Somalia

In pursuit of a safety net programme in the short term paving the way to a social protection approach in the long term: Issues and options

Final report

Key messages

- While Somalia remains an extremely complex and volatile context, it also provides opportunities for innovation in aid delivery methods, as has long been the case in the development of cash-based humanitarian and development programming.

- Working with the Federal and Member State Governmental authorities under the National Development Plan provides an important (and currently opportune) moment in the pursuit of a ‘Safety Net’ approach over the short to medium term.

- A Government-owned ‘national’ framework may serve to streamline an international aid system that is widely acknowledged to be fragmented at all levels. It can also lay the foundations for transition to a social protection system in the long term.

- Donor leadership, drive and increased capacity is the first requirement in moving towards a coherent approach and ultimately ‘system’.

- Harmonising and streamlining of agency roles and responsibilities is required where added value is currently unclear.
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Acknowledgements

We would like to thanks all of the respondents and contributors who made this work possible, most of whom are named in Annex II. In particular, many thanks to the various staff at the European Union and ECHO in Nairobi for practical and substantive input; Helène Quentrec, Susanne Martin, Johan Heffinck, Pauline Gibourdel, Quentin Le-Gallo, Heather Blackwell and Jayne Ogwell. In addition, Massimo La Rosa and Juergen Hohmann provided valuable advice. Much appreciation also to Gianfabrizio Ladini of DAI for essential administrative and logistics support throughout the assignment.

We are very grateful to Government staff who provided critical input in Mogadishu, in particular Abdi Dirshe, and Mohamed Moallim, respectively the Permanent Secretaries for Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management.

Finally, much appreciation to Peter Hailey, Matt Hobson and Gabrielle Smith who provided crucial inputs and/or comments on the report at different stages.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<thead>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AML</td>
<td>Anti-Money Laundering</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Legislation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRCiS</td>
<td>Building Resilient Communities in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CaLP</td>
<td>Cash Learning Partnership</td>
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<td>CBT</td>
<td>Community Based Targeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHC</td>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVMG</td>
<td>Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCT</td>
<td>Donor Coordination Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>European Union Delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>Food for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>FSL</td>
<td>Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Member States</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<td>HSNP</td>
<td>Hunger Safety Net Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Phase Classification</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRF</td>
<td>International Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>KYC</td>
<td>Know Your Customer</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Minimum Expenditure Basket</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-donor Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MESH</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation (M&amp;E) project for the Somalia Humanitarian Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTO</td>
<td>Money Transfer Operator</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Post Distribution Monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMT</td>
<td>Proxy Means Testing</td>
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<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Net Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVI</td>
<td>Rift Valley Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SomRep</td>
<td>Somalia Resilience Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Single Registry</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDRF</td>
<td>Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>STREAM</td>
<td>Somalia Resilience Action Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNWFP</td>
<td>UN World Food Programme</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings and recommendations from an assignment for the EU Delegation to Somalia and ECHO Office to Somalia, with the underlying objective to ‘seek opportunities to envision during the next 3 years how the current humanitarian assistance and development cooperation in Somalia, especially through cash transfers, could be an option on which to build the foundations of a transitional large-scale emergency safety net programme in protracted crisis for chronically food insecure households, including internally displaced people.’ It was carried under the ASiST framework of technical support implemented by DAI. The assignment involved a 12-day field mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu, a review of relevant literature and interviews with a wide range of stakeholders including those from the Federal Government of Somalia, international donors, international and national agencies and a number of other experts. The assignment provides a country case study in line with a range of global commitments and goals that have arisen in recent years that are collectively aimed at engaging more systematically in fragile contexts, harmonising developmental and humanitarian objectives and supporting increased cash-based programming.

Somalia remains an extremely complex and volatile context. However it has also provided opportunities for innovation and new approaches. For example, the Somalia context has been an important arena in the development and learning around cash-based programming in fragile contexts, for over ten years. It continues to play this role through the rapid evolution of mobile money transfer technology.

The Somalia national policy and political environment is currently conducive to envisioning and developing a long-term goal for a Government-owned social protection programme. However, in the short to medium term, the focus should be on the development of a more harmonised safety net approach, building on the humanitarian and resilience experience and programming in the country, but that lays the foundation for a transition to a national social protection programme.

Developing and following a ‘national’ framework, in the short, medium and long-term, has the potential to streamline international aid provided to Somalia that is widely acknowledged to be fragmented at all levels (across and between donors and agencies, between Nairobi and Mogadishu and between humanitarian and developmental objectives).

A pre-requisite to developing a more coherent approach is donor leadership, drive and the necessary capacity. Without this willingness and action short, medium and long-term goals and programmes are likely to remain limited and fragmented. Government ownership and the streamlining of international agency engagement is fundamental to this process. This report outlines a vision, a process and a preliminary work-plan for moving in this direction, based on an identification of the characteristics and core functions of a system and a prioritisation of key activities. A number of policy and programmatic initiatives have taken place in recent years in Somalia that have been informed by social protection and safety-net thinking and this report builds on this experience and aims to add a holistic and integrated approach.

Table 1 below is a summary of priority actions to take place over the short-term to end-2018, medium-term to 2019 and long-term to 2025. Beyond that is difficult to set out clearly, but suggestions are given for the “end game” to guide a future vision. It should however be emphasised that working in Somalia requires a flexible and iterative approach and this report should be utilised in that light.
### Summary recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timescale</th>
<th>Short Term to 2018</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership/coordination</strong></td>
<td>FGS and DCT to form, meet and agree “one programme” vision, principles and priorities. Agree role and inclusion of FMS in process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy</strong></td>
<td>Policy priorities agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial</strong></td>
<td>Transitional financing plan for “one programme” developed, joint agreement, inducing management and disbursement channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical</strong></td>
<td>Technical feasibility for MIS (Identity, Registration, Payments &amp; Communications) completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational</strong></td>
<td>Implementation agencies (UN, NGOs) participate in technical working groups to agree standardisation. CWG provides continuation.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Medium Term to 2019</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership/coordination</strong></td>
<td>FGS and DCT continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy</strong></td>
<td>National Social Protection policy completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial</strong></td>
<td>Medium term financing (MTF) plans aligned with jointly agreed policy priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical</strong></td>
<td>DCT secretariat / Technical assistance facility functioning. MIS commissioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational</strong></td>
<td>Standards and integration with MIS developed by TWGs</td>
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<tr>
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<th>Long Term to 2025</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership/coordination</strong></td>
<td>FGS and DCT continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy</strong></td>
<td>Policy priorities upheld and revised as necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial</strong></td>
<td>MTF implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical</strong></td>
<td>MIS functioning to support benefits distribution (cash transfers, goods, services and referrals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational</strong></td>
<td>Implementation uses core MIS</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>End game beyond 2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership/coordination</strong></td>
<td>FGS / FMS lead / coordinate with international support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy</strong></td>
<td>FGS / FMS set and review policy priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial</strong></td>
<td>Increasing FGS / FMS contribution of finance from taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical</strong></td>
<td>MIS continues. Foundational ID in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational</strong></td>
<td>Equitable and standardised distribution of assistance based on evidence/impact and</td>
</tr>
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Table 1: Roadmap for short, medium and long term actions
INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

1.1 Study Objectives

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world and is subject to recurrent and often major natural and man-made shocks. In 2011, southern Somalia faced a famine in which an estimated 260,000 people died and which generated a huge humanitarian response; the famine was the result of a severe regional drought, global and local food price rises and a political-security context that delayed and constrained the humanitarian response (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2012). Currently, in 2017, another major drought has hit the country and while the political and security conditions are better than 2011, major limitations in access continue to affect the response and warning messages of famine have been evident throughout the year. This has led to another massive humanitarian response, estimated at a value close to US$1bn. ¹

More generally at the international policy level, as well as within the Somali development and humanitarian arenas, the need for more predictable financing and principles and commitments for more harmonised international assistance have been evolving. These international goals and commitments are referred to in Section 1.5. At the Somalia level, for example, in December 2016, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), within the framework of the Somali New Deal Compact, approved a programme entitled “Combating Poverty and Vulnerability in Somalia through Social Protection”.

This assignment has been initiated jointly by the EU Delegation and ECHO Somalia, with the underlying objective to ‘seek opportunities to envision during the next 3 years how the current humanitarian assistance and development cooperation in Somalia, especially through cash transfers, could be an option on which to build the foundations of a transitional large-scale emergency safety net programme in protracted crisis for chronically food insecure households, including internally displaced people.’ (see Annex I for full ToR).

1.2 Methodology

The mission team comprised of two experts with complementary backgrounds and skills: Ric Goodman has managed a number of large social assistance programmes in different countries and currently manages the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), in Kenya. Nisar Majid has extensive knowledge of the Somalia context as a result of a long engagement with the country and the wider Somali environment, through a variety of roles, studies and assignments over many years.

The team gathered and reviewed relevant documentation and consulted with a range of stakeholders, including Government at Federal level, aid organisations, the private sector and independent experts.

The focus of the work was: consultation with a range of stakeholders, rapidly assessing current approaches, identifying major elements of a transitional approach, and the short, medium and long-term steps to follow.

¹ This figure was quoted by several respondents, during the assignment, for the 2017 humanitarian response, but was not verified. It is however comparable to the 2011 humanitarian response cost (see figure 1).
The mission took place between the 4th and 15th September. This included a 3-day visit to Mogadishu (9-11th). Stakeholders consulted included the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, representatives from the EU Delegation and ECHO, DFID, USAID/FFP/OFDA, the Italian Cooperation, and Finnish Cooperation. Meetings were held with the Deputy Representative to the Secretary General and Humanitarian Coordinator, the Country Representative of UNDP, representatives from UNICEF (Regional and Somalia), WFP, UNHCR and OCHA, the World Bank, the ICRC, the NGO resilience consortia of SomRep, BRCiS and Stream, the NGOs Acted, Adeso and Tardo, the regional representation of CaLP, Samuel Hall Consulting, the Centre for Humanitarian Change, the MESH programme, as well as other experts (see Annex II).

The relatively short timeframe for the assignment meant that not all relevant stakeholders were consulted and visits were not made to Somaliland, Puntland or other member states.

1.3 What is Social Protection and Social Assistance?

The following comprises a brief discussion of the notion of social protection and the position of social assistance or safety-net programming within it. There are many definitions of social protection, a simple version being that it is ‘... the set of public actions that help households address risk and moderate their vulnerability to hazards and shocks’ (Barrientos, 2010). Translating this definition into possible interventions, Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler (2007) categorise social protection into the following themes:

- Protective (recovery from shocks)
- Preventative (mitigating risks in order to avoid shocks)
- Promotive (promoting opportunities)
- Transformative (focusing on underlying structural inequalities)

These themes can in turn be related to a number of instruments which include (ibid) (see Figure 1):

- Social assistance, including social transfers, public works programmes, fee waivers and subsidies
- Social care services
- Social insurance (e.g. health and employment insurance)
- Active labour market interventions (promotion of employment, labour markets, protection of workers)

It is widely agreed however that social protection is something that is government owned, and informed by national policies and institutions, though other actors may have supporting and implementing roles to play. A ‘transitional humanitarian safety net’ is not social protection. The Somalia government has adopted the following definition of social protection:

*Government-led policies and programs which address predictable needs throughout the life cycle in order to protect all groups, and particularly the poor and vulnerable, against shocks, help them to manage risks, and provide them with opportunities to overcome poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion*²

In a developed country context, the above instruments comprise a range of policy, programmatic and legal measures that protect and support individuals, households and populations at different stages in the life cycle. In less developed countries including in politically fragile contexts, these options and instruments are more limited. In particular, in contexts such as Somalia, humanitarian funding, objectives, time-horizons and programming dominates international engagement and, alongside state fragility, challenges the process of moving towards social protection approaches and systems, which are by their nature government owned, long term and predictable.

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While social protection provides an important underlying framework and vision that informs this work, the term “resilience” perhaps best captures the current and short-term approach to developing a coherent safety-net programme. The concept and practice of building resilience has gained traction in recent years, including in Somalia. For simplicity we suggest that most initiatives designed to improve the lives and well-being of people in a sustainable way can be said to be part of a “resilience approach”. Examples include:

- **NGOs**, including several consortia groups, implement various approaches which include transfers of cash and productive assets, public works programmes, savings groups, etc. funded over several years.

- **UNICEF, WFP and FAO** operate under the Joint Resilience Strategy in Somalia. Three pillars are identified: a) strengthen productive sectors, b) improve basic social services; and c) establish predictable safety nets – to address the most vulnerable people’s basic needs through predictable and sustainable transfer of food or cash, including for the destitute or seasonally at risk.

While there is overlap with social protection at the implementation level, this approach falls short on two issues. Firstly, donor funding tends to be over a finite period provided for a few years, or indeed only covering short-term emergency need. This does not provide continuity, sustainability and certainty to recipients. Secondly, approaches are commonly undertaken with minimal involvement of government at any level, and are currently not informed by policy or institutions. Social protection, including seasonal support or a predictable shock response is ultimately, and by definition, a function of government. Hitherto, in the absence of government capacity, the international community has taken measures to provide assistance directly, and rightly so. As argued in this paper, and following the title “safety net programme in the short term paving the way to a social protection approach in the long term”, the vision of a government owned social protection system should be the end goal, working in parallel with a range of initiatives to support the Federal and Member State governments.

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3 Clearly in Somalia, ‘Government’ is a fluid, evolving and sometimes nebulous notion, where authority, capacity and legitimacy varies considerably between and within Somaliland, Puntland, the Federal Government and the Member States. There is however a clear international commitment to support and involve the evolving Government where that is possible and this report takes that stance.
As a cautionary note, it is easy to be distracted by unresolvable debates about definitions of terms. The focus of the current assignment was therefore to be cognisant of the broader social protection principles and framework, particularly those with a ‘national’ perspective, as this provides a reasonable starting point, while building upon the existing approaches, architecture and initiatives as much as possible. The broader purpose of this mission is to suggest progress towards common ground to best support Somalia.

