trauma and improves well-being. International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) mobile support services better reach refugee girls and women in Lebanon.

- **Data:** Don’t ignore learning: use and adapt existing tools to measure learning. Existing tools (e.g., ASER, EGRA, EGMA) can be used to measure learning and assess needs. Determining and understanding the impact of refugee crises on learning outcomes (for both refugee and host children) will require more longitudinal or multi-year studies.

### Natural disasters

- **Politics:** Engage in the multi-sectoral response and ensure education is adequately included in immediate disaster assessments (e.g., Tanzania, Sierra Leone). Build a better case for preparedness and include education (e.g., Nepal’s Strengthening Disaster Resilience and Responding to Humanitarian Emergencies). DFID’s Humanitarian Reform Policy13 (Oct 2017) recognises the need to focus more on disaster preparedness, resilience and risk management to reduce subsequent dependency on humanitarian aid. Evidence shows that a pound invested in preparedness saves over two pounds in humanitarian aid, and increases the speed of the response.

- **Systems:** Support government to coordinate the response. Engage local actors, utilise their knowledge and motivation to restore services (e.g., Typhoon Haiyan, Philippines).

- **VfM:** Broker effective partnerships between government and non-state actors, invest in coordination structures that promote the visibility of government and build trust. Where possible, adapt existing programmes to support the response (e.g., Sierra Leone).

- **Quality:** Recover lost time through curriculum adaptation and scripted/structured support materials for teachers (e.g., Sierra Leone). Accelerated learning programmes can provide useful approaches that can be adapted for post-disaster recovery.

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13 Saving lives, building resilience, reforming the system: the UK Government’s Humanitarian Reform Policy, DFID, 2017
• **Protection:** Child friendly spaces can help young children overcome the trauma of disasters. In Sierra Leone, a DFID/UNICEF programme supported pregnant girls to continue education whilst schools were closed during the Ebola epidemic.

• **Data:** UNICEF’s EduTrac system uses SMS to secure real-time data from schools on a small range of key indicators (e.g., teacher and pupil attendance), and helped to monitor the “back to school” campaign in Sierra Leone.

## CONTEXT ONE: PROTRACTED CONFLICT

### INTRODUCTION

Protracted conflict involves periods of intense violence, often armed, causing instability and mass displacement. Civilian populations account for 90% of the victims of armed conflict worldwide. Armed conflict takes many forms and often purposely targets civilian populations (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Pakistan). Children and young people are repeatedly caught in the centre of these violent conflicts and are often the most vulnerable.

**Box 1: Newly displaced people**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Newly Displaced People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>922,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq:</td>
<td>659,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria:</td>
<td>501,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India:</td>
<td>448,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan:</td>
<td>281,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria:</td>
<td>824,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan:</td>
<td>653,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen:</td>
<td>478,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia:</td>
<td>296,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines:</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2016, there were 6.9 million newly displaced people, of which 38% were in sub-Saharan Africa and 30.7% were in the Middle East. The most recent conflict-related displacements in 2016 include:

- 1. DRC: 922,000
- 2. Syria: 824,000
- 3. Iraq: 659,000
- 4. Afghanistan: 653,000
- 5. Nigeria: 501,000
- 6. Yemen: 478,000
- 7. India: 448,000
- 8. Ethiopia: 296,000
- 9. South Sudan: 281,000
- 10. Philippines: 280,000

In 2016, there were 56 countries experiencing armed conflicts, with the vast majority occurring within their own borders (Box 1). As a result, over 40 million people have been affected by insecurity and displacement, with devastating impacts on children and education systems. The most significant of these effects on schools and children are: direct attacks; misuse of schools as military centres, barracks or munitions storage; recruitment into the military; increased violence against both boys and girls (including rape); loss of family and friends; and mass displacement.

There are multiple challenges in delivering education in the context of protracted conflict. The government’s own legitimacy may be compromised, and working with and through the state may not be possible in part or all of the country, including opposition held areas (as in the case of South Sudan). Pre-conflict fragility often results in education systems being weakened, with low levels of political and financial commitment, as well as weakened service delivery capacity. **The long-term aim is to build effective and resilient education systems; the short-term imperative is to stave off collapse.** Keeping schools going, ensuring the safety of children and staff, and realising the potential of schools as places of safety and hope become immediate priorities requiring diverse and flexible strategies.

This section examines delivering education in protracted conflict contexts under the six outcome areas: political settlements; accountability; cost-effectiveness; quality and learning; protection and inclusion; and data monitoring and evaluation.

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14 These figures do not include the estimated 600,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh
OUTCOME 1: POLITICAL CONSENSUS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, MULTI-LATERAL, BI-LATERAL AND NGOS ON THE INCLUSION OF EDUCATION IN THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Establishing a consensus on the importance of education and how to sustain delivery during violent conflict brings several key challenges. Strategies require getting to grips with an often complex and shifting political context. Getting education included in the initial response involves simultaneously working with and through different players (government, opposition, non-state actors) as well as with both development and humanitarian actors. Ensuring children are protected and schools can remain open and resourced, wherever possible, is critical to avoid further deterioration to the system.

Promising practice and strategies to consider:

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<tr>
<th>Adviser experience and evidence base</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Get education on the agenda at the start.</strong> In an OCHA analysis of 27 emergency needs assessment initiatives, none covered education in any depth. Education advisers need to be alive to the pressures of initial de-prioritising of education. Education should not be separated out. Actively engage in the initial Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and the Strategic Response Planning (SRP). Bring technical understanding to the response. The “Grand Bargain” commitment on Joint and Timely Needs Assessments can inform these processes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan: Education actors need to convince humanitarian actors of the value of education in an emergency. Provide clear and concrete messaging about education as an “entry point” and “platform” (via schools) for an integrated response. Another powerful message is that education is central to stabilisation through its ability to protect children (from violence and conscription) and stabilise communities. Clear messaging helps advisers in contexts dominated by humanitarian advisers who do not see education as a priority. The education donor group supports the education cluster in refining messages and negotiating with OCHA and the Humanitarian Country Team.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Invest in relationship-building.</strong> Build personal relationships with humanitarian colleagues and develop networks/alliances. Identify like-minded ‘allies’ as well as champions who will advocate for EiE. Work with and through multiple partners and approaches. This can involve working in opposition held areas with local governments and non-state actors.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protect schools and students from attack</strong> by designating schools as safe spaces. Use child rights and protection to advocate and support education in politically sensitive and difficult contexts - “We had to win people over, hosts might not like permanency, but children have rights and if you want to monitor child rights, unaccompanied kids, child marriage – school is all we have.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Global Coalition for Protection of Education from Attack (GCPEA) has identified several community-based strategies to protect schools, namely, demarcating schools as neutral spaces, negotiating with local combatants to keep schools safe, community patrols around schools, and protecting children walking to and from schools.</td>
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</table>

16 Assessment and Classification of Emergencies Project: Mapping of key emergency needs assessment and analysis initiatives, OCHA, 2009
17 Grand Bargain commitments, Agenda for Humanity, 2017
18 DFID Adviser comment
OUTCOME 2: EDUCATION SYSTEMS (INCLUDING STATE AND NON-STATE) STRENGTHENED TO ENSURE EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE EDUCATION SERVICES

In many protracted conflict contexts, the government’s human and financial resources are likely to be constrained. Pre-conflict political will and levels of investment in education are unlikely to be sustained during conflict and may decline further as conflict becomes protracted. Programming in is often humanitarian focused, which means that education responses are likely to be supported by non-state actors, input-based, centered largely on camps, using delivery systems that are outside of government. This results in fragmentation and a lack of government ownership. There are multiple and often perverse incentives within the humanitarian aid architecture that militate against strengthening systems to enable a more effective and accountable government-led response. Building a consensus that conflict is likely to be protracted, and that short-term humanitarian responses alone are likely to be insufficient can help bring longer-term planning on board.

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<tr>
<td><strong>Understand local actors/providers.</strong> Non-state providers, including the private sector, NGOs and faith-based organisations, are often major providers of education services in conflict and fragility. They can be more resilient than state structures and enjoy greater acceptance amongst communities. Develop programmes with them, in consultation with central government, regional and local authorities and communities (e.g., Save the Children in Somalia and Somaliland21). In DRC and Nepal, civil society and community schools have helped to keep the education system running through times of conflict.21</td>
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<td>**Strengthen the regulatory function of government, to avoid possible inequities that come through diverse providers: this can exacerbate inherent dynamics in the conflict in the first place and reinforce fragility (e.g., Nepal).**22</td>
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<td><strong>Agree to common standards, norms and principles for implementing partners and getting donors aligned behind these is a good starting point for a more coherent response.</strong> This is particularly important in maintaining consistency between what is offered in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps and in regular schools. Maintaining a degree of equity and fairness is important in preventing further damage to the education system (e.g., rates of pay or special allowances for teachers). This is a particular challenge where many implementing partners are operating, often at relatively small-scale in particular areas. Establishing equity in education provision plays an important role in mitigating a sense of exclusion and grievance which in turn can fuel further conflict. It is important to explore various options.</td>
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<td><strong>South Sudan: Through the Girls Education South Sudan (GESS) programme, DFID has supported government ownership and decision making in determining the amount and coverage of girls’ scholarships when demand outstripped available funds. Rather than leave the decision with the implementing partner (IP), the MoE took the equitable decision to pay all girls less, rather than pay fewer girls more. This was a calculated risk, but one that reinforced government leadership and ownership.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>In South Sudan from 2014-15, there was more effort on how to work better together between humanitarian and development actors. Both agreed on core principles that should be applied both to state schools in stable areas and to schools located in camps (rather than set up parallel or different standards for schools in camps). At the time, these principles were not underpinned by a strong framework or coherent strategy, but it was a work in progress, and progress was made. Further monitoring is needed to see the extent to which principles are adhered to.</strong></td>
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20 *Equitable Access to Basic Education for all Children*, Save the Children, 2017
21 *Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict Affected States*, World Bank, 2011
22 *Social Protection and basic services in conflict-affected situations*, ODI, 2012
23 *Capacity Development for Education Systems in Fragile Contexts*, Davies, 2009
(state and non-state) to work across all sides in conflict.

**OUTCOME 3: VALUE FOR MONEY ACHIEVED THROUGH EFFECTIVE COORDINATION IN FINANCING, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EDUCATION PROGRAMMES**

Humanitarian responses are frequently fragmented and expensive. They tend to be short-term, input-focused and delivered outside of government systems. The response can be dominated by UN agencies and INGOs through numerous and poorly coordinated initiatives. Coordination amongst partners varies considerably, but is frequently fraught and complicated by diverse interests. Competition for funding between NGOs does not improve coordination. Senior development partner staff are often located outside of the country with weak connections to the coordination mechanisms.

Promising practice and strategies to consider:

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<tr>
<td>Understand the different institutional arrangements and financing options of other active donors. This can be complex: the US and EU maintain separate humanitarian and development teams with distinct portfolios, remits and reporting lines. Other donors have integrated humanitarian and development structures at headquarters level, but few have extended this to country level.</td>
<td>South Sudan: DFID’s Girls Education South Sudan (GESS) programme has provided cash transfers to upper primary and secondary school girls (paid directly to the girls) linked to school attendance, as well as capitation grants to all schools to provide essential cash to meet running costs. Funding responsibility was shared with the government until an escalation of conflict in 2015 and the collapse of the economy. The GESS programme not only maintained girls’ enrolment in schools, but it continued to increase, despite the conflict. The capitation grants provided a lifeline to schools at a time when government financing dried up and payment of teachers’ salaries, already massively devalued by inflation, were paid intermittently. The grants played a major part in keeping schools open. Issues remain around long-term sustainability, though government’s earlier and substantial financial commitment to the grants suggests they will resume once the economy recovers.</td>
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<td>Establish clarity on the end goal of a programme. There is no standard, single approach to ensuring coordinated alignment and financing in protracted conflict: an effective response is highly dependent on context and requires quick and sound initial analysis. This will determine which aid instrument is most appropriate. Extending the use of humanitarian aid modalities to provide basic services, including education, beyond the short-term can undermine state-building, delay the long-term development of the education system as well as be poor value for money. Pooled fund mechanisms allow greater coordination across agencies and can encourage a more programmatic approach in crisis contexts (e.g., OCHA’s pooled Humanitarian Fund in DRC).</td>
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<td>Direct grants to schools are an effective aid instrument, and when used well, offer good value for money. Direct financing to schools may be taken on by government at a later stage on as part of the budgetary process.</td>
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OUTCOME 4: QUALITY EDUCATION IN EIE CONTEXTS IS DELIVERED WITH AN EMPHASIS ON TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, COMMUNITIES AND CURRICULUM

Protracted conflict often results in the forced displacement of large numbers of children and young people to safer areas of the country. Where IDPs are able to gain entry into a new school (either via camps or in their new area of settlement), resources are likely to be badly stretched: there will likely be a shortage of teachers, overcrowding, use of double-shifts, and a lack of learning materials. Education budgets are constrained as conflict diverts resources away from education. Therefore, salaries may not be paid, and funds are likely to dry up, leading to schools closing. Qualified teachers are essential in keeping schools open and ensuring learning; there is an increased reliance on unqualified, under-educated volunteer teachers who require substantial support to become effective.

Promising practice and strategies to consider:

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<tr>
<td>Work to support systems to keep teachers in place and teaching. Where budgets are constrained and salaries not paid, consider mechanisms for paying stipends to teachers and volunteers.</td>
<td>Paying teachers in South Sudan. In one hot conflict, 10,000 teacher stipends have kept over 700 schools open. This initiative reached a third of the children in opposition held areas who would not have been in school or with only a volunteer teacher. There was also support to volunteer or contract teachers, plus support to teachers during times of crisis; particularly when the MoE could not pay or their salaries would be worthless due to inflation. In South Sudan, many teachers have moved away to avoid conflict and schools have become reliant on volunteer teachers. Allowing a proportion of the school grant to be used to pay a small stipend proved a useful incentive. Support to all teachers, and unqualified lower-educated volunteers in particular, through materials and training have been essential in trying to maintain quality.</td>
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<td>Get basic resources and support to teachers. One-size fits all solutions offer instant solutions to the shortage of classroom resources in both camps or formal schools, but are costly. Locally-sourced basic materials, when available, can stimulate local business and provide better value for money. Highly- scripted lesson plans proved useful with unqualified and inexperienced teachers in Liberia. Where schools become isolated through conflict, radio programmes are able to reach teachers and learners. Africa Education Trust’s (AET) SOMDEL literacy programme in Somalia relied on radio instruction, incorporating general life skills to benefit not only pupils and teachers, but also a wider audience of listeners. Evidence from Afghanistan and DRC shows that a low-cost school-based peer support system, which brings experienced teachers and volunteers together, can be effective in increasing both morale and capacity.</td>
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<td>Focus on certification and examinations. Disruption during conflict has a further effect on children in or approaching critical examination years. Not only is learning disrupted, but children may not be able to sit the examinations: the opportunity for certification may never be recovered and the necessary passport to further education is lost.</td>
<td>In one hot conflict, the opposition education ministry held exams for grade 9 and 12 students but the exam was not internationally recognised. DFID approached the UK’s National Agency for the Recognition and Comparison of International Qualifications and skills (NARIC) to provide international benchmarked validation and advice on how to reach international standards. Although the body concluded that the exam could not be internationally benchmarked, they provided the MoE with concrete ways to improve.</td>
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26 Literacy education in conflict and crisis-affected contexts, Zakharia and Bartlett, 2014  
27 SOMDEL: Somali Distance Education Literacy Programme, Fentiman, 2003  
28 Preliminary impacts of the ‘Learning to Read in a Healing Classroom’ intervention on teacher well-being in the DRC, Wolf et al., 2015
OUTCOME 5: SCHOOLS ARE ENSURED AS SAFE SPACES THAT PROTECT CHILDREN AND ARE INCLUSIVE OF THE MOST VULNERABLE, PARTICULARLY GIRLS AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

Conflict has devastating effects on children’s lives, and heightens already existing challenges to reaching all children and ensuring their safety. Those most at risk during conflict are the more marginalised children: girls, children with disabilities, children from ethnic or religious minorities and children from the poorest segments of society. The challenge is to ensure schools are able to provide both sanctuary and continuity during conflict and are safe spaces that restore some sense of normalcy for all children.