It is also useful to note that this assignment is taking place alongside ongoing internal work of the EU and ECHO on social protection and safety-net programming in fragile contexts, in order to identify a joint strategy for working together that can meet short-term and longer-term objectives.

1.4 Evidence and Expectations

This assignment sets out an outline approach for providing a transitional large-scale emergency transfer programme, in line with a ‘safety net’ approach, leading to a ‘system’ that can help to mitigate the impact of future disasters through a) a more regular and predictable flow of assistance and b) the ability to scale up more efficiently than is currently the case and that c) has potential to transition to something nationally owned and in line with social assistance as the policy and institutional capacities develop. While this should indeed be the medium to long-term aim there are a number of caveats that must be acknowledged in the short-term in order to manage expectations associated with a changed approach:

a) Large-scale social assistance systems take years, if not decades, to develop and refine; the PSNP in Ethiopia and the HSNP in Kenya are two such examples. The effectiveness and impact of these systems are considered positive but also complex to assess.

b) These (large-scale assistance) programmes are in part designed to smooth out what would otherwise be recurrent ‘humanitarian’ caseloads (as is the case in Somalia) and may in part be assessed by what would be required in their absence.

c) The impact of cash transfers in Somalia is itself challenging to determine. There is no doubt that cash-based programming is appropriate\(^4\) to the context and at the household food security and wider economic/market levels the use and impact of cash is well known and has been well documented in Somalia. Evidence shows that cash transfers are predominantly used by recipients to improve access to food (improving quantity and quality); reduce household debt (and therefore re-open credit lines); and improve access to other (non-food) household essentials, water and education (Ali et al. 2005; Hedlund et al. 2013). However, this positive impact is mitigated by a number of further issues:

a. The effectiveness of targeting processes, in particular in reaching the most vulnerable populations including marginalised and minority populations. This is not a specific concern for cash-based programming but affects all forms of aid distribution in Somalia and may contribute to limiting improved welfare outcomes to most vulnerable groups; and

b. the impact of cash on nutritional indicators; for example the current (2017) large-scale cash programme has been implemented while numbers of people in IPC 4 have increased; malnutrition levels for many IDPs have remained high in spite of IDPs being amongst the most (geographically) accessible population group to aid agencies and cash programmes in recent years; findings from the REFANI study (see below).\(^5\)

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\(^4\) There is a large evidence base on humanitarian, resilience and safety-net programming that all point to the appropriateness of cash in the Somalia context, largely justified on the basis that markets are strong and responsive in Somalia (see for example: Ali et al. 2005; Majid et al. 2007; Hedlund et al. 2013; Majid et al. 2016)

\(^5\) See: [https://www.actionagainsthunger.org/refani/somalia-country-study](https://www.actionagainsthunger.org/refani/somalia-country-study)
There is, however, a significant and positive evidence base on the impact of long-term safety-net programming in the form of social assistance in more stable contexts (Davis et al., 2016). In a recent study for example, assessing the livelihood impacts of cash transfers in six African countries (including Kenya and Ethiopia), focusing on beneficiary perspectives, the authors conclude that marginal livelihood impacts are evident, which enable households to make strategic livelihood choices, and that households benefit in both economic and social terms; ‘spending money on food, cleanliness, clothing shelter and medicine, and increased social participation that implied dignity, self-respect, hope and inclusion’. In addition, impact was also positive in terms of limiting negative coping strategies, such as child labour and begging), and improving future livelihood possibilities, such as through education (Fisher et al. forthcoming).

Measurement of the impact of such social assistance programmes varies. For example, Berhane et al. (2017) found that resilience of PSNP recipient households increased by as much as 60%, compared to non-PSNP households, when measured against distress sales of productive assets. Another important impact of cash-based safety net programming identified is the multiplier effect of regular cash transfers across the wider community in receiving areas (Davis et al., 2016).

Other important issues and factors that influence the effectiveness and impact of regular social assistance programming include: the size and regularity of the transfer itself, which give ‘confidence’ to receiving populations in terms of household financial management.

However, Fisher et al. (forthcoming) highlight the variable individual and household contexts within which the funds are received which influences impact, and the importance of understanding the wider political and economic context, including of economic growth and equity factors. These political, economic and equity factors are known to be extremely complex and problematic in fragile contexts, such as Somalia. In addition, the high mobility and vulnerability of the Somali population (including high numbers of IDPs) was considered an important factor in reducing the positive impact of cash on nutrition outcomes, and the study concluded that cash on its own was not effective at preventing wasting and that high levels of morbidity and low vaccination coverage were likely undermining ability to address wasting properly. The study also noted that the population was highly heterogeneous and vulnerability (and hence risk for malnutrition) varied depending on date and origin of displacement (REFANI study, 2017).

In summary, while there are widely recognised benefits of large-scale, predictable social assistance programmes in other contexts, (and positive evaluations for shorter-term cash transfer programmes in Somalia), and assertions that these can contribute to improved ‘resilience’ against shocks, there are a range of factors, including, but not only, the efficacy of targeting measures and the availability of basic services that can influence these outcomes. It is therefore important to be very clear about what the objectives of a long-term predictable cash transfer are and to be cognisant that the diversity of impacts that long-term cash programmes are proven to make will depend on the particular design of that programme.

In addition, a livelihood framework (as illustrated in a Sustainable Livelihood framework6) provides a more appropriate and holistic conceptual and programmatic approach to assistance, enabling social capital and basic services objectives to be incorporated alongside food security objectives.

1.5 International Policy Context

There are a number of international goals, commitments and frameworks that, in principle, support the development of a predictable, large-scale, cash-based transfer programme, in line with a ‘safety net’ approach for countries such as Somalia. These include:

a. The Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 1.3 “Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable”.

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b. Accra Agenda for Action, which highlights the importance of engaging with politically fragile countries in order to pursue stabilisation.

c. The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), including through Commitment 5: increasing cash-based programming in situations where relevant.

d. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Strategic Note on ‘Cash Transfers in Humanitarian Contexts’

e. The CaLP Global Framework for Action, including its guidance to: strengthen coordination of cash transfer programming; and to develop a predictable approach to strategic coordination by international actors, and implement it.

f. The Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIACB), and its statement of commitment “strengthening of social protection systems to continue to address chronic vulnerabilities and … social protection as a means of responding to shocks and protracted crises”.

The current assignment takes place within the framework of policy and technical developments by the EC (Devco and ECHO) to explore synergies and understanding between humanitarian and developmental arms. Box 1 provides an illustration of where humanitarian and social protection principles are closely aligned (Cherrier et al. 2017). This illustrates the point that there is much shared value between the two schools of thought. The challenge is to balance moving towards a more predictable, institutionalised, national approach in the longer term without compromising the support provided to vulnerable households in the short to medium term, in a fragile country context.

Box 1 Converging Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian principles</th>
<th>…map to…</th>
<th>Social protection principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Humanity</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>• Solidarity (human right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Neutrality</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>• Universality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Impartiality</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>• Equality and non-discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Independence</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>• Government ownership</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. FINDINGS ON THE SOMALIA CONTEXT

2.1. Common Governance and Policy Context

The governance and policy context for Somalia presents a very mixed and complex landscape, with both reasons for and examples of political and administrative progress, as well as major caveats and concerns. This is little surprise given the long-prevailing political fragility of the country, and is exemplified by the overall message of progress and opportunity expressed by those within and outside of Government during the current assignment, but which also occurred while the current Government was itself in a moment of significant instability (with a presidential impeachment process underway and written complaints by Federal Member States to the Federal Government).

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In terms of the overall governance arena, the ‘national’ level is itself contested with Somaliland remaining a secessionist polity, with its own administration, currency, ‘national’ ID system and (limited) regulatory environment. In addition, the authority, administrative capacity and governance arrangements at the Federal level and between the Federal and Member State levels remain highly variable and often volatile.

That said, interviewees from within the Federal Government as well as external actors acknowledge that there has been significant progress in relation to governance, security, and policy development within the last five years. An independent review of the Somalia Compact was broadly favourable, while recognising considerable difficulties (Manuel et al., 2017). The Somalia Compact has since evolved into the New Deal, with 7 Peace and State-building Goals (PSG/Pillars). Under Pillar 5, the Revenue & Services Social Protection strategy has developed, and a social worker workforce established. Furthermore, a National Development Plan (2017-2019) (NDP) has been completed, although its full ownership/support among the Federal and Member States is not yet clear. The NDP represents a guiding framework in which resilience, social protection and safety-net programming is incorporated. The National Disaster Management Policy (July 2017) provides additional guidance relevant to resilience and social protection.

To illustrate this, key messages from official Government documents include:

**Vision**
“...the most marginalised can become productive members of society and the economy and the most vulnerable can live with dignity and safety as a tenet of a compassionate Somali society...” (NDP 2017-19)

**Goal**
“The most vulnerable receive a package of dependable assistance” (NDP 2017-19)

**Policy Priorities**
“Disaster mitigation - Mitigation is about reducing/minimising the impact of a disaster. Strong social protection mechanism or having diversified livelihoods can help households cope with shocks and stresses, and thus help improve the capacity of communities to withstand negative impacts of disasters. There is a strong link between development and disaster management in that mitigation addresses the underlying causes of vulnerability” (National Disaster Management Policy, July 2017)

**Target**
“National social protection policy or system designed” (NDP 2017-2019)

**Outcome**
“Encourage all Federal and State institutions to consider disaster risk factors and the possibilities of reduction of risks and strengthening resilience while preparing and implementing all development projects” (National Disaster Management Policy, July 2017)

### 2.2 Political economy context – accountability and integrity?

Developing a transitional programme, in line with a ‘safety net’ approach, and aligned with the growing national vision for a future long term social protection system, has the potential to transform perceptions and narratives around the meaning and purpose of international aid, where there is a long history of mutual mistrust and suspicion between governmental authorities and local populations, between international aid actors and local populations and between Governmental authorities and aid actors (see Hammond and Vaughn-Lee, 2012; Hagmann, 2016, Transparency International, 2016). To this effect, the World Bank identifies three key concerns and drivers of the country’s fragility (World Bank, 2016):
• The absence of a political consensus on a federal system based on inclusive representation and wealth-sharing among Somalia's communities and regions;
• The absence of functioning institutions that can deliver basic services to citizens, including; security, and manage the economy effectively and transparently; and
• Elite capture and economic exclusion resulting in widespread vulnerability.

In addition, a recent study of corruption in humanitarian aid in Somalia emphasises the fact that a lack of integrity and corruption is not confined to Governmental actors (or national NGOs) but is part of the overall aid architecture, and should be conceived as a function of relations between national and international agencies and actors (Transparency International, 2016). This relational view is applied to political and state-building processes involving governmental and international actors (Hagmann, 2016). Several large international agencies are in the midst of significant internal reform processes in order to attempt to address and transform these dynamics and Somalia governmental authorities themselves draw upon prominent business leaders and religious leaders to improve their credibility when attempting to fund-raise in times of crisis (DEMAC, 2016).

Acknowledging and addressing the accountability and integrity deficits of both national and international actors in the eyes of the local and international/diaspora Somali populations (an underlying feature in any politically fragile context) should be fundamental to the approach and design of a social protection framework and is an opportunity to encourage a real social compact.

2.3 Current Architecture and Arrangements

The current aid architecture in Somalia consists of many donors funding a wide range of programmes and projects through different bilateral and multi-lateral financial instruments and arrangements. The major donors to Somalia include the US, DfID and the EU/ECHO (the three largest OECD funders). There is also significant donor support from OIC (Organisation for Islamic Cooperation) countries. Beyond this donor-country level support the usual set of developmental and humanitarian actors (and those that cover both). This includes a wide range of UN agencies, including UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, ILO, WHO, FAO, UNHCR, some of whom are multi-mandate organisations, the World Bank Group, a large number of international NGOs and many national NGOs. Donor and implementing agencies from OIC countries are also present. Programme implementation and support is also undertaken by a number of private contractors, who may be national, regional or global in scale.

A range of support functions are provided, both internal to the UN and NGO system, such as the UN Risk Management Unit, OCHA, the Somalia NGO Consortium and National Safety Programme (NSP), as well as from the private sector, including international and national consulting companies and private contractors, involved in a range of activities from third-party monitoring roles, research and direct implementation of projects etc.

Leadership across this array of actors is, in principle, located primarily within the donor agencies, and in close collaboration with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, and his Deputy (who is also the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator). This set of actors should have (and should aim to develop) short, medium and longer-term perspectives incorporating humanitarian and developmental goals.
In addition, there are various collaborative/coordinating mechanisms, including the informal humanitarian donor group, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), OCHA, the Somalia NGO Consortium, sectoral UN Cluster platforms and other platforms such as the Cash Working Group. Furthermore, three prominent resilience consortia, BRCiS (Building Resilient Communities in Somalia), SomReP (Somalia Resilience Programme) and STREAM (Somalia Resilience Action Consortium) provide further platforms in which, in principle, harmonised processes around planning, implementation and learning can take place.

Specific funding mechanisms include multi-donor Trust Funds (MDTF) from the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Africa Development Bank. Special funding arrangements were set up for the 2017 humanitarian response, including the DfID IRF (International Response Fund). Funding is also directed to the various NGO consortia, such as BRCiS, SomRep and STREAM, as well as directly between individual donors and individual agencies.

Since approximately 2012, a number of key initiatives, programmes and studies have taken place that are relevant to social protection, reflecting embryonic work in this area. These are listed in

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8 14 International NGOs make up these consortia, some of whom implement with national NGO partners. STREAM is EU funded, BRCiS is DfID and EU funded and SomRep is funded by USAID.
Annex 3 List of key documents and provide an important set of reference documents for this report and for related work on this subject.

2.4 Current expenditure on humanitarian assistance, social capital development and resilience

Average ODA expenditure levels for Somalia has been consistently over US$1bn since 2011 (see figure 2 below).\(^9\) This is equivalent to approximately US$70 per capita.\(^10\) A further breakdown of funding is provided in figure 3. These figures are provided to indicate the existing costs/expenditure of providing aid to Somalia. Humanitarian funding, while fluctuating significantly over the last ten years, has not fallen below approximately US$250m, and since 2011 has remained above US$500m. This is effectively recurrent spending that could be partially re-assigned to a recurrent budget line. Furthermore, under a framework for a transitional safety net programme, allocations from several of the pillars, particularly social and human capital and resilience could logically be applied to such a programme.

These figures provide a reference to those generated in section 3.2.3 on the finance and affordability of the safety net programme suggested in this report; given Somalia’s relatively small population and relatively high and recurrent needs, a new and transformative approach appears to be affordable.

Figure 2 ODA Flows to Somalia 2006-2017

\(^9\) Development assistance is reported and published by the Federal Government of Somalia in its Aid Flows in Somalia – Analysis of aid flow data, April 2017. This included figures from most OECD donors and contributions via UN agencies but not for example Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Figures are also presented by sector for the last recent years.

\(^10\) Population estimation based on 14.3m 2016 projection (World Bank: data.worldbank.org/Somalia)
2.5 Brief reflections on the current arrangements

This section makes some general observations and, given the limited timeframe and relevance for this assignment, focuses on the Cash Working Group (CWG). According to respondents interviewed as well as from reports consulted, the aid architecture in/on Somalia is generally considered complex and fragmented (Maxwell and Majid, 2014; Transparency International 2016; World Bank, 2016), although the degree of this complexity and fragmentation changes over time. Factors influencing this characterisation include the management arrangements for humanitarian and developmental aid, divided between Nairobi and Mogadishu. Senior representation is found in both locations. There continues to be a move towards Mogadishu with the Special Representative and Deputy Representative of the UN both based in the capital. However, most donors and senior UN and NGO staff remain based in Nairobi. Governmental actors play a limited or no role in co-ordination in humanitarian programming, and more of a role in resilience programming, although again this varies depending on location and agency.

During this assignment, coordination within and between donors was commonly identified as problematic, as was the silo-effect of different donors funding different implementation consortia. Coordination, while generally considered to have improved recently, takes place through a wide variety of platforms, as indicated above. The Cash Working Group (CWG), convened by CaLP and WFP, provides a good example of coordination fluidity; it was revived in early 2017, in response to the growing emergency, but after a period of dormancy.

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11 The CWG has a wide membership, with donors, UN agencies, international and national NGOs attending.

12 Coordination can be problematic between development and humanitarian arms of the same government as well as between different donor governments.
The CWG demonstrated the tapering of institutional memory within the aid community over time, requiring that lessons learned from the previous drought response be quickly synthesised and brought back to attention. The CWG produced two important documents that capture lessons from previous cash-based responses in Somalia: ‘Checking Back. Using cash and vouchers in Somalia: Recommendations from the 2011-12 Somalia Drought Response’ (March 2017); and ‘Looking back to move forward: Building on learning from 2011 to strengthen the 2017 drought response in Somalia. Report from an inter-agency reflection workshop.’ (May 2017). The meeting and documentation associated with these documents highlight how quickly lesson learning can be lost in the disaster-response cycle (i.e. in between crises) and turnover of staff.

Current work-streams taking place under the CWG reflect important developments but also identify constraints (see Section 3.1.1.). The CWG is developing common approaches on a number of topics, including in relation to mobile money systems, developing common guidance on cash programming, developing risk management approaches and encouraging learning. Those involved in the CWG identify important achievements within this group but also areas where inertia, competition and a preference for working alone limit further collaboration and harmonisation.

The current scaling up of cash-based responses to the 2017 humanitarian crisis in Somalia is considered positive in terms of timeliness, in comparison to the context of the humanitarian response during the famine of 2011 (which was very late), however respondents suggest that many other learning points from the 2011/12 response were not incorporated into the current response. This includes the lack of investment in preparedness and a strategy for a more harmonised ‘safety net’ approach to cash based emergency response in between crises (i.e. between 2012 and 2017); the lack of a strategy to reach inaccessible areas and populations and in relation, the cost of encouraging further displacement, in the current crisis, as people move to access resources; the lack of a learning oriented M & E system for the 2017 response (the 2011 cash-based humanitarian response contracted ODI to develop and implement, with partners, a monitoring system). Furthermore, many areas that the CWG has been or is currently working on, were long overdue, for example in the review of MEBs, which had not been undertaken for many years.

Another important dimension of the current humanitarian and development response that is critically linked to notions of social protection concerns targeting and in particular, reaching marginalised and minority populations. It is worth acknowledging that targeting such groups has been extremely problematic for many years although there is currently more acknowledgement of this issue.

Improved monitoring practices, at the donor and agency level, have been a major part of improved risk management and targeting processes since 2011 and will clearly be important in relation to social assistance. But it is also recognised that monitoring processes, including third-party monitoring can themselves be susceptible to co-option and corruption, and have played little role in improving access for a range of excluded groups (Transparency International, 2016; CHC, 2017).

Working in Somalia carries clear fiduciary, reputational and legal risks, centred around the counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering legislation and exemplified through the US Patriot Act. The following quote captures a range of issues of concern:

"The humanitarian community in Somalia is fragmented; most donors and agencies will not divulge the results of internal reviews or audits on programs in Somalia, even under strictly confidential terms, for fear that anything that admits mistakes will lead to blame and stigmatization. The competitive structure of funding makes genuine information sharing difficult. The realities in the field simply cannot be made to match with the rhetoric from headquarters offices of either donors or agencies. Agency staff turnover is high and new people have to relearn the same lessons—often the hard way. (Maxwell and Majid, 2014: 6)."
The current atmosphere within the Somalia aid environment is arguably currently not as fractured or fearful as that described above however but many of these underlying factors are still present, and were highlighted by respondents.

2.5 Remittances and informal social support mechanisms

The Somali diaspora is a well-known and important stakeholder providing income support to households and communities in Somalia and could be a source of finance for a future national transitional cash based transfer programme, in line with a ‘safety net’ approach, or the financing of social assistance in the longer term: the diaspora remit between US$1.2 and US$2bn annually, out of an estimated GDP of US$6bn (World Bank, 2015; Hammond et al., 2011). These remittances may reach up to 40% of the population, through either regular or occasional transfers (WB forthcoming). These transfers are sent in ‘normal’ periods as household support but also increase through household, clan and wider forms of solidarity in times of disaster/emergencies, where they may be combined with money raised by the business community in-country. Members of the diaspora are well-represented within Government and the aid sector. Remittance flows provide a major pre-existing informal safety net system for a significant proportion of the population, through both regular and ‘emergency’ flows. Somalis in the country also support poorer and disaster affected populations through the private sector, local fund-raising and sharing processes and through religious actors and institutions. Local business and remittance resources are often combined to support affected populations (DEMAC, 2016; Maxwell and Majid, 2016).

The possibility of linking to or incorporating the diaspora (e.g. through diaspora organisations and platforms) and/or their remittances, into humanitarian-development policy and programming has been an ongoing subject of research for some years (Hammond et al., 2011; DEMAC, 2016; Lype et al., 2016). Perspectives and ideas on how to leverage or harness remittances vary from those who suggest this system should be left alone and not interfered with (other than to lobby against restrictive legislation), to those who see the potential for remittances to be jointly fund-raised and/or programmed and distributed through a formal, Government or internationally run system. This remains an area of interest where appropriate engagement with the diaspora, under a convincing social protection and assistance framework, may have wider social and political resonance.13

2.6 Poverty and Vulnerability Context

Poverty and vulnerability are two distinct though inter-related notions. Definitions of poverty are contested and can refer to either absolute or relative levels of income and well-being, measurable by different means. Vulnerability (of a person, household or community) is related to exposure to risk (including covariate risk and idiosyncratic risk), and capacity to manage this risk. The ability to manage risk is in turn related to access to productive assets, services and social networks. Vulnerability therefore has both economic and social dimensions.

Somalia has extremely high levels of both poverty and vulnerability. It is ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world, consistently placed in the bottom ten of all countries depending on the criteria used (UNDP, 2012). It also has very high levels of risk and vulnerability, exposed to covariate shocks, particularly climatic, as well as economic shocks (livestock bans; global food price rises) and conflict/insecurity, as well as idiosyncratic shocks at the household level.

In Somalia poverty and vulnerability both have important geographic and identity-based dimensions. In general, welfare indicators identify a hierarchy of poverty and vulnerability based on geography, with Somaliland consistently ranked better than Puntland, and Puntland ranking better than central and southern areas of the country (UNDP, 2012; World Bank, forthcoming). These broad geographic

13 For example, linking remittance funds, through a taxation process (on money transfer organisations) or through voluntary contributions, to an entitlement for over-70s may appeal to a diaspora public.
variations may be further disaggregated at the level of livelihood and social identity within more localised areas.

A full analysis and discussion of poverty, vulnerability, food insecurity and malnutrition is beyond the scope of this report but will be a critical aspect of any further work that is conducted in relation to both developing a transitional cash based ‘safety net’ or longer term social assistance, and must take place with expertise that is sensitive to both technical and socio-political considerations (often technical considerations dominate). A number of salient points are presented below to aid such work:

- An underlying issue is the lack of rigorous survey data on poverty and vulnerability.
- The Somalia famines of 1991/92 and 2011 (famines represent the ultimate outcome of vulnerability) took place in southern Somalia and predominantly affected particular identifiable groups whose livelihoods are based on agriculture. IDPs in Somalia are predominantly found from these same groups (Majid and McDowell, 2014).
- According to a comprehensive analysis of social protection issues, local communities perceive that 70% of the population could be considered poor but perceive differences between the ‘community’ as a whole, and those considered most vulnerable to shocks. This included:
  - The very poorest/destitute
  - Those people who cannot get help from other means such as from relatives
  - Those who cannot help themselves or are suffering most in almost all aspects of life, particularly health

Furthermore, vulnerable groups identified by the same study and common across communities include:

- Children (especially orphans)
- People living with disabilities (including chronically ill) and especially those without family support (including those with mental illnesses)
- The elderly especially those without family support
- Female headed households (especially widows without family support)

(Smith, 2014)

The subject of vulnerability and targeting is a critical subject for further analysis, and that must consider both social and economic dimensions. Community-based targeting approaches, widely adopted in Somalia, are thought to be very unevenly applied, and targeting is more commonly thought to be based on clan-power dynamics, where many vulnerable groups and households are not included. A widely supported and ‘honest’ approach to targeting has the potential to address or reverse current perceptions of aid and targeting that are widely thought to be unfair at best, captured and corrupt at worst. Preliminary discussions held during this assignment as well as in the UNICEF Social Protection report (Smith, 2014) suggest that more visible and categorical forms of targeting may generate broad support, be easier and simpler to communicate and provide an outlet from current methods, or complex poverty targeting approaches such as proxy means testing (PMT), that are time-consuming to implement and have unclear results. Discussion of vulnerability and targeting is often driven by personal preferences, inertia, methodological biases, donor/upstream requirements for data/evidence, poor context understanding, un-balanced or un-informed trade-offs between technical and social/political objectives.
3. TOWARDS A HARMONISED NATIONAL ‘SAFETY NET’ SYSTEM FOR SHOCK RESPONSE AND A FUTURE TRANSITION TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

3.1 Outline and elements of a harmonised national system

3.1.1 Safety-nets (existing)

As requested in the TORs, this section briefly outlines the cash-based architecture/programmes in Somalia. Programmes and projects that include cash transfer components are currently implemented by a large set of actors. These are discrete, time-bound projects designed and implemented by international agencies, and are not therefore social assistance programmes as envisioned under a social protection framework. Two major types of programmes are briefly referred to here: multi-year resilience programmes and emergency cash transfers currently taking place in 2017.

The resilience consortia, BRCiS, SomReP and STREAM account for a significant share of multi-year, cash-based programming. These consortia have a lead agency which receives and then disburses the funds to the other partners. These programmes have slightly different objectives and designs, but broadly include a focus on productive activities through conditional cash transfers, including cash-for-work, savings and loans schemes, support to irrigated agriculture and others. These often involve seasonal-based transfers. Two of the three resilience programmes also include regular, monthly, unconditional support to the most vulnerable over the course of the programme. FAO also implements major conditional cash-based programmes focused on asset creation and livelihood activities in the agricultural sector, and implements through a large number of national NGO partners. These programmes have a substantial start-up time and have more potential to develop and follow good targeting practices according to their objectives and activities, although it is generally accepted that targeting is often heavily influenced by local power dynamics and the exclusion of marginalised and minority populations is commonplace.

As a result of the 2017 crisis, emergency cash programmes targeted at drought affected populations and IDPs have been taking place. For example, the Cash Alliance was created by ECHO to respond to this emergency. It consists of a loose alliance of agencies, working towards common goals, but funded individually (rather than through a consortium lead). 4 INGOs of the Cash Alliance are also part of the BRCiS consortium and part of DfID’s cash-based emergency response to the 2017 crisis is implemented through the BRCiS consortium (through DfID’s IRF financing instrument). ICRC is also a major cash implementer in Somalia, particularly in 2017, but is not able or willing to share details of its programmes. In addition other INGOs and national NGO partners operate emergency programmes, and the UN managed Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) is another funding source for emergency response. WFP provides emergency resource transfers using SCOPE to provide electronic food assistance vouchers rather than cash transfers, enabling access to a range of commodities through a smart card and with authorised vendors. Targeting and distributions for emergency programmes are also highly constrained by the local political economy environment, including a significant ‘gate-keeper’ challenge in the case of IDPs as well as the exclusion of marginalised and minority populations (see Haver and Carter, 2016; Transparency International, 2016).

There are a number of characteristics associated with this architecture:

In terms of financial mechanisms, channels and processes, there are a variety of systems used by different donors and organisations, considering both resilience and humanitarian caseloads. These include direct donor to implementing agency arrangements as well as those through a lead NGO in a consortium. Transferring funds from Kenya to Somalia may take place via Djibouti (e.g. Salaam Bank), through a MTO (such as Dahabshiil or Amal) or through an intermediary businessman or company. Funds are transferred within Somalia, to the final beneficiaries, via mobile money, physical cash (via a MTO or businessmen) or using WFP’s SCOPE electronic voucher system. The dominant platform for INGOs is mobile money transfers using the Hormud-Golis-Telesom platform.