Promising practice and strategies to consider:

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<tr>
<td><strong>Understand demand-side barriers.</strong> Establish what will incentivise parents to send their children to school in a protracted conflict context. Factors will be highly contextualised and may also vary over time, particularly as conflict spikes and recedes. This requires working in a cross-sectoral way.</td>
<td>In one hot conflict the ‘cash for work’ scheme included paying women to escort younger children to and from school, overcoming a concern over safety and incentivising attendance.</td>
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<td><strong>Child safeguarding</strong> needs to be in place, which requires the vetting and training of community workers and volunteers using transparent vetting criteria, codes of conduct and monitoring tools and reliable referral systems which are widely understood (e.g., Protection, Sexual Exploitation &amp; Abuse PSEA toolbox). These need to be simple and easy to understand.</td>
<td>In Afghanistan, village-based schools reduced distances to travel and improved girls’ access and achievements. Placing schools in close proximity to households increased parents’ willingness to allow their girls to travel alone. However, after primary schooling, gender gaps in enrolment persisted, most likely due to other cultural norms such as early marriage.</td>
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<td><strong>Psycho-social programmes</strong> can promote resilience and better cognitive function in children and young people affected by crises. Promising interventions include teacher training in DRC on “Learning to Read in a Healing Classroom” and creating after extra-curricular clubs in state schools that use teachers and community members to emulate the aims, activities and outcomes of child friendly spaces often found in camps. The Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) materials and model for teacher training has demonstrated positive psychosocial outcomes for children.</td>
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<td><strong>Teachers also experience trauma</strong> and have economic and survival needs in times of conflict. There is some evidence that links teachers’ own well-being to their effectiveness in the classroom, so it is important to include psycho-social aspects in support and training programmes.</td>
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29 Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Tools, 2017
30 Preliminary impacts of the ‘Learning to Read in a Healing Classroom’ intervention on teacher well-being in the DRC, Wolf et al., 2015
31 School-based intervention in ongoing crisis: lessons from a psychosocial & trauma-focused approach in Gaza schools, Schultz et al., 2016
32 What Works to Promote Children’s Educational Access, Quality of Learning and Wellbeing in Crisis-Affected Contexts, Burde et al., 2015
33 Bringing education to Afghan Girls: A randomised controlled trial of village-based schools, Burde and Linden, 2013
OUTCOME 6: RELIABLE AND RELEVANT DATA IS COLLECTED AND USED TO DESIGN EIE PROGRAMMES AND MONITOR THEIR IMPACT ON BENEFICIARIES

Securing reliable, comprehensive and timely educational data during conflict is a major challenge. National-level data systems, which may already be weak, can quickly become dysfunctional and data become unavailable during protracted conflict. Frequently, no data are available in conflict-affected areas. Coverage may be partial, restricted to government or government-aided schools and not from private, alternative, or community schools. There is therefore a heavy reliance on alternative sources of data from a range of sources, principally NGO implementing programmes. This often suffers from a lack of standardisation of indicators which restricts accuracy. In changing and volatile contexts, data quickly goes out of date.

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<tr>
<td>Advisers need to be alive to the need to pull in data from a wide variety of sources, including official figures and disparate reports from implementing agencies. Coordination of data across sectors (e.g., health, WASH) is poor and a missed opportunity. Since 2015 the Southern Turkey Education Cluster has stepped up efforts to report attacks on schools, information that is critical in understanding the changing needs.</td>
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<td>In DRC, attempts to use UNICEF’s EduTrac system to capture core information on attendance, teacher’s pay etc., have had partial success, but the predominant mode remains paper-based and patchy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>There is a need to establish common protocols around indicators and sharing of data. This is poorly done generally and implementing partners are often reluctant to share information. Securing reliable information on non-camp IDPs is problematic: 80% of IDPs are in urban, non-camp settings. Data is often not sufficiently disaggregated at a local level.</td>
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<td>The GESS programme in South Sudan has developed the South Sudan School Attendance Monitoring System (SSSAMS). This allows schools to use mobile phone SMS technology to report real-time enrolment data. This has proved an invaluable source of data in the current absence of an effective EMIS and enabled good estimations on school attendance during conflict. The main limitations are network coverage, the current inability to integrate this within the Ministry of Education’s existing (and severely stretched) EMIS arrangements, and high costs. Self-reported data still requires verification by local agents (sub-national government officials and/or implementing partners) through school visits.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase the focus on education quality. Data on attendance, retention and drop-out is vital. Use and adapt existing tools to measure learning. There are a number of tools (e.g., ASER, EGRA, EGMA) that can be adapted to context to measure learning and assess needs. Determining and understanding the impact of conflict on learning outcomes requires more longitudinal or multi-year studies, if possible.</td>
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<td>ICT has provided innovative real-time collection of data on teacher and student attendance, teacher pay and school fees. Within Syria, the Mobenzi app on smart phones can be used to collect education data then erases it once it is sent to protect the user.</td>
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</tr>
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34 Schools under attack in Syria, Syria Response Education Cluster, 2015
35 Technologies for monitoring in insecure environments, Dette et al., 2016
37 South Sudan School Attendance Monitoring System, SSSAMS, 2017
**CONTEXT TWO: REFUGEE CRISES**

**INTRODUCTION**

UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation where 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five or more years in a given asylum country. UNHCR estimates that the average length of a major protracted refugee situations is now 26 years. Twenty-three of the 32 protracted refugee situations at the end of 2015 have lasted for more than 20 years. Moreover, once refugees have been displaced for six months they have a high-probability of being displaced for at least three years. Refugees facing protracted displacement often suffer from a lack of physical security, legal status and protection of their fundamental human rights. Their presence can also lead to tensions with the local population and to the exacerbation of regional conflicts.

**Box 2: Scale of the refugee crisis from the Syria conflict**

To date, the Syrian crisis has resulted in over 5 million UNHCR registered Syrian refugees, 3 million in Turkey and 2 million in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. There are over 30,000 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa, and increasing numbers in Europe. There are currently 5,453 Syrian refugees in the UK, out of a commitment to accept up to 20,000. There are almost 1.7 million registered school-age Syrian refugee children in the five host countries. Less than 10% of Syrian refugees are in camps. The full scale of the Syrian refugee crisis is far greater; these figures do not include refugees not registered with UNHCR. In Jordan, for example, whilst there are around 655,000 registered Syrian refugees, an estimated 700,000 are unregistered and do not receive formal support from humanitarian aid.

In 2016 there were an estimated 65.6 million forcibly displaced people globally, of which 22.5 million were refugees. Over half (55%) of refugees come from just three countries – Syria, Afghanistan and South Sudan. There were over 10 million newly displaced people in 2016; in the same year just over half a million refugees returned home. Over half of displaced persons are children. Children are amongst the most vulnerable, at real risk of being left behind. Refugee children are five times more likely to be out of school than non-refugee children. Just over half have access to primary education, but only 22 per cent have the chance to attend secondary school, and just one per cent attend university.