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14 Haver and Carter (2016) is based on findings for four country studies, including Somalia, available at: http://www.saveresearch.net/
Targeting approaches vary depending on programme objectives, agency presence, mandates and preferences. They generally include a geographic and livelihood group-based dimension, using the IPC system. This is typically followed by community-based targeting (CBT) or categorical targeting (e.g. for IDPs). Agencies’ techniques for – and success in – managing local pressures and 'gatekeepers' is considered highly variable, as mentioned above. Geographic and livelihood-based targeting is also severely constrained by access issues.

Transfer amounts vary depending on the objective of the programme, local MEB rates and agency mandates and discretion. Work has been ongoing within the CWG to harmonise MEBs but donors have used different rates in 2017. Unconditional transfers to the unproductive/most vulnerable safety net category varied between US$20 and US$40 pp/pm according to respondents to this study. Emergency transfer rates varied between US$60 and US$80 pp/pm. Livelihood grants and start-up funds for savings and loans schemes were also identified as forms of cash transfer. Different transfer rates may be used in the same areas, by different agencies, as well as geographically (based on local MEBs).

The CWG has been highly active in 2017, revived in part due to the current emergency. It has developed a number of work-streams to harmonise approaches and encourage learning and the sharing of experiences and learning. The Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) Cluster is currently assessing CBT approaches in order to develop common guidance. Respondents from the CWG and the FSL identify a number of opportunities and challenges, in relation to these areas. This includes very recent meetings with the Hormud-Golis-Telesom conglomerate which suggests that it may well be possible for donors or agencies to transfer money directly to Hormud’s Salaam bank in Djibouti, which is integrated with its mobile money platform. Ongoing revision of the MEBs is also taking place under the CWG.\(^\text{15}\)

In addition, members of the BRCIS, STREAM and SomRep consortia have been sharing experience and learning around the benefits of resilience programming in their areas of operation. However, members of the CWG and FSL identify a number of ongoing challenges:

- Some agencies are reluctant to develop a common negotiating position (and rate) with MTOs as they prefer to maintain their own institutional and personal relations and rates
- Existing registry/databases of beneficiaries are not shared and cannot be usefully shared as the information collected cannot be easily compared
- Coordination and sharing of information in Somalia and in Nairobi remains limited
  - There is also a reluctance to share learning from mistakes
- Agency inertia and competition limit many areas of potential harmonisation

### 3.1.2 An integrated model for a transitional ‘safety net’

There is a range of interpretations of the terms social assistance and safety nets. Recognising that current cash based approaches employed by international actors in Somalia include both unconditional transfers as well as those with conditions, requiring households to participate in activities (such as public works and training), this paper describes a hybrid model which includes this range of instruments.

The model is conceived as providing support across the spectrum of vulnerability found in much of Somalia. These groups have been referred to, in Figure 4 below, as: Chronically Vulnerable; Chronically Food Insecure; Seasonally Food Insecure and Food Secure.\(^\text{16}\) In reality, from the perspective of an individual in Somalia living in an area of widespread deprivation, most people would consider themselves to some extent vulnerable and in need of cash based assistance, regardless of

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\(^{15}\) It is notable that the MEBs were not revised for many years and were long overdue for such a review – a function of inertia and discontinuity of assessment.

\(^{16}\) These terms are the choice of the authors and not groups used by implementing agencies.
how they are categorised by a participatory wealth ranking exercise. Furthermore, as explained in section 1.4, a livelihoods approach provides a more holistic framework for analysing and responding to vulnerability given the regular divergence in Somalia between food security indicators and nutrition indicators; social services and social capital dimensions must also be incorporated into programme objectives.

Typically, an implementing agency operates a targeted project or programme in a given location, guided by its own organisational priorities (often referred to as a “mandate”) or terms of donor funding. It selects participants for a defined set of activities and benefits such as cash transfers and labour on a public works scheme, alongside other interventions such as water supply, nutrition supplements, etc. It is not uncommon to find another agency implementing a different approach nearby, possibly targeting a different category of the local population. In the name of coordination, these agencies might have opted not to implement in the same location (although this is not always the case). While at (say) a district level, it can be said that “x% of HHs are receiving support”, this is not integrated programming from the perspective of the individual, as s/he can only access the benefits of the project operating in his/her location and not the neighbouring scheme.

Integrated programming would provide a range of support across the spectrum of wellbeing or wealth groups to illustrate an ideal model. If one is excluded from selection to a benefit on the grounds of being deemed too well off or not meeting minimum entry criteria, one is selected for the appropriate scheme above or below accordingly. This is shown in Figure 4 below. This provides for people able to improve their wellbeing and economic status where they would be able to protect the gains made. If they subsequently suffer a shock and set back, they fall back on temporary assistance, i.e. a safety net.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household type</th>
<th>Integrated access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Secure</td>
<td>Market systems development, labour skills &amp; vocational training, credit, micro-insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonally Food Insecure</td>
<td>Seasonal transfers, plus e.g. productive activity, public works, HH IGAs, savings, school feeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronically Food Insecure</td>
<td>Predictable / priority shock-responsive transfers, plus e.g. productive activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronically Vulnerable</td>
<td>Long term transfers and social welfare services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4 Integrated approach

Aiming to reach this ideal raises the question of affordability and requires a planning and budgeting approach at a regional or national level. An integrated model requires social assistance to be planned, budgeted and monitored at a higher level than is the currently the case. Donor agencies need to move from acting independently within a fragmented system, to
supporting the coordination of a systems approach. Not everything can be delivered at once and a prioritised transition plan needs to be agreed.

3.1.3 Core functions of a national social assistance system

Functions of a benefit distribution system

Any benefit distribution system requires a standard set of core functions. For example, all implementing agencies delivering goods and services in Somalia need a definition of which households are being assisted, a means of registering and selecting beneficiaries, a delivery system and verification that those who receive benefits are those intended to benefit. Social assistance programmes are based on a series of standard operational processes in order to select and make transfers to recipients. These administrative processes are illustrated in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5 Stand-alone distribution system

Moving from an ad hoc and fragmented project-based approach implemented by international agencies, towards a more predictable and harmonised national “system approach” requires that these functions are standardised and operate more uniformly. Harmonisation under a policy framework and standardised technical approaches enables more efficient use of resources at scale, in addition to improved understanding, access and accountability to beneficiaries. Providing accessible centrally managed functions such as identity, registration and post-distribution monitoring for all implementing agencies would encourage standardisation and facilitate the implementation of national policy. A simplified impression of a possible institutional framework and administrative system for a national transitional safety net in Somalia is shown in Figure 6 below.
In Figure 6, government functions are represented in blue; donors and implementing agencies are in pink, and social assistance functions are represented by green hexagons. Banks and Money Transfer Operators are in their own grey box, and integrated implementation is shown in the bottom right in light grey.

Having standardised functions available to each implementation agency changes their functions, as each will reference the Identity system and Registry as needed. All implementation would be subject to independent post-distribution monitoring – this is represented in Figure 7 below.
As is set out in the sections that follow, the strategy to create a national transitional safety net similarly requires the creation of a set of priority central functions (Policy, Identity, Regulation, Planning and joint financing) standards and the core Management Information System. These must be designed in close participation with government. Implementing agencies (including UN, NGO and MTOs) use these central functions to enable consistency of implementation approach. This is illustrated in Figure 8 below. It is also worth emphasising that even without the effective participation of the government, adopting such an approach creates a more coherent and cost-effective overall aid system.

Figure 8 National system functions at central and implementation levels

### Central functions
- Policy
- Identity
- Regulation
- Planning, financing, compliance, triggers
- Standards (Standard Operating Procedures)
- MIS – registration, payroll, communications, monitoring, evaluation

### Implementation functions
- HH selection and validation, data capture to Single Registry
- Case management, updates and complaints
- Referrals to other services
- Payment services
- Resilience activities

A brief description of these elements follows below, describing the function, their current state of development in Somalia and some of the ways in which they could be improved to support a more efficient social assistance system in the short, medium and long term.

### 3.2 Transition to a national system – issues and recommendations

#### 3.2.1 Leadership and Coordination

Donors control the bulk of the financial resources allocated to social assistance. Hence the group of donor personnel hold the responsibility for upholding a coherent policy dialogue and agree upon efficient allocation of resources with government.

The formation of a Donor Coordination Team has greatly strengthened the foundations of national safety nets approaches in other countries, from formative stages to maturity\(^\text{17}\). Collaborating donors participate in a regular meeting forum under an agreed Terms of Reference (linked to the principles as suggested above). A DCT develops common positions and analysis and oversee the coordination of approach. Importantly, a DCT acts as a single point of contact in liaison with different levels of government (FGS/FMS) on policy and objectives.

\(^{17}\) A good case study is the way in which Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was supported by a DCT.
The DCT would work to an agreed set of objectives, and perform the following functions:

- Support the FGS and FMS in the development of a joint sustainable Somalia social protection system;
- Ensure alignment under a national framework, to increase coherence of policy and its application, standards setting, implementation planning and monitoring;
- Guide FGS and FMS in undertaking a joint national scale approach to planning and financing;
- Financing through pooled funding mechanisms where possible;
- The DCT should consider having a rotating chair;
- A further priority for the DCT to discuss and agree with FGS and FMS is the clarification of roles of the multiple stakeholders; and
- To develop thinking on the wide range of technical issues that a social protection system requires, the DCT would need to be supported by a technical and administrative Secretariat coordinating a number of Working Groups. The Working Groups might include issues such as identity, single registry, targeting, transfer values, etc., as described in the section below.

Way forward and recommendations

The formation of a Donor Coordination Team is a priority action to be undertaken immediately. A discussion on composition and terms of reference should initiate the process.

The Secretariat function might be simple to start with. Aside from policy issues, there a number of technical challenges and research to be assessed, commissioned and implemented, as identified in this paper. For the time being, technical assistance can continue to be provided by development partners, such as UN agencies who have dedicated staff with international experience and already provide research and systems development for project implementation.

In the longer-term, the DCT could be a supported by a dedicated contracted technical assistance Facility. Work needs to be orientated towards providing technical assistance to the Somali government at Federal and State levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership &amp; Coordination</td>
<td>Donor Coordination Team – Convene and define TORs. Workstreams identified and assigned. TORs for Secretariat defined and consider establishing TA facility. Cash Working Group (CWG) to continue.</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Facility established.</td>
<td>Capacity support for FGS / FMS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.2 Characteristics and Principles

The Somali population experiences high levels of vulnerability and exposure to individual and generalised hazards. This predicament is long term and not easily resolved. Encouragingly, the
alignment of various factors currently creates an opportunity to agree on approaches which help reduce risks and thus the volatility of people’s well-being. These factors include international recognition of an overwhelming global humanitarian caseload, resulting in a renewed effort to reduce the cost and increase the effectiveness of the support provided, especially to recurrent and long-term crises. For Somalia itself, a significant step forward has been made with the election of a Federal government and the emergence of Member State administrations. While there is much to do in building the governance structure and moving towards expanding democratic inclusion, this process is underway and generally supported by international donors. While many of the lessons from the 2011 drought response needed to be re-learned in 2017, many international staff with this experience are still in post at the time of writing (towards the end of 2017) and so it is currently possible to consult and learn from all levels of the aid system: from affected households; Somali civil society organisations and NGOs; Member States and the Federal Government of Somalia; development partners, donors, and their headquarters.

In order to take advantage of these coincident opportunities, this paper suggests building a consensus and strengthening collaboration at all levels. Of course, this is easier said than done, but nevertheless an appropriate and achievable aspiration, starting with some straightforward and achievable actions. Aiming to ensure provision of predictable and accessible assistance, it is proposed to start with some suggestions setting out the characteristics of a national social protection system and the principles for collective working. The following are suggested but of course, as noted in the text that follows, the final form needs to be arrived at through a consultative process.

While there are many technical matters to resolve (as described in more detail below), the characteristics and principles of a nationally coordinated approach to providing humanitarian and development assistance in Somalia would include:

**Government owned but not necessarily government implemented**

The set of policies, financing and resourcing, and implementation functions are agreed to by government (at Federal and Member state level as appropriate).

In accordance with international agreements on “good donorship” (codified in the Accra Agenda for Action), social assistance provided by the international community for a country should be conducted at the request of the state authorities. The absence of stable governance structures in fragile states commonly gives rise to fragmentation of aid efforts and this continues to be evident in Somalia. However, with recent progress in Somali governance it is appropriate to review these relationships. Further discussion on Somalia’s governance structure is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that this principle applies both at the Federal and Member state levels.

What is proposed is to support the creation of a system under the auspices of the host government. This is not yet a true social protection given the government is not fully responsible for all aspects (not least, financing). However designing in this way is not only an improvement on the present, it will have the appropriate design hallmarks, underlying institutional framework and operational systems that can act as a foundation or springboard for moving towards true social protection programme as and when the policy environment matures and capacities develop.

This approach recognises a distinction between official leadership and participation, and the need for capacity support. Indeed, the functions of a national social assistance system need to conform to international best practice and standards of technology and data security. Somalia has well developed skills in telecommunications which could be harnessed to good effect. It is likely that core functions such as a single registry of household data and third party monitoring are managed autonomously by contractors (whether private sector or international organisations).

**Builds the social contract**
Assistance must be administered in such a way that it builds confidence in nationhood and support for good governance. This is best achieved through the government being perceived as providing for its citizens in a way that is deemed to be “fair”. To achieve this, assistance must be transparent, including decisions around targeting. This requires consultation at all levels, including at the member state and local population levels.

Achieving this will require an adequate consultation process and communication strategy to ensure the design is rooted in the positive aspects of Somali social perceptions and traditions, as well as recent experience, while not ignoring international evidence. Such processes are more resource intensive in the short term but arriving at a mutually agreed array of functions and standards is critical in ensuring acceptance.

A national design will need to address chronic vulnerability & reduce exposure to idiosyncratic and covariate shocks (i.e. building resilience). The Somalia context exhibits problems which are, because they are recurrent, reasonably well understood. The nature of these problems and degree of volatility can be expected and planned for. Interventions can be nuanced so as not to reinforce the status quo of inequity and need to be transformational and not transactional.