The benefits of education, to individuals as well as to societies at large are just as valid, if not more so, for refugee children and young people, as they are for those in more stable contexts. Education can strengthen resilience and open up prospects for a better life; it is an essential to a pathway out of crisis. Education for refugees is essential to ensure they become skilled professionals to rebuild their country on return. Education can help protect already vulnerable boys and girls, can contribute to some sense of normacy in disrupted lives and offer psychosocial support at a time of trauma. Education has a stabilising effect, helping build more cohesive, tolerant and peaceful societies, as well as countering discrimination. Conversely, failing to educate a generation of young people runs a high risk of perpetuating inequality, fueling greater grievance that leads back into conflict.

In 2016, UN member states came together to agree a new approach to refugee crisis response. The ‘Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework’ (CRRF) sets out the framework for a UN-led international agreement, the Global Refugee Compact, due for adoption in 2018. DFID is leading efforts to ensure that this global refugee compact embeds a development-focused, more comprehensive, international approach that provides refugees with the long-term opportunities they need, including education. This section examines

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38 [Syria Regional Refugee Response](https://www.unocha.org/syria), Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, 2017
protracted refugee contexts under the six outcome areas: political settlements; accountability; cost-effectiveness; quality and learning; protection and inclusion; and data, monitoring and evaluation.
OUTCOME 1: POLITICAL CONSENSUS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, MULTI-LATERAL, BI-LATERAL AND NGOS ON THE INCLUSION OF EDUCATION IN THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Mainstreaming refugees into host country schools is the preferred global response as this approach has several advantages, including accountability, standardisation, and recognised certification of educational opportunities. However, host governments may be reluctant to take on the long-term liability for refugee education (e.g., Kenya). Only two-thirds (16 of 24) of UNHCR priority countries allow refugees full access to their education systems, though accept externally funded camps. Integrating refugees into host country systems, many already over-stretched, can be politically difficult amidst fear of the effects on the education of host country children (e.g., Lebanon where refugee pupils outnumber Lebanese pupils). This can fuel resentment. There can also be a disconnect between a host government’s focus on formal education and the more flexible approaches required to address the needs of more mobile refugees.

Promising practice and strategies to consider:

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| **Use political settlement analysis/political economy analysis** to understand the politics and motivations behind key actors: government, donors, the UN and NGOs – all of whom are driven by different political incentives and institutional preferences.  

**Identify like-minded “allies”** as well as champions in host governments who will advocate for inclusion of refugees into host country education systems.  

**Understand the dynamics and possible tensions between home and host country systems.** These will have to be considered when negotiating curriculum, examination, language of instruction etc. (e.g., negotiations around exams for Burundian refugees in Tanzania in 2015).  

**Donor support can incentivise policy shifts to include refugees** in host nation education plans and open up access to mainstream education (e.g., Jordan and Ethiopia Compacts) in preference to parallel systems. |
| **Jordan:** The UK’s hosting and championing of the Syria Conference (Feb 2016), with its high-level international political backing, resulted in the **Jordan Compact**. This catalysed a focus on education and initiated a rapid and substantial multi-donor investment in Jordan’s education system. High-level, cross-mission backing from the King of Jordan, UK Prime Minister, UK Ambassador and head of office was critical in securing buy-in and sustaining momentum. Programme development involved establishing a pooled fund supported by seven donors. This was a major financing innovation, combining both humanitarian and development funds. It required flexibility and a willingness to change from traditional modalities as well as compromise around earlier commitments.  

**Lebanon:** in 2014 the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), with financial support from donors, launched the Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) programme, which opened 238 double-shift schools to accommodate Syrian refugees. It ensured that school fees were eliminated for both Lebanese and refugee children. A Programme Management Unit (PMU) was established to coordinate refugee policy response and implementation. In 2016, the MEHE also issued its Non-Formal Education (NFE) Framework: this aimed to consolidate and regulate non-state actors who provide remedial classes, language support, community outreach, etc. Delays in Framework implementation and threat of closures have led to tensions with some NFE organisations and actors. |

43 UNHCR Education Strategy, 2012-16, UNHCR, 2012  
44 Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises, ODI, 2015  
45 How does political context shape education reforms and their success? ODI, 2016  
46 Refugee Education: A Global Review, UNHCR, 2011  
47 Urban Refugee Education: Strengthening Policies and Practices for Access, Quality and Inclusion, Mendenhall et al., 2017  
48 Ibid
OUTCOME 2: EDUCATION SYSTEMS (INCLUDING STATE AND NON-STATE) STRENGTHENED TO ENSURE EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE EDUCATION SERVICES

There are multiple and often perverse incentives within the existing system of responding to emergencies that undermine approaches to strengthening government systems and leadership. Competition amongst NGOs to deliver donor programmes often bypasses government and establishes alternative delivery channels and reporting and accountability structures. The imperative to act quickly can make it difficult to start from a systems-strengthening approach. Host government education systems can be overwhelmed by the stress placed on their education systems, especially exacerbated by an influx of people into already poorly served areas (e.g., Northern Uganda, Bangladesh).

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<tr>
<td>Government-led responses working within national systems are more sustainable and can contribute to national unity. Effective capacity development is cross-sectoral, grounded in conflict analysis and accounts for the political context around equity and rights. It can target individuals, systems and institutions.</td>
<td>Lebanon: DFID’s support to the education sector is built on the principle of promoting government ownership. The Business Case found that providing further support non-formal education provision to Syrian refugees was not the preferred option as it is too ‘reliant on continued emergency funding to support its quasi-parallel delivery systems threatening sustainability’. The preferred option, developed in partnership with the World Bank, is to support the Lebanese education system to integrate Syrian refugee children through a double-shift system. The programme supports the government to meet the added costs through materials and grants, as well as adapting the sector strategy in recognition of the policy shift.</td>
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<td>Focus on equity over efficiency in refugee education planning and delivery. Equity promotes social cohesion and peacebuilding; inequitable service delivery can fuel tensions. Longer-term systems approaches have more lasting impact. Accept that this comes at a cost.</td>
<td>Jordan: both donors and the MoE have built on or adapted what was already in the system. For example, donors adopted tools already established by the EC. This provided a ready-made platform for joined advocacy and approaches that donors could prioritise. Similarly, most certified non-formal education programmes and ones that focus on remedial education were used or adapted for accelerated education for refugees. For example, the MoE’s ‘Drop-out Programme’ covers primary in two years and is being expanded to include refugees.</td>
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<td>Work with actors who already have proven and relevant programmes, e.g., the USAID Questscope programme in Jordan was adapted for over-age Syrian refugees.</td>
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<td>Hold donor only meetings to enable joined up thinking and agree coherent messages and approaches in dealing with government. Open these meetings to the key implementing partners and multilaterals to reduce mixed messaging.</td>
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<td>Provide technical assistance to host governments: in Jordan, the technical capacity of the MoE for financial planning and reporting struggled to cope with the demands of donors. Technical assistance helped resolve this.</td>
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49 Dealing with fragile states: entry points and approaches for development cooperation, Debiel, 2005
50 The Political Economy of Education Systems in Conflict-Affected Contexts, Novelli et al., 2014
51 USAID Non-Formal Education Programme, USAID, 2017
52 Emergency Education System Stabilisation Programme for Lebanon, Business Case, DFID, 2014
OUTCOME 3: VALUE FOR MONEY ACHIEVED THROUGH EFFECTIVE COORDINATION IN FINANCING, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EDUCATION PROGRAMMES

Coordination is often hampered in emergency settings by the fact that humanitarian actors and development actors have not shared a common coordinating structure or a coherent approach. Humanitarian assistance for refugees is expensive and does not build systems for the longer term. The key challenge is how to get humanitarian and development actors working together.