**Implementation within and contributing to an evolving national system**

Coupled to the previous point that all stakeholders need to commit to a national guiding policy, planning and implementation should not occur independently of an agreed national framework. National planning and policy agreements and international commitments and are too often forgotten. This paper has referenced some of the important processes and agreements already made and it is important to retain and build on these. In order to transition from a project by project arrangement and move towards a system approach, funding agencies need to insist that implementing agencies demonstrate not only how they are filling an implementation gap but also conforming to emerging policy and planning. Indeed, funding agencies themselves need to be held mutually accountable for the same. Increasing technical harmonisation is discussed further below under specific issues, including: Identity; Registration; Transfer value; Monitoring, etc.

**Predictable, long term and sustainable**

If cash assistance is provided in a timely, regular and guaranteed manner, it achieves greater impact and is more cost effective. A great deal needs to be in place to achieve this: commitment to longer-term financing (including arrangements for foreseen volatility of need); smooth allocation decisions through the budget cycle, regular disbursement of funds, and efficient last mile solutions for transfers and delivery of in-kind benefits.

While there is a common desire among donors and government to see household economies rise rapidly above a certain threshold, resulting in an end to the need for support, it is not realistic in a context of widespread fragility to expect people to be entirely self-sufficient and immune from stresses and shocks in a short time-frame. Indeed, people’s needs and opportunities vary as their well-being, age, household composition and productive potential increases and decreases. For a system of support to be sustainable and supportive over the long-term, the end point should not be graduation from support, but graduation from one kind of support to another kind of support, while continuing to ensure a safety net for those who slip back and need it for whatever reason.

In line with the major covariate risks facing Somalia, i.e. drought and conflict, assistance needs to be able to scale-up / down in line with stresses. This is commonly known as being "shock-responsive". Operationally, this requires the rules, indicators and finance for such a mechanism to be agreed.

**Collaboration and clarity of roles**

Following from the above suggestions, we now move to some more practical considerations. An impression widely shared in the course of consultations for this paper is a sense of international aid personnel working in fragmented organisational silos. The formation of implementing agencies consortia is considered a good step forward, although even with these consortia there is significant variation in coherence and learning. Implementation and administration has been improved recently from the point of view of the donors, which is also to be welcomed. Gains in effective planning,
financing and coordination of a sustainable social assistance programme can best be made through
closer donor collaboration.

The need for “decongestion” was referred to at all levels of consultation, alongside examples of the
competitive environment that restricts the development of more harmonised and coherent
approaches, especially when resources are being made available or when there is an opportunity for
a high-profile role. This has led to some secrecy and other stakeholders finding out about important
initiatives through hearsay. Inevitably, while many see the need for streamlining, ‘no camel votes
for Eid’ and it is always others who are nominated to be put back in their place!

In order to move towards a more coherent array of policy and practice, further improvements are
necessary. Simplification would lead to a clearer relationship between donors as a whole and
FGS/FMS.

Way forward and recommendations

Support the development of the social protection policy for Somalia to ensure it includes adequate
consensus and is built around principles and ways of working, as the foundation for the future
approach.

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<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principles, characteristics and roles</td>
<td>Agree principles and stakeholder roles through social protection policy development process</td>
<td>Apply and review</td>
<td>Continue to assess</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regulation of Money Transfer Operators (MTOs)

Strong regulation of financial institutions is needed to manage risk across the financial system.
Detailed discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper but it is referred to here as it has great
bearing on building a stable transfers system, especially as it is dependent on accountable
international donor funding.

A financial regulatory environment define standards of financial service providers and Money Transfer
Operators (MTOs) to comply with Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL),
reducing systemic risks and increasing reliability of transfers. This helps create a robust system for
social transfers.

Currently, diaspora remittances and cash transfers from international donors are entering the country
without such formal regulation in place. While banks and mobile money operators are currently
unregulated, they do undertake due diligence checks on account holders, for example through
community-level reference checks. It is also noted that developments are taking place in this area,
supported by the World Bank, with the development of private banks and the Central Bank.
International banks increasingly engaged and working with Somali institutions – for example, UNHCR
works with Standard Chartered Bank and Salaam Bank, for the transfer of cash to refugee returnees)

Way forward and recommendations

In the short term, transfer will continue to be provided without a strong regulatory framework in
place. The DCT needs to appraise itself of the risks of continuing such an approach and what can be
done to minimise exposure to disruption of money transfer services. The DCT needs to be aware of
plans and process to strengthening the Central Bank (CBS) and the legal / regulatory framework.
In the medium term, DCT should ensure it follows a risk reduction strategy with respect to money transfers, while keeping informed of the regulatory environment and trends.

In the long term, it is assumed that the regulatory environment will continue to improve in line with general governance and stability.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulation of Money Transfer Operators (MTOs)</td>
<td>Assess risk landscape of unregulated transfers and develop mitigation plan</td>
<td>Monitor and revised risk management plan. Regulation is imposed</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identity system

Somalia is currently without a national identity system. An accepted national authority which confers citizenship through a standardised national ID system is a cornerstone of any state. A foundational ID system provides a permanent and common reference for multiple purposes such as democratic elections, migration, and payments between government, businesses and persons (including taxes, fees and transfers). An ID system supports international financial inflows and transfers, i.e. remittances and social transfers. A credible ID system enables due diligence checks i.e. Know Your Customer (KYC) to be undertaken for financial account operation as required under the US Patriot Act.

Some means of identifying people registered to receive transfers (goods, services, financial transfers, etc.) is necessary in any distribution system. Currently in Somalia implementing agencies are using a variety of standalone approaches. Schemes tend to issue proprietary project identity and registration cards as “tokens” to present and receive payments. Some of these tokens use analogue identity checks (inked finger prints or facial photographs) but are increasingly using digital checks i.e. biometrics (using fingerprint or iris scanners). Systems operated by separate implementing agencies are generally incompatible with one another (i.e. they are not interoperable).

For the meantime, social transfers and remittances will continue to operate without a national ID. It is possible to create a stand-alone functional application for a social assistance system, adhering to international best practices in including biometrics and data protection / security. A central identity function could service all implementing agencies providing a range of benefits (not only cash transfers).

A functional identity system, which may be necessary prior to the creation of a foundational system, falls short of providing multiple benefits of creating a national ID platform with uses beyond transfers, including for one person, one vote elections and (eventually) tax collection. A scoping study completed for a national ID system suggests that the challenges are considerable but introducing a system is deemed to be feasible. However, there is currently no resourcing for this until further studies are undertaken.

Way forward and recommendations

In the short term, consider the scope and design of a standardised functional system using biometrics which implementing agencies can use to create a user profile, against which MTOs can verify profiles and approve payments.

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19 Ibid.
In the medium term, a functional ID system needs to be commissioned and operationalised. Consideration should be given to how such a system relates to the national and federal government(s), while providing an assured identity verification service to implementing agencies and MTOs. This might be done under a public-private partnership model, operated on behalf of government.

In the long term, encourage international donor (WB) support to create a foundational national ID system for Somalia. This is highly likely be based on biometrics and possibly be password based, rather than require individuals to carry physical cards.

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<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
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<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Scope functional ID system for all social transfers</td>
<td>Implementation of ID system for social transfers</td>
<td>Foundational ID replaces functional system</td>
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</table>

**Social Protection policy**

The development of a Social Protection policy for Somalia is underway at the time of writing. This is taking place in collaboration with the government, contracted to Samuel Hall Consulting by WFP. It will develop an overarching policy which defines the government’s vision and key priorities for social protection in the short, medium and long term, and a roadmap of actions in the first three years to move forward with realising the policy objectives. This will provide a starting point for crystallising discussions around and concretising actions supporting development of short term transitional safety nets and more longer term social assistance in the country. Any move by EUD or others to support design and implementation of such harmonised approaches must be informed by and align with this national vision. Equally, the policy development process should be informed by the present analysis and recommendations.

**Way forward and recommendations**

In the short-term, support the ongoing social protection policy development process and ensure the timeframe and consultation process is sufficient, that cultural notions of social solidarity are appropriately incorporated, that finalisation of the policy is inclusive of all key stakeholders, and that it reflects the findings and recommendations of this study.

In the medium-term, ensure that design of any EU-support for a transitional safety net is in line with this policy and reflects the strategic priorities for programming and for institutional strengthening.

In the long-term, as part of the implementation process, look for opportunities to support (through finance, TA support, other) the full integration of such a safety-net into a truly nationally owned social protection programme or programmes and associated systems.

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<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social policy</td>
<td>Consultation &amp; development</td>
<td>Finalise &amp; adopt</td>
<td>Implement and oversee</td>
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**Management Information System and Registration**
Registration of individuals is an important step to being able to manage a sustainable distribution system. The data it provides underpins not only the selection for enrolment to receive transfers, but also planning, budgeting, managing the distribution and monitoring.

In order to apply selection criteria, details of an individual or household are recorded ahead of a distribution, checked and held securely. While until recently it was common for project managers to keep beneficiary lists on paper and Excel spreadsheets, modern registries are secure computer databases, with protocols for data access, sharing and transmission, coupled with accountable records for all data entry and changes. A Single Registry collects data from various sources (separate programme registries) and combines the data, enabling it to be cross referenced. One important function of a SR is to coordinate benefit transfers between separate programmes and provide analytics to improve programme management.

The accuracy of a SR is dependent on the programme design and the type of data needed to make decisions (such as generating budgets, different targeting approaches, monitoring), balanced with the cost and feasibility of keeping it up to date.

Data held on a SR is of different types. Individual characteristic data might include gender, (approximate) date of birth and (stated) place of birth. An individual’s circumstances at the time of the registration can also be recorded, such as an estimate of consumption and sources of income, place and condition of assets such as dwelling, or number of dependents. The latter type of data is likely to fall out of date as sooner than characteristic data at an individual, their household and a regional scale.

Hence the value and efficiency of data held in a SR depends on the rate at which essential data changes over time. Schemes using more slowly changing individual characteristics tend to be more accurate than schemes using consumption, income or situational data. This is an important consideration given the cost of capturing data, even more so in difficult to reach areas.

A SR is a central component of a broader set of software applications forming a Management Information System (MIS). MIS modules can be designed to process registration data changes and updates, complaint resolution, payroll reconciliation, monitoring and communications (for example mass communication using mobile phones). A variety of distribution functions to be run from a single system, including not only cash, goods and services transfers and reconciliation but also referrals to other benefits such as social welfare or public works and maintain individual case history. An illustration of a typical distribution system MIS is shown in Figure 9 below.
Currently in Somalia such registries are operated separately by implementing partners and are not compatible across projects or organisations. As with project-based identity systems, it is not uncommon for implementing agencies to run field registration processes for a single project use, needing costly repeat exercises. WFP's SCOPE system has the features of a functional registration system. To date this is used primarily by WFP and the NGOs it has sub-contracted, although some other UN agencies and NGOs are either using it or interested to use it.

Ideally a SR should be established at the request of a government authority and managed independently from implementing agencies. Standardisation of data enables improvements of planning, provision, monitoring, and cross programme applications (e.g. for health, nutrition, education, water and social welfare, plus some economic development activities), and would support field workers being able to manage their caseload from a common platform supported from the centre. The pooling for resources could lead to a much higher quality system available to a wide range of applications.

In order to build a common registry, data entry could be delegated to any number of participating implementing agencies, such as NGOs and MTOs. Franchises might be awarded on a geographical basis. Data registration agencies would collect and contribute data, conforming to standards and submitting to quality assurance checks. Over time, data captured in this way and added to a SR would approximate to a national database, referenced by multiple implementing agencies.

The centrally managed SR would permit access to stored data only to those approved to access it. Access to data by other users would be restricted to ensure security and protection of both data and people. For example, there might be a need for a high-level management summary for performance oversight, but without the need to view individual details. While there is widespread sensitivity in Somalia to issues of data security and the consequences of breaches, the governance and security of such a system follows common international standards and are not unique to such a context.

Case management to allow for record updating, including addressing complaints and grievances can be supported by implementation agencies themselves, who would raise any issues and refer them to the data capture agencies for verification and making necessary changes. This would need to be combined with an independent ombudsman to consider issues such as safeguards, exclusion and rights violations.
A closely associated function for cash transfers is that of Payroll. Ultimately a Government-to-person (G2P) payments system would require a centrally procured payments services manager to be run independently of implementation agencies.

**Way forward and recommendations**

In the short term, conduct an in-depth study on the governance and technical architecture of a single registry and data collection and storage system to operate at the request of government. Central concerns that need addressing are data ownership and access. Consideration should be given to other MIS and payment management functions which might be centralised and made independent of implementing agencies including a phased introduction process.

As a stepping towards a single registry it would be appropriate to investigate the interoperability of the existing registries used by the different actors (WFP’s SCOPE Cash Alliance partners/BRCiS ONA, etc.). Given sensitivities around data sharing in Somalia, a transitional phase where partners can exchange partial anonymized data relinquishing their own registration systems might advance the process of establishing a single registry. Achieving uniformity and cross platform standardisation has been achieved in other countries. Shared data fields could be limited to: a unique identifier (biometric), organization’s name; months of cash assistance; transfer value; and an location of the household (offset to anonymise). The biometric would most likely need to be a finger/ thumb print, especially as WFP have already registered their beneficiaries in SCOPE in this way, although it is not without its difficulties. The difficulty likely faced is to achieve cross platform interoperability, a common standard needs to be agreed that might be above all or most current approaches in use – for example needing to record ten finger prints or iris scans, whereas currently this data is not collected by any current system.

Also, it would be helpful to conduct an analysis of the existing systems and other registries (such as the HSNP one in Kenya). This analysis should be done independently to avoid any conflicts of interest.

Note on SCOPE: While the authors acknowledge that there has been significant investment in SCOPE to date and that the SCOPE registry provides the largest registry of beneficiaries (and potential beneficiaries – not all registered populations have received assistance), there are important considerations in assessing the role that this system continues to play in Somalia. Most pertinent is that the system is proprietal, is owned by an implementing agency, and is reported to have technical support limitations regarding its expansion. These are major constraints. It may be advisable to review SCOPE vis-à-vis other platforms and with reference to a cost-benefit analysis of medium to long-term benefits of continuing with SCOPE or developing another system. WFP might consider making the system available to third parties other than implementing partners (its subcontractors), modifiable and open-source; and to transfer the data it holds to another future replacement platform.