Promising practice and strategies to consider:

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<tr>
<th>Adviser experience and evidence base</th>
<th>Country examples and case studies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinated implementation leads to more effective programme outputs, but the link to improved VfM is more assumed than proven. The literature discusses coordinated financing, planning and implementation, evaluates models and recommends good practice, but lacks evidence on VfM.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consider resourcing/funding key coordination groups, such as the intersectoral coordination group in Lebanon, to ensure there is a voice to represent education and argue its case for inclusion as a first response.</td>
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<td>Don’t focus solely on emergency coordination in the donor group. Look at the whole sector (as in Jordan) or establish an NGO coordination forum for education development, not just humanitarian work (as in South Sudan).</td>
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<td>Invest long-term. This includes smarter use of existing development funding that provides longer-term predictability. Consider new innovative financing mechanisms such as matching community contributions, poverty focus in school grant funding, and the Education Cannot Wait fund.</td>
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<td>Prioritise putting agreements in place so certified education is recognised across borders and support efforts for international accreditation (e.g., Somalia, Kenya). Consider payment of exam fees and transport provision, a lack of which may exclude refugee children from key examinations and reduce impact of investments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan: After a series of high-profile events, education became a joined-up political commitment following the Syria Conference (Feb 2016). This forced countries to work together to support Syrian refugees and donors quickly initiated the Jordan Compact. In order to be successful, humanitarian and development actors had to work together, and with this momentum, the UK was able to get other partners to work more strategically and in support of government. Strong and coordinated donor action made things happen and others fell in line. DFID is currently co-chairing the education donor group with Germany - a positive partnership that isn’t just focusing on refugees but focusing on the whole sector.</td>
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<td>Ethiopia: The Education Cannot Wait (ECW) fund, launched in 2016, aims to bring together humanitarian and development actors to deliver a more ambitious, integrated education response in emergencies. To date, ECW has gained high-level commitment from a number of aid organisations and donors (of which DFID is one, with a commitment of £30 million). The fund’s current work in Ethiopia is supporting a gradual integration of refugee education into the national system. Activities include providing new facilities for forcibly displaced children and their host communities, making quality improvements to existing schools, and recruiting and training hundreds of new teachers and officials.</td>
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OUTCOME 4: QUALITY EDUCATION IN EIE CONTEXTS IS DELIVERED WITH AN EMPHASIS ON TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, COMMUNITIES AND CURRICULUM

Integrating refugee children into government schools presents multiple challenges including overcrowding, reduced time in school when double-shifting is adopted (as well as double teaching shifts), pressure on
stretched resources as well as language, cultural, and religious differences. These factors impact on the quality of learning. Pressure from host communities at what they perceive as a reduction in the quality of service for their children needs to be carefully managed, and runs the risk of squeezing the time available for refugee education (e.g., Jordan, Lebanon). What about education in camps where refugees are unable to access mainstream education?

Promising practice and strategies to consider:

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<tr>
<td>A double-shift system for refugee students using host teachers expands access to certified primary and secondary education within the host nation system. It is intended as a short-term fix that requires working with government to support the budget to expand access for refugee students. A double-shift system should include a longer-term solution of integration into a single-shift with a full timetable, a reduction in class sizes, and building the capacity of the system.</td>
<td>In Palestinian refugee camps, UNWRA use a satellite TV programme to support literacy and numeracy in the early grades. Edtech solutions are still in their infancy but a World Refugee School being piloted in Jordan and Lebanon has MoE-approved content on a cloud-based platform to provide remedial support to refugee students and may have potential.</td>
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<td>Ongoing, school-based teacher training using a teacher-centred approach combined with teacher instructional guides and teacher learning circles (TLC) has a significant positive impact on teachers with the fewest years of experience. TLCs using WhatsApp has proven to motivate teachers in Dadaab refugee camp, Kenya. Training needs include new languages, curricula, managing overcrowding and providing psycho-social support to refugees.</td>
<td>Interventions to support language include bridging classes, some online platforms, and using refugee volunteers to support language in class particularly with young children. In Bangladesh, BRAC are recruiting and training teachers from the host community who speak a dialect of Bengali understood by Rohingya pupils. World Bank research in Jordan on formal schools found that increased monitoring of teachers by the principal resulted in more time on task by teachers and had a positive impact on learning outcomes. Investing in training and support for school management, staff and governance structures are a cost-effective means to increase learning outcomes.</td>
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<td>Rapid qualification and cross-border recognition of teaching qualifications. Due to the demand for more teachers, many teachers may be unqualified or not qualified in their host country. UNHCR suggests developing sequential teacher training programmes with host governments that result in completion of a basic qualification over a condensed period of time. It is also important to create flexible pathways for deployment of qualified refugee teachers that would serve both host and refugee communities, particularly for the purposes of integration, repatriation or resettlement.</td>
<td>A study in Liberia, where approximately 60% of primary school teachers do not have any certification or teacher training, found that teachers were unable to follow week-by-week outlines of lesson plans and instead required daily scripted lesson plans, which produced effective results in students’ learning outcomes. However, barriers to success included the high cost of such support, which is likely to be prohibitive in many conflict- and disaster-affected contexts.</td>
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57 What works to promote children’s educational access, quality of learning and wellbeing in crisis-affected contexts, Burde et al., 2015  
58 Preliminary impacts of the ‘Learning to Read in a Healing Classroom’ intervention on teacher wellbeing in the DRC, Wolf et al., 2015  
59 UNHCR Education Strategy, 2012-16, UNHCR, 2012  
60 Urban Refugee Education: Strengthening Policies and Practices for Access, Quality and Inclusion, Mendenhall et al., 2017  
61 World Refugee School, 2017  
62 Literacy education in conflict and crisis-affected contexts, Zakharia and Bartlett, 2014
OUTCOME 5: SCHOOLS ARE ENSURED AS SAFE SPACES THAT PROTECT CHILDREN AND ARE INCLUSIVE OF THE MOST VULNERABLE, PARTICULARLY GIRLS AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

Refugee crises can have devastating effects on children’s lives, and further exacerbate challenges to providing inclusive education and child protection. The children who are most affected by exclusion and protection issues during these crises are typically the most marginalised children in the community, such as girls, children with disabilities, children from ethnic or religious minorities and children from the poorest segments of society.

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<td><strong>Focus on approaches which ensure protection</strong>, either through making formal schools safer, or finding alternative ways of delivering education services. Alternative buildings need to be quickly assessed for safety and suitability with emergency exit mechanisms put in place. Home-based and community schools often offer good security for children, staff and facilities.</td>
<td>Providing cash transfers to vulnerable groups and flexible education has proven to increase access for those involved in child labour or domestic duties, particularly girls. Examples include, UNICEF’s child cash grant in Jordan for Syrian children and GESS cash transfers for girls in South Sudan.</td>
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<td><strong>Distance to school is a major barrier</strong> for young children, girls and children with disabilities. Building more schools at village level or providing a transport system, has positive effects on access and achievement particularly for girls, as can having female volunteers in classes supporting male teachers.63</td>
<td>Provide social cohesion programmes such as mixed host/refugee summer remedial programmes and chaperoned walking to school routes, such as the Malala programme in refugee camps in Jordan.65</td>
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<td><strong>Working with specialist actors</strong>, such as Handicap international or Mercy Corp, to support children and youth with disabilities can have had a dramatic impact on their inclusion and provide advice to other education actors.</td>
<td>Providing teacher training on gender and inclusion has had positive effects in Northern Uganda whilst using disabled trainers and teachers increased disabled children/youth participation in community schools in Afghanistan.66</td>
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<td><strong>Bringing Gender Based Violence (GBV) response/support direct to beneficiaries</strong> has positive effects, such as IRC’s mobile support services for Syrian girls and women in urban areas in Lebanon.64</td>
<td>NRC’s Better Learning Programme used in formal schools in Gaza and refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon has had positive effects on refugee children’s wellbeing, particularly with regard to reducing nightmares and improving sleep patterns leading to better attention in class.67</td>
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63 Bringing education to Afghan girls: a randomised controlled trial of village-based schools, Burde and Linden, 2013


65 Malala Fund, 2017

66 Inclusive and Child-Friendly Education in Afghanistan: Success Stories, UNESCO, 2010

67 School-based intervention in ongoing crisis: lessons from a psychosocial & trauma-focused approach in Gaza schools, Schultz et al., 2016
OUTCOME 6: RELIABLE AND RELEVANT DATA IS COLLECTED AND USED TO DESIGN EIE PROGRAMMES AND MONITOR THEIR IMPACT ON BENEFICIARIES

There is a general lack of data on refugee educational pathways, attendance, retention and learning outcomes. Official administrative data (typically from the Education Management Information System (EMIS)) often do not identify pupils as refugees. This prevents gaining a better understanding of their location and needs that can inform education programming. Data on refugees in urban environments is particularly problematic, as many may not be formally registered as refugees. Donors and UN projects typically do not fund work with unregistered refugees unless they are in the formal system.

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<td><strong>OpenEMIS</strong> is an Open Source Education Management Information System (EMIS) that can be customised to the refugee needs of different countries. In Jordan, the existing system was customised in 2014 as ‘OpenEMIS Refugees’, to track educational data of Syrian refugee children. In 2016 the system was rolled out as OpenEMIS to cover all schools in Jordan as part of a restructuring of the country’s EMIS. ⁶⁸</td>
<td>Both UNICEF and UNHCR have data collection systems that implementing partners are required to complete. For example, the UNICEF Bayanati system ⁷⁰ in Jordan collects fully disaggregated data for individual children receiving education with UNICEF support, and a standardised reporting system for multiple implementing partners. There are also good practices around using standard tools for data collection led by the education cluster even though they are time consuming.</td>
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<td><strong>Having a good relationship with partners</strong> can provide informal factual accounts that are important in developing the broader picture. Security concerns frequently prohibit field visits, using a national third party to conduct research is a way to compensate for this restriction.</td>
<td>The London Conference on <em>Syria and the Brussels conference in 2017</em> were both catalysts for collecting data from a variety of sources (MoE, UNICEF, IPs and Department of statistics) to provide a complete picture of the situation. Data is often held by a variety of people or organisations with different political affiliations. Thus, global or regional events can act as a means to request and collect quality data.</td>
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<td><strong>Determining and understanding impact of refugee crises on learning outcomes (for both refugee and host children) will require more longitudinal or multi-year studies.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Use and adapt existing tools to measure learning.</strong> There are a number of tools (e.g., ASER, EGRA, EGMA) that can be adapted to context to measure learning and assess needs (e.g., Syria, Afghanistan and Jordan).</td>
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<td><strong>The certification of learning achievements for refugee and IDP children remains a technical and political challenge,</strong> and solutions are very context-specific. A World Bank review found some recommendations and e-learning pilots to develop standardised competency-based indicators of learning achievement to overcome this challenge. ⁶⁹</td>
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⁶⁸ [OpenEMIS, UNESCO, 2017](#)

⁶⁹ [ICT and the Education of Refugees: A stocktaking of innovative approaches in the MENA region, World Bank, 2016](#)

CONTEXT THREE: NATURAL DISASTERS

INTRODUCTION

Natural disasters are defined as sudden, often unpredictable, adverse events resulting from the earth’s natural processes causing significant disruption to human activity. The main types are: geological (earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides), hydrological (floods, tsunamis) and meteorological (cyclones, hurricanes, droughts). Sudden onset epidemics, such as the Ebola crisis in West Africa, are also considered as natural disasters. What links all of these and turns a natural event into a disaster is the immediate and lasting impact it has on populations. Though the majority of natural disasters are sudden and short-lived events with devastating initial impacts, their effects are frequently felt for prolonged periods.

Box 3: The frequency of natural disasters

The frequency of natural disasters has increased steadily over the past one hundred years, from 9 in 1902 to 153 in 2015. Before 1970, the average number of natural disasters was just 1.5 per year. Between 1970 and 2013 there were an estimated 3.3 million deaths resulting from natural disasters, 95% of which were in developing countries. Since 2000, an estimated 2.7 billion people have been affected by natural disasters, 98% in developing countries. Average annual disaster-related displacement is over 20 million. IDMC estimates three-quarters of internal displacement worldwide is the result of natural disasters. The total cost of natural disasters is variously estimated to be between $60bn and $90bn a year.

Children and youth often make up more than half of affected populations and they are particularly vulnerable to the immediate and longer-term effects of natural disasters. The literature confirms that two over-arching priorities for children in natural disasters begin to restore a sense of normalcy to their lives, by reuniting them with family and their community, and by getting them back to school.

However, the closure of damaged schools frequently becomes longer-term as reconstruction takes time and alternatives may not be accessible to all. Displaced children may not be able to easily access education in host communities, many of which already experience high demand and low levels of service. Prolonged effects on health, lack of food and clean water affect children’s participation and achievement in school. The psychological effects on children of loss of family, friends, homes and possessions, as well as the trauma of displacement, can be long-lasting. The shocks to family livelihood and income impact children, one consequence being withdrawal from school through the inability to meet opportunity costs and the increased need for children to work. Girls become more susceptible to sexual exploitation and early marriage.

DFID’s Humanitarian Reform Policy (Oct 2017) recognises the need to focus more on disaster preparedness, resilience and risk management to reduce subsequent dependency on humanitarian aid. Evidence shows that a pound invested in preparedness saves over two pounds in humanitarian aid, and increases the speed of the response.

This chapter examines the challenges, experiences and promising practice of delivering education services in the aftermath of natural disasters under the six outcome areas: political settlements; accountability; cost-effectiveness; quality and learning; protection and inclusion; and data monitoring and evaluation.

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71 **DFID Humanitarian Policy Consultation**, DFID, 2016
73 **Internal Displacement Update**, IDMC, 2017
74 **Saving lives, building resilience, reforming the system: the UK Government’s Humanitarian Reform Policy**, DFID, 2017
OUTCOME 1: POLITICAL CONSENSUS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, MULTI-LATERAL, BI-LATERAL AND NGOS ON THE INCLUSION OF EDUCATION IN THE EMERGENCY

Education is often insufficiently prioritised within the immediate humanitarian-led response which typically focusses on water, food, shelter and disease control. Undamaged schools are often adopted as relief centres. The immediate benefits of functioning schools are often missed. Already weak governments may struggle to assert leadership in the face of a sudden and massive influx of humanitarian agencies, even where maintenance of education provision is an agreed priority.