In the medium term a SR agency needs to be identified, ideally through a competitive procurement process, or by convening/encouraging Government and Somali telecommunications and money transfer organisations (with suitable technical support) to develop this area.

In the long term the SR needs to be established and embedded to provide a standardised service to implementing agencies, with a vision of providing this under the auspices of the government.

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<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>Common Standards identified and used</td>
<td>Single Registry designed</td>
<td>Single Registry operating independently</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

At the implementation level, lie a range of detailed technical decisions. As described above in the section on integrated programming, planning at scale is aided by standardisation and ensures adherence to policy and equitable distribution of resources. This applies to all benefits including cash and the value of other transferred goods and services.

While standardisation brings clear advantages, it also allows for experimentation, innovation, research and evidence gathering to inform design. There is need for experimentation of approaches suitable for replication as part of a national framework. A standard approach simplifies comparison of activities, results, outcomes and impacts. A balance needs to be struck between national uniformity and adaptation to localised circumstances. There is a strong body of experience and innovation in aid programming in the Somali environment, and agencies that have demonstrated this should continue to be consulted.

It falls to the DCT to ensure that there is consistent advice provided to the government on the choices available coupled with the evidence to inform choices. As with the technical issues described below, the technical working groups are well placed to define common approaches and standards.

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<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
<td>Priorities / quick wins identified with support from CWG. Agree common framework for contracting implementation</td>
<td>Core SOPs developed further linked to policy e.g. social protection policy.</td>
<td>SOPs followed by implementing agencies and independently monitored.</td>
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| and procured |
Targeting

Benefit schemes currently implemented by aid agencies commonly follow similar targeting processes, using a combination of geographical, livelihood group, poverty and vulnerability criteria to divide up available project resources. Moreover, due to access difficulties, many projects rely on subcontracted organisations for registration, selection using community-based targeting (whereby local leadership is asked to guide the final choice) and followed up with post distribution monitoring (PDM). With finite resources to provide for all poor households, PDM tends to emphasise checking that all who received a transfer conformed to the selection criteria, but less attention is paid to those excluded (and the reasons for their exclusion). In contexts where the majority of people consider themselves poor and in need of assistance, poverty targeting is likely to be inaccurate. This holds true even in contexts with unimpeded access, which is certainly not the case in Somalia. Moreover, as poverty is dynamic over time, any selection based on consumption and asset ownership risks quickly falls out of date. Given that all resources are allocated to those selected, others who might subsequently prove they meet the project’s eligibility criteria cannot have their complaints and appeals upheld due to budget constraints. Experience from many similar contexts is that poverty targeting is experienced as inaccurate and unfair (see Smith, 2014).

Consultations undertaken indicated a strong interest for official assistance that is “visible”. This is interpreted as being a targeting policy based on consensus, but which is demonstrably accountable and helps to build recognition of the government’s role in delivering basic services to its citizens. While only a thorough consultation process coupled with household survey, economic and demographic trends data can reveal what is appropriate and affordable for Somalia, in other contexts HHs with young children, persons with disabilities, and the elderly are among commonly chosen vulnerable groups. Exclusion criteria might be considered to remove those with formal employment could be applied to remove the better off from accessing the scheme. While there is some wastage in those better off being eligible for these benefits, this also helps build political support for the allocation of resources.

While a ‘revolution’ of current targeting practice is unrealistic, the suggestion is made to trial targeting of categorical vulnerability and consider including it is the mixture of transfers available. Referring again to Figure 4 above showing integrated programming, the most vulnerable are likely to require long-term unconditional support, ideally of both direct transfers and welfare services (without a graduation requirement).

Geographical targeting can be used to ensure the areas of the country most severely and frequently affected by natural disasters and conflict are adequately provided for.

Focus on IDPs

Over 700,000 people have been displaced in 2017 alone, adding to the large pre-existing IDP population. The mobility of Somali populations has long been a feature of life and has occurred over time due to war, conflict and drought as well as through more natural processes of urbanisation, education and economic migration (often these factors of forced and voluntary movement merge over time). Recent motivations to move are thought to be a function of both push and pull factors as rural conditions deteriorate and as assistance becomes available in urban centres.

It is currently thought that a significant proportion of IDPs may choose not to return to their original areas and many IDPs may already be more accurately described as part of the poor urban environment. However, Somalis are renowned for their dispersed family networks and strong social bonds and the diversification of livelihoods through family members maintained in different locations (nationally and internationally) is common in the country. The ability to send resources (particularly cash) between different locations has long been a characteristic of the Somali environment and has been further enabled by the reach and efficiency of mobile money transfers.
The majority of IDPs however are from historically marginalised and minority groups, and are often preyed upon by more powerful actors – gatekeepers – in their new urban locations. Humanitarian indicators for IDP populations throughout Somalia have remained very poor in spite of good geographical access to these areas (geographical access does not necessarily correlate with social or physical access to these populations). In addition, numbers of IDPs are frequently contested with estimates often considered to be significantly inflated.

Given their large numbers (in absolute terms and as a percentage of the population) and underlying vulnerability, information and analyses on displaced populations should be consolidated and further research conducted on their conditions, including their access to assistance and other economic activities, as well as their motivations, plans and livelihood strategies (e.g. for moving or staying in their new urban locations, sending money back to family members in their areas of origin). A number of studies are expected to be undertaken in the near future that will contribute to an improved understanding of displaced populations.20

**Way forward and recommendations**

In the short term, while the development of the social protection policy is underway, a discussion and consensus of vulnerability and poverty should be carried out, and feedback solicited on people’s experience of targeting methodologies experienced. Consideration should be given to trialling different approaches, including some targeting categorical groups. Very preliminary feedback during the assignment found that respondents reacted positively to the suggestion of using more ‘visible’ categories, such as disabled and the elderly (see also Smith, 2014, on this subject).

In the short term, targeting criteria should be harmonised within the new ECHO funded operations, but it would also be helpful to harmonise with other donors and the NGOs and UN agencies they fund (in particular: WFP, UNICEF and FAO).

A single agency providing Complaints Response and Feedback Mechanisms (CRFM): services for all cash actors would improve efficiency and make it more simple for beneficiaries to obtain help.

These trials should be conducted with the aim of informing scaled up approaches. In the long term this will result in targeting which is considered as fairer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeting</strong></td>
<td>Options for targeting categorical groups explored (referencing social protection policy). Consider forthcoming research on IDPs. Uniformity / convergence of targeting criteria agreed. Pilot(s) identified, initiated and evaluation methodology agreed</td>
<td>Pilots identified, started and evaluated. Independent Complaints Response and Feedback Mechanisms (CRFM) in place.</td>
<td>Scale up integrated approach with long term transfers for most vulnerable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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20 These include research with the University of London under the R2HC (Research for Health in Humanitarian Crises) programme and research involving the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London.
Transfer rates

The amount of cash transfers given to poor and vulnerable households has been the subject to much debate in the course of the 2017 drought response. Aid agencies (donors, UN and NGOs) have argued for (and about) a standard agreed rate which varies in line with food or a minimum expenditure basket (MEB), and what proportion of the MEB should be provided over what period of time. Others might prefer additional benefits for those with more dependents, or for particular categories of people or groups. An argument that it is better to provide more people with less money is also valid, where many people may well feel excluded from assistance.

Ultimately this one’s coat needs to be cut from the cloth available and a national approach to transfer rates need to be derived from taking all needs and resources available nationally, in a way that is affordable and sustainable.

Way forward and recommendations

Transfer rates are among several issues needing standardisation, stemming from a transition towards a planned national scale approach. A balance between affordability and coverage is essential. In the short-term, reviewing of the MEBs should be encouraged and compared with transfer rates and rationales in neighbouring and other countries.

In the short term, it is critical for the harmonization and streamlining of the cash transfer values between the major donors to agree and stick to well defined transfer values.

In the medium-term standardised rates should be set but also periodically reviewed. Independent experts could be brought in to provide some oversight or to provide alternative perspectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer rates</td>
<td>Continue review of MEBs</td>
<td>Set MEBs but review regularly</td>
<td>TBA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scaling up / down in response to shocks

There is increasing evidence and analysis from Somalia and elsewhere that it would be more cost effective to support long-term resilience building which helps avoid a crisis, than pay for early preventive action at the onset of a drought or other slow onset disaster. Both are more cost effective than a response, which inevitably comes after loss and damage have occurred.21

Figure 10 below represents the variations in support needs and costs across several years, including a drought, extreme drought and recovery year. Much long-term support continues, typically supported by development budgets. However seasonal and shock-responsive transfers are more volatile and require a more flexible approach. For a volatile caseload and funding requirement to be made more predictable, risk financing approaches should be considered.

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In order to provide flexible and rapid assistance response, design decisions need to be made in advance of a predicted response.

- The type and value of assistance to be provided under given circumstances. Triggers for rapid and automated expansion of assistance need to be determined. For example, for a foreseen circumstance, are transfers to be scaled up horizontally (adding more people to receive transfers) or expanded vertically (increased benefits for people already receiving).

- The systems to provide promised assistance need to be in place.

- Critically, financing arrangements (risk ownership or contingent liability) needs to be agreed in advance. Without such a framework being agreed, any additional funding provided for early response is discretionary and susceptible to political interference (at all levels).

Sufficient financing needs to be identified for even the worst scenarios. Navigating the legal and policy issues at donor headquarters will be challenging. Humanitarian funding needs to be provided not only in response to a crisis, but in advance of a probabilistic event.

In Kenya, the government’s Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) has used remote sensed satellite data (Vegetation Condition Index-VCI) as the basis of triggering expansion of cash transfers to pre-registered households, as a rapid, early stage response. Somalia might consider a similar approach. The system is based on objective time series data, for which the probability (and hence cost) of an event occurring can be calculated. An ability to price risk over the long term means that risk finance and insurance approaches can be used to ensure predictable funding is guaranteed.

Introducing risk-based flexible assistance in the midst of an ongoing crisis is impossible. The costs of a response to a current situation are known with 100% certainty, so that the cost of insuring what is known is the same as the actual cost.

**Way forward and recommendations**

In the short term, further feasibility study needs to be conducted on options for data sources, identified triggers, risk-finance options and modelling the costs of design parameters based on historic data. Options should be considered for pooled contingency funding.

Discussion and agreement of proposed options should lead to agreement not only on a common design but also of risk ownership, leading to implementation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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Figure 10 A typical scalable social assistance scheme
## To end 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scaling up / down in response to shocks</th>
<th>Feasibility study of design options and risk ownership. Identification of risk ownership</th>
<th>Adopted design and financing arrangement</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Monitoring, Research and Evaluation

A variety of monitoring, research and evaluation capacity exists with respect to Somalia. Independent monitoring and evaluation has played an important role in recent years in documenting programme strengths, weaknesses and impact, and thereby influence programme quality. While this overall positive role is evident, analysts have also highlighted that such processes can be compromised in the complex and competitive environment that is the Somalia operating field (Maxwell and Majid, 2016; Transparency International, 2016). In addition, while M & E has played an important disciplining role, donors and agencies are recognising the need for complementary constructive and supportive processes that provide advice on how to improve programme quality; a current example is CHC’s research and advisory role for DfID and its partners, to help improve access to vulnerable populations. The authors are aware of other similar research and advisory requests from UN agencies and NGOs.

Good quality research is also available but it is very unclear whether findings and recommendations are incorporated into agency practice and whether these outputs are quickly forgotten. In the highly complex Somali environment, forms of maintaining institutional memory are required. The RVI and CHC are examples of small organisations with this capacity, and who are also able to convene and include independent Somali perspectives and analyses, which are often missing.

Somalia remains a highly complex and contested environment in which good quality data and information can be difficult to obtain as well as to interpret. However, high quality, independent research is still possible. It is increasingly the case that combining multi-sectoral technical expertise with good contextual knowledge to understanding the Somalia operating environment. Third-party monitoring organisations will continue to be relevant. A review of their strengths and weaknesses could usefully be undertaken.

**Way forward and recommendations**

In the short-term, this capacity could be contracted in and added to the Donor Coordination Team function, to ensure available knowledge is incorporated into analysis and decision-making processes from the outset.

In the medium-term a research and advisory facility could be created, with a strategic focus on social protection-related issues.

A medium-term (e.g. 3-year) applied research and advisory facility may usefully be considered, and aligned with social assistance goals. CHC and RVI are two examples of current organisations that are currently playing this role but often on an informal and ad hoc basis.

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22 CHC advisory work with DfID (2017).

23 An example might be the DfID funded SAVE study (http://www.saveresearch.net/).
### Food Security and Nutrition surveillance

Currently the FSNAU and FEWSNET provide a wide range of data and analysis on Somalia. These include satellite-based rainfall and vegetation cover, market data and analysis, nutrition surveillance, detailed livelihood profiles and integrated seasonal analyses and forecasts (amongst others). These agencies provide a critical resource that is used by agencies for resource mobilisation and planning purposes, although their relative strengths and weaknesses were not reviewed as part of this exercise.

These agencies have little or no presence in Somalia or Somaliland and therefore are not available to Government or other actors in Somalia (although there are reports and outputs available online). These agencies need to improve their links and capacity building of their counter-parts in Somalia, such as SoDMA in Mogadishu.

These organisations do not provide longitudinal analyses of food security and livelihood changes and many of the livelihood baseline profiles are out-dated.

As mentioned it is worth noting that the HSNP uses a simple satellite vegetation index trigger to mobilise increased transfers in the case of a drought. Similar or the same satellite data is available for Somalia. Analysis of the correlation of such satellite data with deteriorating food security conditions and humanitarian funding increases would be useful and may give credence to using it as a trigger, such as in Kenya.

**Way forward and recommendations**

In the short term it is likely that FSNAU and FEWSNET continue to operate from Nairobi, however closer ties should be encouraged with SoDMA, including the possibility of providing increased technical assistance within the authority. This support should continue to grow over time and a capacity support and skills transfer plan should be agreed and actioned.

### Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring, Research, Evaluation</td>
<td>Capture lessons learned from 2016/17. DCT to agree research commissions</td>
<td>Continue 3rd party monitoring. Consider contracting research and advisory facility</td>
<td>Joint 3rd party monitoring Research and advisory facility in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition surveillance</td>
<td>Continue with FSNAU / FEWSNET analysis</td>
<td>Integrate within SoDMA</td>
<td>Operated within SoDMA, supported by FSNAU / FEWSNET</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.4 Finance and affordability

At the time of writing 3.1m people are categorised as being in IPC Phase 2, and 3.1m in Phases 3 and 4. 18 months ago, 3.7m were in Phase 2 and approx. 1m in Phase 3 and 4 (68% of whom were IDPs).

Following the 2011 drought and famine, now followed by conditions approaching famine in 2017, much of Somalia is experiencing a prolonged period of exacerbated vulnerability, which will only improve significantly with several consecutive reasonable rains (and other positive factors).

As a reality check on the affordability of a nationally planned social protection programme, some back of the envelop calculations might be helpful at this stage. The figures suggested are very preliminary estimates and simply to give a sense of proportion. Clearly much more detailed planning would need to take place in due course.

The cost of a long term unconditional cash transfer scheme is estimated first. It is assumed that a (say) 10% of the population are deemed to be “vulnerable” and beneath the minimum entry requirements for participating in a productive activity programme (following the integrated programme model suggested above).

- 13 million people @ 6 people / HH = 2,170,000 HH
- 10% of these HHs might be suitable for entry to a cash transfer programme for the most vulnerable = 217,000 HHs
- These 217,000 HHs might be offered a cash grant of (say) US$30 per month x 12 = US$360 per year. The management costs would be high in the early years but reduce over time once systems are established to (say) 10%.
- Total cost for an unconditional cash transfer = US$78,120,000 plus US$7,812,000 = US$85,932,000.

A typical "resilience“ programme including public works, income generating activities, savings groups, etc., as described by one current implementing partner consulted, provides an assistance package worth approx. US360 per household per year (excluding management fees). Extrapolating this up to national scale, and ignoring all other variables, produces the following calculation:

- This might cost (at 10% of the population, say) 217,000 x US$358 per HH = US$77,686,000
- Plus, let’s say 20% management costs US$15,537,200 (it’s more costly to manage field activities than cash transfers)
- A combined total for vulnerable transfer and resilience programming is = US$93,223,200 per year.

As advocated for in this paper, this is considered a long-term cost, with no real prospect of the number of households needing this type of support diminishing for the foreseeable future.

Hence, adding these two numbers gives a total of US$179 million. This is the same order of magnitude as the approx. US$110 million spend in recent years on this sector in addition to health and education. It is less than the current humanitarian annual spend. Once a registry and ID system is created, transferring this money becomes more efficient.

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24 This is comparable with rates provided under the BRCIS and STREAM programmes.

25 This is admittedly lower than currently preferred by aid agencies based on Minimum Expenditure Basket calculations. This figure is chosen to use a figure which is nationally affordable. If an increase is desired, the budget might be reduced for the productive activities also illustrated.
### Way forward and recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Affordability</td>
<td>Scoping research and estimates / MDTF use</td>
<td>Joint / consolidated</td>
<td>National planning and financing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Process

This section outlines priority focus for transitioning to a social assistance system over the short term (now to end 2018), medium term (2019) and beyond (2020-25). Finally, it suggests a visionary statement summarizing the principles and technical functions proposed above. The following section sets out individual tasks in tabular form, consolidating what has been described above. Finally, a suggested monthly timetable for managing workload from now to end 2018 is presented.

Short term for 2018 - BUILDING CONSENSUS FOR A CONTINUUM OF SUPPORT / RESPONSE

Internal EU/ECHO work will need to continue developing and following a joint strategy, identifying precise entry points for quick wins and longer-term work.

Establish Donor Coordination Team (DCT) with a mandate, authority and defined resources. Agree how the DCT will be funded, from where and by whom. Agree ways of working together and develop MoUs with development partners and operational agencies. Starting with major donors (EU, DFID, WBG and USAID), proceed to agree between other bilateral donors and development partners (e.g. WFP, UNICEF, FAO etc).

Between Development Partners, agree what a broad 2030 vision could look like and identify immediate priority joint analytical work to inform future, with technical working groups and FGS: targeting, vulnerability, payment delivery system, food management, harmonizing beneficiary lists, registries, IDPs, etc. Consider role for Cash Working Group and CaLP on technical issues. Also consider establishing dedicated technical assistance facility as a DCT secretariat, to coordinate the technical work and with funding for consultancy deployment (including for capacity support and technical assistance to FGS and FMS).

Review all existing financing instruments and agree what instruments to transition to. Review financing pipelines and agree on financing modalities - ideally a common pool, or at least harmonised instruments that know when each can be used. This might not be completed in the course of 2018 as the discussion will take a long time, especially if new alternatives to humanitarian financing are identified. Hence this will need to be reviewed periodically.

Establish structures for technical discussions and shared decision making (and transparent processes for making and communicating decisions). These should be FGS/FMS owned and chaired but likely populated by DP/s and FGS/FMS. Aside from increasing contact in Mogadishu, use high quality video conference facilities to connect people in different locations.

Medium Term for 2019 - OPERATIONALIZING CONSENSUS ON A CONTINUUM

Internal Devco and ECHO work needs to demonstrate execution of its strategy.

Hold conference to achieve the following:

(1) review joint technical analytical work, agreed in 2018. Make relevant agreements about implications for new programming and existing; and

(2) to design a national programme. Commit to developing a “Joint Programme Design Document”, one logframe, etc. which can then be used to push in respective donor HQs for mobilising funding. Agree strategic programme objectives with FGS in lead, and fundraise for “One Programme”.

(3) Agree plan for joint (or at least synchronized) investments in common “delivery systems” and processes: Identity system, Registry, Payment mechanism.

Lastly, establish dedicated senior level task team (including FGS, FMS) to agree transfer rates - this is ultimately a political decision, not a technical one.

Long Term 2020-2025 - DELIVERING A CONTINUUM
Standardization: develop SoPs for implementers and framework to regulate cash payment mechanisms/partners.

Pilot categorical vulnerability targeting trial in at least one Region.

Collectively agree and invest in food security and nutrition information system to generate data on agreed triggers.

Continue to assess and respond to Government capacity support needs.

Develop shared learning agenda – including data requirements, knowledge gaps, facility.

**End game - 2030**

Beyond 2030, Somalia has a single functional benefits distribution system which delivers support to those most in need. Predictable assistance, provided in the name of the state, enables people to improve their wellbeing and maintain the gains they make. It reduces deprivation and inequality, helps meet people’s short term needs, and encourages economic growth. The system is based on a consensus across Somalia society including the most marginalized, whereby the government is perceived to be providing for its citizens. A nationally led and planned approach is supported by international assistance and designed with best practice and available technology. Over the long term this helps reduce the unpredictable demands for international aid and makes financing more predictable.

**4.2 Summary actions table**

A summary table of issues described in the above text is set out in Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Short term To end 2018</th>
<th>Medium term To end 2019</th>
<th>Long term 2020 and beyond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership &amp; Coordination</strong></td>
<td>Donor Coordination Team – Convene and define TORs. Workstreams identified and assigned. TORs for Secretariat define and consider establishing TA facility Cash Working Group (CWG) to continue.</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Facility established to coordinate technical work and assistance. Agree joint delivery systems.</td>
<td>Capacity support for FGS / FMS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principles, characteristics and roles</strong></td>
<td>Agree principles and stakeholder roles.</td>
<td>Apply and review.</td>
<td>Continue to assess.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulation of Money Transfer Operators (MTOs)</strong></td>
<td>Assess risk landscape of unregulated transfers and develop mitigation plan.</td>
<td>Monitor and revised risk management plan.</td>
<td>Assess risk landscape of unregulated transfers and develop mitigation plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity system</strong></td>
<td>Scope functional ID system for all social transfers.</td>
<td>Implementation of ID system for social transfers.</td>
<td>Foundational ID replaces functional system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Protection policy</strong></td>
<td>Consultation &amp; development.</td>
<td>Finalise &amp; adopt.</td>
<td>Implement and oversee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Registration</strong></td>
<td>Common Standards identified and used.</td>
<td>Single Registry designed and procured.</td>
<td>Single Registry operating independently.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Roadmap summary showing short, medium and long-term actions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs)</strong></th>
<th>Priorities / quick wins identified with support from CWG. Agree common framework for implementation Core SoPs developed and agreed.</th>
<th>Core SoPs developed further linked to policy e.g. social protection policy.</th>
<th>SoPs followed by implementing agencies and independently monitored.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeting</strong></td>
<td>Options for targeting categorical groups explored (referencing social protection policy). Consider forthcoming research on IDPs. Pilot(s) identified, initiated and evaluation methodology agreed.</td>
<td>Pilot(s) identified, initiated and evaluation methodology agreed.</td>
<td>Scale up integrated approach with long term transfers for most vulnerable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfer rates</strong></td>
<td>CWG to continue to monitor transfer rates.</td>
<td>Agreed transfer rates with FGS / FMS.</td>
<td>Review and revise periodically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scaling up / down in response to shocks</strong></td>
<td>Feasibility study of design options and risk ownership. Identification of risk ownership.</td>
<td>Adopted design and financing arrangement.</td>
<td>Implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring, Research, Evaluation</strong></td>
<td>Capture lessons learned from 2016/17. DCT to agree research commissions.</td>
<td>Continue 3rd party monitoring. Consider contracting research and advisory facility.</td>
<td>Joint 3rd party monitoring Research and advisory facility in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food Security &amp; Nutrition Surveillance</strong></td>
<td>Continue with FSNAU / FEWSNETS analysis.</td>
<td>Integrate within SoDMA.</td>
<td>Operate within SoDMA supported by FSNAU / FEWSNET.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finance and Affordability</strong></td>
<td>Scoping research and estimates / MDTF use.</td>
<td>Joint / consolidated.</td>
<td>National planning and financing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3: Roadmap for short, medium and long term actions

#### Summary recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timescale</th>
<th>Short Term to 2018</th>
<th>Medium Term to 2019</th>
<th>Long Term to 2025</th>
<th>End game beyond 2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership/co-ordination</strong></td>
<td>FGS and DCT to form, meet and agree “one programme” vision, principles and priorities. Agree role and inclusion of FMS in process</td>
<td>FGS and DCT continue</td>
<td>FGS and DCT continue</td>
<td>FGS / FMS lead / coordinate with international support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy</strong></td>
<td>Policy priorities agreed</td>
<td>National Social Protection policy completed</td>
<td>Policy priorities upheld and revised as necessary</td>
<td>FGS / FMS set and review policy priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial</strong></td>
<td>Transitional financing plan for “one programme” developed jointly, agreement, including management and disbursement channels</td>
<td>Medium term financing (MTF) plan aligned with jointly agreed policy priorities</td>
<td>MTF implemented</td>
<td>Increasing FGS / FMS contribution of finance from taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical</strong></td>
<td>Technical feasibility for MIS (Identity, Registration, Payments &amp; Communications) completed</td>
<td>DCT secretariat / Technical assistance facility functioning, MIS commissioned</td>
<td>MIS functioning to support benefits distribution (cash transfers, goods, services and referrals)</td>
<td>MIS continues. Foundational ID system in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational</strong></td>
<td>Implementation agencies (UN, NGOs) participate in technical working groups to agree standardisation. CWG provides continuation.</td>
<td>Standards and integration with MIS developed by TWGs</td>
<td>Implementation uses core MIS.</td>
<td>Equitable and standardised distribution of assistance based on evidence / impact and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Background

Social protection in Somalia is defined as “government-led policies and programs which address predictable needs throughout the life cycle in order to protect all groups, and particularly the poor and vulnerable, against shocks, help them to manage risks, and provide them with opportunities to overcome poverty, vulnerability, and exclusion. By addressing the root causes of poverty, risk, and vulnerability, social protection is expected to contribute to poverty reduction, social cohesion and inclusion, and economic growth as part of a cost-effective, sustainable, and comprehensive national system”.

Although social protection is not yet high on the list of government priorities, it is mentioned among the objectives under the Resilience Pillar first Somalia National Development Plan (SNDP)\(^\text{26}\) covering the period 2017-2020. Indeed, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) recognizes that safety nets and social protection is a critical instrument for state building, economic recovery and resilience in Somalia.

As a fundamental step towards developing this system, back in December 2016, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), within the framework of the Somali New Deal Compact, has approved a programme entitled “Combatting Poverty and Vulnerability in Somalia through Social Protection” to be financed under the UN Multi-Partners Trust Fund. This programme, to be implemented by UNICEF and WFP, aims to lay the foundations for the design and management of a comprehensive social protection system by developing the Policy and Institutional Frameworks for Social Protection and by identifying strategies to reach vulnerable populations through social protection.

In terms of coordination mechanism, it has been agreed that the post-2016 architecture will build on and reinforce the mechanisms and frameworks that have been set up for the implementation of the Somali Compact and which are currently functioning adequately. The dedicated social protection sub-working group under the Somali Compact and Peace and State-building Goals (PSGs) will be continued under the the sub-working group "Disaster preparedness, social protection, Food Security /Nutrition” of the Resilience Pillar. Development plans for both Somalia as a whole and Somaliland propose establishing social protection or social welfare systems that provide for the needs of the most vulnerable populations.

In conflict affected or fragile states, government social protection systems are often weak or absent and generally only exist because of external support. Usually they do not go beyond cash transfer programmes of limited coverage and length. In these contexts, non-state actors including international NGOs or UN agencies are the predominant provider of social assistance services and livelihood interventions. However their programmes tend to be small and fragmented, administratively challenging and too expensive to be brought to scale, not predictable, of limited

coverage and duration and insufficiently mutually streamlined. As such they are not considered to fulfil a full social protection role. This is the case in Somalia.