Promising practice and strategies to consider:

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<tr>
<td>Ensure that education is adequately included in immediate needs assessments and the “loss” is used to advocate for immediate action. “Where credible physical, social and economic assessments are available, countries ultimately mobilise more assistance than otherwise”.75 In Tanzania, DFID, jointly with the government of the Netherlands, funded an assessment of damage to education infrastructure following the 2016 earthquake.76</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Participate constructively in the multi-sectoral response.</strong> Focus on the offer as much as the ask. Education expertise may be lacking in the immediate response; education advisers need to bring detailed knowledge of the sector, including standards, unit costs, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Build a better case for preparedness.</strong> Ensure education is adequately covered in multi-sectoral Disaster Risk Reduction business cases. Education is usually mentioned, but little by way of proposed activity or allocation of resources is given. In disaster-prone countries, ensure resilience and contingency are part of education business cases. Ensure government’s education sector policy, plans and budgets include strengthening capacity for resilience and disaster preparedness.</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone: Prioritising education in the Ebola response. The Ebola outbreak of 2014-15 forced the closure of schools for nine months. Many schools were adapted as treatment centres. Education was one of seven sectors prioritised under the Presidential Recovery Plan. The weight of presidential backing moved initial reluctance at the top levels of the Ministry of Education. The political momentum was important, and an impending general election further motivated government to demonstrate success.</td>
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<td>Much was gained from this experience, not just in the immediate response but in more routine ways of working (e.g., focusing on key priorities and results, coordination and reporting, securing and using data). This enabled a strong government-led response to the devastating mudslide of August 2017 (see also Outcome 6).</td>
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<td>DFID Nepal’s Strengthening disaster resilience and responding to humanitarian emergencies is a good example where a component is devoted exclusively to the education sector (see Outcome 2).</td>
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75 Response to the Haiti Earthquake: Evaluative lessons, IEG, 2010
76 Tanzania Earthquake: Kagera Region Damaged Schools, Map Action, 2016
OUTCOME 2: EDUCATION SYSTEMS (INCLUDING STATE AND NON-STATE) STRENGTHENED TO ENSURE EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE EDUCATION SERVICES

Even relatively strong education systems can become overwhelmed by the sudden shock of a natural disaster; the impact is greater on weaker systems. The immediate humanitarian response frequently bypasses normal government delivery systems and relies on its own range of separate, parallel systems. Whilst initially this may be inevitable, reliance on separate humanitarian relief is unsustainable and can undermine government systems and the longer-term development process. Wherever feasible there is a need to transition quickly to a government-led, development-focussed approach.

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<tr>
<td>Focus and support government’s capacity to coordinate the response above their ability to deliver. The strong central authority of the Philippines government co-chaired the cluster and led the national response to cyclone Haiyan. Education was given priority. The approach was embedded within existing government systems, avoiding the creation of parallel priorities, approaches and standards.</td>
<td>Sierra Leone: The Ministry Education established a Back to School Coordination Unit to lead the Ebola recovery process. This was supported by DFID, through an existing World Bank MDTF, and UNICEF. The delivery structure, monitoring and reporting worked through the Ministry’s line departments. The result: within months of re-opening pre-Ebola enrolment levels were surpassed, and a resurgent momentum and confidence established within the Ministry of Education. Effective central control with the Ministry allowed a softening of previously quite hostile relationships with NGOs, turning grudging acceptance into productive partnerships that were able to deliver front line services.</td>
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<td>Engage local actors. The value of engaging local actors is often overlooked, in favour of bigger and more powerful national or international players. Local actors are often part of the affected communities giving them an acute understanding of needs, and ability to organise local communities. They are often able to more easily engage with authorities than more remote national or international actors, and often carry a higher level of acceptance and neutrality.</td>
<td>Nepal: education as part of a multi-sectoral approach to building resilience. DFID’s Strengthening Disaster Resilience in Nepal Programme (£42m 2016-2023) is a multi-sectoral programme including a component focused on education including the seismic retrofitting of schools, awareness raising of children and communities in disaster preparedness, and working with youth to promote positive messaging on disaster risk reduction. Education is recognised as one of Nepal’s “islands of leadership” in disaster management. However, change around risk reduction requires resources and commitment. In Nepal, a national Building Code was introduced in 2003: at the time of the 2015 earthquakes only a quarter of Nepal’s 191 municipalities has begun implementation.</td>
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| Focus on building resilience. The Tabasco floods (2007) produced a step change in Mexico’s disaster risk reduction efforts, supporting a wide range of resilience activities across different sectors including education where the focus has been on creating safe schools. A National Disaster Fund (FONDEN) was established specifically to provide immediate funding for damaged public infrastructure, including schools, until insurance compensation is received. | FONDEN: Mexico’s National Disaster Fund, World Bank, 2013

77 Local actors refer to individuals, communities, faith and community based organisations and indigenous CSOs
78 Localising humanitarianism: improving effectiveness through inclusive action, ODI, 2015
79 FONDEN: Mexico’s National Disaster Fund, World Bank, 2013
80 Strengthening Disaster Resilience in Nepal: Business Case, DFID, 2016
OUTCOME 3: VALUE FOR MONEY ACHIEVED THROUGH EFFECTIVE COORDINATION IN FINANCING, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EDUCATION PROGRAMMES

The immediate surge of support from a wide range of agencies in the immediate aftermath of a major disaster can overwhelm already stressed government capacity. The presence of multiple actors can create contesting priorities and follow divergent approaches which lead to inefficiencies. In extreme cases, such as the Haiti earthquake of 2005, coordination mechanisms were overwhelmed by the high number of NGOs responding, a situation worsened by an ineffective government and the extent of physical damage to infrastructure. Pooled and simplified financing mechanisms are difficult to arrange quickly and there is need for quick draw-down and contingency facilities. These challenges are felt across all sectors and therefore call for a multi-sector response.

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<tr>
<td><strong>Sector capacity is critical and varies country by country.</strong> The Ethiopian government have demonstrated capacity to deal with food security but not with education during the El Nino drought crisis. Education lacked a clear response strategy; consequently, it was unable to attract resources and unable to take action.</td>
<td>In Sierra Leone, there were poor relationships between the Ministry of Education and NGOs prior to the onset of the Ebola crisis, with low levels of trust and communication. NGOs played a major role in the fight to eradicate Ebola and in the recovery - they were essential implementing partners. To improve coordination, the Ministry instigated a monthly forum, chaired by the Minister, that brought together all implementing NGOs, as well as major donors. This provided a valuable information exchange, helped to improve relationships and increased the government’s sense of control. UNICEF provided the secretariat function to limit the transaction burden on the Ministry.</td>
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<td><strong>Support the development of partnerships between non-state actors and government.</strong> An effective response to a natural disaster requires considerable support from non-state actors. Governments can be fearful of the possible loss of authority and control, particularly where that is already quite weak. This applies at both central and local levels. Promoting the coordination function and visibility of government (national and sub-national) by helping to consolidate networks and coalitions amongst non-state actors improves partnerships.</td>
<td>In Pakistan, the 2005 Earthquake was seen as an opportunity for profit. There was much internal competition for funding amongst NGOs, which did not improve coordination or transparency - there was a confusing number of fora. Isolated regions (e.g., Kashmir) had previously very limited experience of foreign NGOs. The frequent and high turn-over of humanitarian staff did not help coordination or relationship-building.</td>
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<td><strong>Use flexible and adaptable programming.</strong> In Sierra Leone, DFID re-aligned an existing programme of NGO-support to education to respond to the immediate “back to school” priorities of the government in the immediate aftermath of Ebola, enabling a quick and seamless transition to new priorities. The ongoing World Bank-managed MDTF however, proved less flexible and responsive, partly on account of being managed from Washington, and was prematurely shut-down.</td>
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Learning is at the heart of DFID’s work in education. The underlying challenges faced in raising the quality of education are inevitably increased in the wake of natural disasters. Progress, already often slow, can quickly be halted and reversed at a time when the need for education becomes even greater. Learning is affected by the physical and psychosocial effects of an emergency. Learning also frequently gets lost in the aftermath of disasters, as schools get taken over as relief centres and the focus of attention centres around children’s physical and emotional well-being.