Donors, fatigued by huge humanitarian budgets and competing humanitarian priorities, are looking for more efficient and effective ways to meet acute and chronic needs, prepare better for the next crisis and invest in the future, but there are constraints.

International agencies in Somalia are making technical offers, but in the absence of or with limited comprehensive and coordinated vulnerability and poverty assessment, there seems to be no clear prioritisation on which SP investments to focus with the limited human and financial resources available. This more opportunistic and diverse approach may be sensible in the short-term given the political economy of the donor environment in Somalia, but in the long-term it creates a risk that limited resources (financial and especially human) are not prioritised effectively, and could lead to uncoordinated and un-scalable entitlements with high administrative costs and limited impact on poverty and vulnerability.

The current humanitarian drought response in 2017 potentially provides a base from which to transition, combined with other donor interest, in scaling up cash transfers. This may provide a catalyst towards medium-long term safety nets/social protection approaches. Although cash transfers will likely continue to play a primary role in social protection support in Somalia given their relative simplicity, flexibility and cost-effectiveness, other instruments will increasingly have a role to play.

A conference on Social Protection in contexts of Fragility and Forced Displacement will be held on the 28-29th September 2017 in Brussels. A special session on Somalia is foreseen. The Government will be represented.

2. **Objective(s), expected deliverable(s) and deadline(s) of the ASiST assignment**

2.1. **Objective(s) of the assignment**

The Social Protection specialists engaged should support the EU Delegation and ECHO Somalia country offices to seek opportunities to envision during the next 3 years how the current humanitarian assistance and development cooperation in Somalia, especially through cash transfers, could be an option on which to build the foundations of a transitional large-scale emergency safety net programme in protracted crisis for chronically food insecure households, including internally displaced people.

At this moment monthly cash transfers are provided to different vulnerable groups in the affected areas of the country. An estimated total of some 3 million people survive on these cash transfers. Much of the transfers are multi-purpose, some are sector specific (e.g. water vouchers). Most of the transfers are unconditional (UCT); some are related to public works (PW) or conditionalities (CCT).

2.2. **Expected output(s)**

Under this ASiST assignment, the experts will be expected to:

- Document the strategic views of the major donors/agencies funding/implementing humanitarian/emergency cash transfers in relation to a “transitional” emergency safety net programme
  - A) Govt. of Somalia (more details to be provided).
  - EU, EU MSs, WB, USAID;
- B) UNRC, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, OCHA;
- C) INGOs consortium – BRICS and SOMREP, Adeso, CWG, CASH;
- D) ICRC.

- Take stock of the current large-scale cash transfer programmes in Somalia.
- Identify and compare major elements, such as:
  - Targeting;
  - Transfer value;
  - Registration methods;
  - Delivery mechanisms and use of biometrics;
  - Aid modalities;
  - Monitoring and evaluation system (incl. PDM);
  - Others.

- Review lessons learned, best practices, evaluation and studies prepared by WB, WFP/UNICEF, Adeso, Save the Children, HPG/ODI, etc.

- Prioritization exercise to identify potential sectors, areas of interest, themes, and targeted groups to be considered in linking the current cash transfer projects to a transitional, more predictable, nascent emergency safety net programme.

- Draft embryonic recommendations on the next steps to be planned in order to:
  - Draw a road map to transition from the current cash-transfers project/programme-approach to a longer term, large-scale emergency safety net programme within 3 years, as a buffer and to respond to recurrent and protracted crisis for chronically food insecure and internally displaced people.
  - Based on a gaps analysis, identify what is needed in each step of the roadmap to make the transition happening.
  - Pay special attention to the potential for financial sustainability to establish a safety net programme for the next three years (funded by int. donors).
  - Provide initial recommendations on how the safety net would interact with the Government and which would be the priority interlocutors in the GoS.

- Present and discuss main insights at the International Conference on Social protection in contexts of fragility and forced displacement in Brussels on 28-29 September 2017.

- Present and discuss main insights at the Staff Seminar on Social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus in Brussels on 23-26 October 2017

### 2.3. Reporting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected deliverables (outputs and reports)</th>
<th>Date / Deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing with EUD and ECHO Somalia (in Nairobi)</td>
<td>Friday 15th September morning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing with Key stakeholders (in Nairobi)</td>
<td>Friday 15th September morning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 zero draft in bullet points (max 4-page)</td>
<td>Around 20th September 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 PowerPoint presentation with the main findings</td>
<td>By 25th September 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 consultants attend the International Conference on Social protection in contexts of fragility and forced displacement (Brussels) as panellists</td>
<td>Thursday 28th September 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 final report (20 pages max, with a 2-page executive summary)</td>
<td>By 20th October 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 consultant attend the Staff Seminar on social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus (Brussels) as guest speaker</td>
<td>Wednesday 25th October 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debriefing session with EC headquarters and the core team of the guidance package on Social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus</td>
<td>By 27th October 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4. Possible follow-up (beyond this ASiST assignment)

The results of the study are intended to be used for the development of the EU Guidance Package on "Providing Social Protection across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus." For this purpose, additional work (to be financed by the Guidance Package initiative) might become relevant, such as:
- Developing a generic approach from conducting such diagnosis and support missions (referred to as "Living case study");
- Translating the study results into training modules to be integrated into the Guidance package;
- Providing any necessary follow-up support to the EUD and ECHO country office, either through another mission or distance support.

3. Activities
- Literature review of the technical documentation recently published (or grey literature) related to cash transfers, safety nets and social protection Somalia-specific only.
- Interviews with key stakeholders in Nairobi and Mogadishu (and capitals by VTC, if needed). List with names to be provided by EU Del and ECHO.
- Feedback meetings with EU Del and ECHO and other stakeholders.
- Drafting and submitting reporting.
- Participation of 2 consultants at the SP Conference in Brussels on 28th Sept. session 1/A.
- Participation of 1 consultant at the EU Staff Seminar in Brussels on 25th October 2017.

4. Profile of the expert(s)
- 2 senior SP specialists:
  - 1 senior practitioner with long-term experience at field level in managing SP programmes, familiar with context of fragility and displacement.
  - 1 with academic background, familiar with context of fragility and displacement, food security and Somalia.

5. Tentative agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Expert 1 (team leader)</th>
<th>Expert 2 (if any)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Do not indicate any amount/budget</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Man-day</td>
<td>Per diem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Preliminary desk work</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>04 Sept</td>
<td>Travel to Nairobi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05-08 Sept</td>
<td>Meetings with stakeholders</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09-11 Sept</td>
<td>Meetings with stakeholders</td>
<td>Modagishu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-14 Sept</td>
<td>Meetings with stakeholders</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sept</td>
<td>Debriefing with the EUD/ECHO</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Sept</td>
<td>Travel from Nairobi</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-22 Sept</td>
<td>Preliminary analysis: 4-pager, draft report, PPT presentation</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Sept</td>
<td>Panel at the SP conference</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02-13 Oct</td>
<td>Final reporting</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct (tbc)</td>
<td>Debriefing package and session with the EC (teleconference)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct</td>
<td>Session at the Staff seminar</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Focal points

- **EU Del Somalia**: Ms. Pauline GIBOURDEL (Pauline.GIBOURDEL@eeas.europa.eu) and Ms. Susanne Martin (Susanne.MARTIN@eeas.europa.eu)
- **ECHO Somalia**: Mr. Johan HEFFINCK (Johan.Heffinck@echofield.eu) and Ms. Heather Blackwell (Heather.blackwell@echofield.eu)
- **ECHO Regional Office**: Mr. Massimo LA ROSA (Massimo.larosa@echofield.eu)
- **DEVCO HQ**: Mr. Juergen HOHMANN (Juergen.HOHMANN@ec.europa.eu)
- **ECHO HQ**: Ms. Montse PANTALEONI-GIRALT (Montserrat.PANTALEONI-GIRALT1@ec.europa.eu)

7. Important practical information

- The logistics of any trip to Mogadishu (1-2 days to be confirmed) would be organised by the EUD/ECHO; any costs would then be covered/reimbursed by the experts/DAI upon EUD/ECHO request.
- The transport costs of the expert 2 for attending the conference in Brussels on 28 September will be covered by UNICEF. DAI/ASiST will take care of both participation (1 WD) and transport costs of the Expert 1 + the participation (1 WD) of the Expert 2.
- The costs incurred to ensure the experts’ security in Modagishu will be covered by the mission’s budget.

☒ Please tick this box to accept that we may contact you after the service is complete to get feedback on ASiST’s performance.
Annex 2 Consultation record

Mohamed Ali CEO, TARDO
Ahmed Abdi, ex-DG Ministry of Telecommunications, FGS
Mark Agoya, DfID Somalia
Degan Ali, Executive Director, ADESO
Johanna Antila, Programme Officer for Somalia, Humanitarian Affairs, Migration, Crisis Management
Barnabas Asora, Head of Programme, NRC Somalia (Coordinator for Cash Alliance)
Nancy Balfour, Partner, Centre for Humanitarian Change
Justin Brady, Head, OCHA Somalia
Chip Bury, Regional Resilience Coordinator, USAID, Kenya and East Africa
Dustin Caniglia, Head of Resilience, Concern Worldwide
Joseph Chege, FFP/USAID Kenya and East Africa
George Conway, Country Director, UNDP Somalia
Pamela Dale, Social Protection, East and Southern Africa, UNICEF
Delphine Dechaux, Protection Officer, WFP Somalia
Peter DeClercq, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative
Abdi Dirshe, P. S. Ministry of Planning, Federal Government of Somalia
Mohamed Farah, P.S. Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management
Pauline Gibourdel, Programme Manager, Resilience and Natural Resource Management, Delegation of the European Union to Somalia
Emily A. Gish, Regional Advisor, OFDA/USAID, East and Central Africa Regional Office
Martijn Goddeeris, Chief of Party, BRCIS
Peter Hailey, Partner, Centre for Humanitarian Change
Jean-Baptiste Heral, Somalia Coordinator, ACTED Kenya/Somalia
Gianluca Iazzolino, Independent Consultant
Liljana Jovceva, Head of Programme, WFP Somalia
Ruby Khan, Programme Policy Officer, WFP Somalia
Andrew Lanyon, Chief of Party, SomRep
Massimo La Rosa, Global Thematic Coordinator Forced Displacement & Migration – Social Protection Advisor, ECHO
Dorian LaGuardia, Director, Third Reef Solutions (MESH Programme, Somalia)
Margherita Lulli, Programme Coordinator, Italian Agency for Development Cooperation
Susanne Martin, Head of Resilience, Infrastructure and Social Sectors, Delegation of the European Union to Somalia
Winnie Mbusya, Consortium Lead, ACTED/STREAM
Takeshi Moriyama, Deputy Representative, UNHCR
Mohamed Moallim, P. S. Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Federal Government of Somalia
Urayi Mutsindikwa, Cash-based Interventions (CBI) Officer, UNHCR
Maniza Naqvi, Senior Social Protection, World Bank
Abdullahi Nur Osman, Hormud
Jama Noor, Director of Projects, Dahabshil Group
Abdullahi Osman, Hormud Foundation
Karen Peachey, Regional Representative – East Africa, CaLP
Deqa Saleh, Cash Focal Point, Adeso
Puteri Natalie Watson, Deputy Head, World Bank
Leo Thomas, DfID
Chris Porter, Head of Humanitarian Profession, DfID
Danielle Trotter, Acting Social Protection Coordinator, UNICEF
Dusan Vukotic, Economic Security Unit Coordinator, Somalia Delegation
Raphael Wittwer, Head of Risk Management Unit, ICRC
Badra Yusuf, Independent Consultant (working with Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs)
Annex 3 List of key documents
The following list is not comprehensive list but highlights important reference documents in relation to safety nets and social protection, in Somalia.

- ‘Cash-Based Safety Nets for Livelihood Support In Northeastern Somalia, a Feasibility Study for Save the Children and Horn Relief (now Adeso), 2007’. (this was followed by two phases of an EU and SIDA funded safety net programme).

The World Bank has conducted a number of important studies and reviews, including:
  - In 2016, the World Bank produced the report ‘Somaliland Social Protection. Stocktaking of Evidence for a Social Protection Policy and Framework: Mobile Nation’. This note provides an important synthesis of relevant data and information on poverty and vulnerability in Somaliland, identifying possible steps forward.
  - A Remittances and Vulnerability study (World Bank, forthcoming)
  - "One person, one identity, one vote – Toward a Somali Identification System to Underpin Democracy and Development”. (World Bank, IOM, UNDP and Terra Incognita, 2016).

Programme evaluations, reviews and concept notes, including:
  - The Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG) analyses of the 2011 famine response (ODI, 2012), and the evaluation of the same response, ‘Cash Response to the 2011 famine’ (Hedlund et al. 2013)
  - The NGOs Adeso and Save the Children, implemented two phases over 3-4 years in northern Somalia, from 2013, of a Social Safety Net programme, funded by the EU and Sida (ended in 2016). Both phases were independently evaluated.


Important programme experience and learning (and documentation) exists with the resilience consortia and UN implementing agencies:
  - BRCiS, SomRep, STREAM, FAO-WFP-UNICEF (Joint Resilience Strategy)

Outputs of the Cash Working Group (see: http://www.cashlearning.org/somalia/somalia)
  - Checking Back. Using cash and vouchers in Somalia: Recommendations from the 2011-12 Somalia Drought Response (March 2017);

Other relevant studies and research:
  - Securing Access in Volatile Environments (SAVE/Humanitarian outcomes – study funded by DfID)
  - Corruption in Humanitarian Aid in Somalia (CREATE/Transparency International/Humanitarian Outcomes – funded by ECHO)
- Famine in Somalia 2011-2012: Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures (Maxwell and Majid, 2016)
- REFANI research programme: [www.concern.net/resources/refani-research-food-assistance-nutritional-impact](http://www.concern.net/resources/refani-research-food-assistance-nutritional-impact)
Annex 4 Bibliography


World Bank, IOM, UNDP and Terra Incognita (2016), ‘One person, one identity, one vote – Toward a Somali Identification System to Underpin Democracy and Development.’