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<td><strong>Power of community.</strong> In Bangladesh, following cyclone SIDR in 2007, many communities became frustrated with the time it took authorities to repair damaged schools. Communities used their own labour and resources to restore schools. Community engagement is linked to more effective schools, but there can be issues over safety, particularly with regard to building standards. Unsupervised physical repairs to schools by communities are risky and advice needs to be made available to school managers on standards and risks associated with quick repair.</td>
<td><strong>Recovering lost learning in Sierra Leone:</strong> The Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone effectively closed schools for a full school year. Recognising the need to recover lost time the government introduced a condensed academic “year” for the next two years. This required adaptation of the existing curriculum. With DFID support, made available by redirecting resources from an existing education programme, a consortium of NGOs worked with the Ministry to produce a complete abridged syllabus for teachers, made available in all schools at the start of the first term. Special provision was made for pupils in critical examination years to sit their examinations. Subsequent support has produced a series of structured lesson plans to supplement the revised syllabus, providing teachers with simple to use, ready-made materials to deliver better lessons.</td>
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<td><strong>Adapt approaches from accelerated learning programmes.</strong> There are numerous approaches (e.g., condensed curriculum, highly structured materials, open and distant learning) that can be adapted to provide both catch-up and continuing education for children affected by disasters.</td>
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<td>Off the peg solutions to replace destroyed learning materials are often expensive, quick solutions that are poorly linked to what teachers are used to. Using local providers for common basic materials, stimulates local supply chains and is more cost-effective.</td>
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OUTCOME 5: SCHOOLS ARE ENSURED AS SAFE SPACES THAT PROTECT CHILDREN AND ARE INCLUSIVE OF THE MOST VULNERABLE, PARTICULARLY GIRLS AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

Children can quickly become vulnerable to a range of pressures in the wake of a natural disaster, including increased likelihood of engaging in paid labour, sexual exploitation, hunger, illness and responsibility for the care of injured or sick relatives. Protecting children and providing services to enable them to overcome the traumas of loss and re-establish a degree of normalcy, are priorities needing to be addressed in the immediate response. Children in school are more visible and their out-of-school safeguarding needs are more likely to be identified and addressed.

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<td><strong>Education infrastructure needs to be quickly assessed</strong> for safety and alternative education space identified and checked for suitability. It is important to ensure emergency exit mechanisms are in place where there is possible continued danger, particularly for earthquake aftershocks, landslides or further flooding.</td>
<td><strong>Sierra Leone: coping with a spike in teenage pregnancy.</strong> Sierra Leone experienced a four-fold spike in teenage pregnancy during the period of school closure during the Ebola crisis. Existing legislation forbids pregnant girls from attending school: pregnancy effectively ends education though, somewhat perversely, mothers are accepted in school. Whilst pressure mounted to change the law, DFID funded UNICEF to establish alternative centres (often schools or other community centres) to allow pregnant school girls to continue their education. Tutorial sessions were offered by existing teachers after school hours. The extra stipend incentivised teachers to volunteer. Textbooks and learning materials were also provided. Arrangements were made for girls in the critical matriculation year to sit their examinations. For those in earlier years the aim is for girls to re-integrate into school after giving birth, though this will depend very much on available childcare support being available. The issue of teenage pregnancy became a national cause, championed by the First Lady.</td>
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<td><strong>Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) provide opportunities for young children to recover from a disaster.</strong> These were positively reviewed following typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, particularly where they were linked to local government day care centres. 81 It is important that CFS are not seen as an alternative to formal school.</td>
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<td><strong>Gender-based violence, including rape, increases in emergencies.</strong> Teenage pregnancy rates rose dramatically during the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone during the period when schools were closed. Multiple strategies are required to tackle both the symptoms as well as the underlying causes. These include creating safe spaces in schools and communities, counselling and support services, alternative programmes to continue education and reintegrate victims back into school. Changing the culture and norms with schools and communities requires working with and through elders, community leaders, youth groups as well as political and administrative leaders. Evidence from Haiti shows that <strong>one-off interventions such as solar lights or radio programmes</strong> cannot improve safety/protection or increase inclusion on their own – they should be part of a more comprehensive package of interventions for women and girls. 82 There is also a need to <strong>change the underlying narrative</strong> around women and natural disasters (as well as conflict), which stops seeing women as inherently vulnerable and victims. The emphasis should be to empower women to be key players in both preparedness and response to natural disasters. 83</td>
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81 Documenting child friendly spaces across typhoon Haiyan affected areas, UNICEF, 2014
82 Lighting the way: the role of handheld solar lamps in improving perceptions of safety in camps for IDP in Haiti, IRC, 2015
83 Women in disasters, BRACED, 2016
OUTCOME 6: RELIABLE AND RELEVANT DATA IS COLLECTED AND USED TO DESIGN EIE PROGRAMMES AND MONITOR THEIR IMPACT ON BENEFICIARIES

Reliable data are essential in assessing the scale of the impact of a natural disaster on the education system (infrastructure, facilities, teachers and pupils), as well as for planning and monitoring the immediate and longer-term response. The degree to which data is available in the immediate wake of a natural disaster depends to a very large extent on the pre-existing strength of educational data systems. Data and information sharing amongst relief agencies is often poor. Alternative and more responsive real-time data and information systems are needed in affected areas following a natural disaster, capable of tracking pupils in often quite mobile situations.

Promising practice and strategies to consider:

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<th>Adviser experience and evidence base</th>
<th>Country examples and case studies</th>
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<td><strong>Actively promote a culture of obtaining and sharing common data.</strong> Within the agreed coordination of the relief effort, establish agreements on collecting and sharing data. Common agreements on what data is needed, the frequency of collection and mechanisms for sharing will help to more effectively monitor progress in the sector. This should be part of the role of the Education Cluster or Technical working group. Ensure new protocols that are introduced link with and build on existing government systems. This reduces reliance on informal networks and individual relationships to get information.</td>
<td><strong>A government-led, data driven approach to the post-Ebola recovery in Sierra Leone.</strong> The Ministry of Education in Sierra Leone developed a real-time data collection, analysis and reporting systems to track district performance against ten key targets in the post-Ebola recovery. The system is based on UNICEF’s EduTrac, using SMS to report status at school to a central situation room within the EMIS unit of the Ministry. Monthly summaries, in the form of colour-coded district maps showing performance against key indicators, were reviewed at senior management meetings within the Ministry and forwarded to the presidential Delivery Team in State House. Education was singled out as one of the top performing sectors. The system has now been fully institutionalised within the Ministry and adapted to focus on pupil and teacher attendance. This system proved crucial in securing data on affected schools, pupils and teachers following the August 2017 mudslide near to Freetown. The Ministry was not only able to quickly report damage to schools and identify displaced children and staff, but was also able to identify schools able to host displaced pupils and quantify those requiring alternative, temporary arrangements.</td>
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<td><strong>Use ICT-driven solutions where they are robust and cost-effective.</strong> There are some promising applications using ICT to obtain regular, real-time data. The South Sudan Schools Attendance Monitoring System (SSSAMS) is described in the Protracted Conflict Guidance note. UNICEF’s EduTrac system has been successfully used in Sierra Leone.</td>
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<td><strong>Make sure data is fully disaggregated.</strong> Data should be disaggregated into meaningful units (e.g., district level), so that the impact of the emergency at specific locations does not get lost in the aggregated data. The data collected should provide insights into gender disparities, urban/rural differences, age and disability needs of the population. The importance of this was noted in the response to the floods in Sri Lanka (2017) where first response data was not disaggregated by gender or age. Having disaggregated data enables a better targeted response which can reduce vulnerability.</td>
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84 Sri Lanka Floods 2017: Sharing the blame, Groundviews, 2017
ANNEX 1 – POLITICAL SETTLEMENT REFERENCES

Click the following link to access: EiE Evidence Brief 1: Political Settlements.


Click the following link to access: EiE Evidence Brief 2: Accountability.


ANNEX 3 – COST EFFECTIVE DELIVERY REFERENCES

Click the following link to access: EiE Evidence Brief 3: Cost Effective Delivery.


ANNEX 4 – QUALITY AND LEARNING REFERENCES

Click the following link to access: **EiE Evidence Brief 4: Quality and Learning**.


Carlson, S. (2013). *Using technology to deliver educational services to children and youth in environments affected by crisis and/or conflict*. Washington DC: USAID.


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ANNEX 5 – PROTECTION AND INCLUSION REFERENCES

Click the following link to access: EiE Evidence Brief 5: Protection and Inclusion.


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