

DELIVERED THROUGH THE EXPERT ADVISORY CALL-DOWN SERVICE (EACDS) LOT B:

## STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE TO CRISES

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# EVIDENCE BRIEF 1: POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

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## EXPERT ADVISORY CALL DOWN SERVICE – LOT B

### STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE TO CRISES

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE

The literature review showed that evidence on this theme emerged out of two main disciplines: 1) work by and for Education in Emergencies (EiE) practitioners - particularly with regard to coordination amongst stakeholders; and 2) academic publications on how to analyse and understand political settlements and their effects. The number of documents found for the former was quite limited. The review found that coordination mechanisms at global and country level are the same across hot conflict, protracted crises, or natural disaster contexts. Although there is a large body of literature on political settlements that comes from governance perspectives, most of these documents are highly academic and do not apply specifically to the education sector. Political settlement analysis can be applied to designing strategies for education in hot conflict, protracted crises, and natural disaster contexts. It is clear that there is currently no robust evidence that provides concrete examples of 'what works', with regard to building greater consensus. The strategies that the reviewed documents provide seem only to be more general starting points for thinking and analysis.

## 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DEFINITION

This Evidence Brief aims to summarise what is and is not known about building consensus and coordination amongst a variety of stakeholders within Education in Emergency (EiE) contexts. More specifically, through a review of current evidence, this Brief aims to answer the following question:

*How can DFID build more consensus and coordination amongst all stakeholders surrounding immediate and long-term education delivery in political settlement contexts?*

Given the complexity and variety of concepts within this research question, it would be prudent to clarify some terms before proceeding. With regard to **stakeholders**, we refer to host governments, multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies, international/local NGOs, and any other relevant humanitarian and/or development organisations working at the global and country level (a more specific list and discussion of these stakeholders is provided in section six). **Immediate and long-term education** refers to both the short-term provision that comes as a response to an emergency (usually involving humanitarian actors) and the long-term provision that is delivered through state structures and systems (usually involving development actors). This Brief aims to explore the mechanisms that facilitate consensus and coordination on these issues, in order to reduce the divide that currently exists. Finally, a **political settlement** is an informal understanding or agreement forged amongst political, social, or economic elites that can have varying effects on the governance and service delivery of state institutions. There are a variety of different types and analyses of political settlements, and these will be discussed further in section six, particularly with regard to how they affect education delivery in conflict settings, protracted refugee crises, and natural disasters.

## 1.3 HOW THE EVIDENCE IS STRUCTURED

There were no documents that addressed the research question in its entirety, most likely due to the multiple concepts contained within the question itself. Thus, it may be helpful to 'break down' the question into the general concepts/themes that are present, particularly since documents could only be found regarding these component parts. These main concepts/themes include:

1. Building general consensus and coordination in EiE contexts;
2. Bridging education humanitarian and development efforts;
3. Understanding and engaging with political settlements in general;
4. Engaging with political settlements regarding education.

The table below outlines these main themes (listed in the blue horizontal boxes) and maps out the documents related to them. The orange vertical boxes provide judgements on the value of the strategies provided in the documents, in which 'concrete strategies' based on practitioner experience were very specific and could provide direct guidance to readers. 'Broad strategies' were based a set of principles or applied theory and often lacked specifics on how to achieve the strategies suggested. 'Abstract strategies' were based on generally academic or conceptual discussions of a topic and provided overarching strategies that seemed quite difficult to apply in a practical manner.

	Building consensus and coordination amongst stakeholders in EiE contexts	Bridging humanitarian and development education efforts in EiE contexts	Understanding and engaging with political settlements in general	Engaging with political settlements regarding education provision
'Concrete strategies' based on practitioner experience	'Education Cluster Coordinator Handbook' (Global Education Cluster, 2010)			
'Broad strategies' based on a set of principles or applied theory	'Principles for international engagement in fragile states and situations' (OECD, 2007)  'Coordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction: challenges and responsibilities' (Sommers, 2004)		'Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper' (DFID, 2010)  'Thinking and working with political settlements' (Kelsall, 2016)	'How does political context shape education reforms and their success?' (Wales, Magee, & Nicolai, 2016)  'Political settlements and pathways to universal health coverage' (Kelsall, Hart, & Laws, 2016)  'The Political Economy of Education and Health Service Delivery in Afghanistan' (AREU, 2016)
'Abstract strategies' based on a conceptual discussion of a topic	'Education Cannot Wait: Proposing a fund for education in emergencies' (ODI, 2016)	'Education Cannot Wait: Proposing a fund for education in	'A review of the evidence informing DFID's "Building Peaceful States	'The politics of what works in service delivery: An evidence-based

	Frequently asked questions and fact sheet on Education Cannot Wait (Education Cannot Wait, 2017)	emergencies ‘ (ODI, 2016)	and Societies” practice paper’ (Evans, 2012)	review’ (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2012)  ‘Researching the politics of service provision: A new conceptual and methodological approach’ (ESID, 2014)  ‘The Political Economy of Education Systems in Conflict-Affected Contexts’ (Novelli, Higgins, Ugur, & Valiente, 2014)
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## 2 KEY FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW

This section aims to thread together the salient findings and lessons learnt from the reviewed documents in order to answer the research question in its entirety. It will start with a discussion of the main EiE consensus and coordination structures at both the global and country levels. Although the literature does not provide concrete strategies for bridging EiE humanitarian and development efforts, we will extrapolate some ideas for this that come from a discussion of how emergency education clusters interface with longer-term education working groups. There will then be a discussion of strategies for building consensus and coordination with governmental education actors, particularly with regard to political settlements.

### 2.1 CONSENSUS AND COORDINATION STRUCTURES AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL

There is one predominant structure at the global level that aims to build consensus and coordination for issues surrounding education in emergencies. This is the Global Education Cluster, comprised of representatives from predominantly humanitarian agencies directly or indirectly involved in the delivery of emergency education services or the development of technical policies and guidance. It was established to ensure system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to emergencies, and to ensure greater predictability and more effective inter-agency responses in education. The Global Education Cluster has eight objectives in total, but its first three are most pertinent with regard to gaining consensus and coordination amongst stakeholders<sup>1</sup>:

Promote increased levels of understanding of the key role of education as part of a first-phase humanitarian response to all major new emergencies, subsequent phases of response, and early recovery.

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<sup>1</sup> (Global Education Cluster, 2010, p. 26)

Promote and improve on internationally recognised standards of good practice in education responses to emergencies and early recovery (including attention to priority cross-cutting issues for the education sector), and coordinate and disseminate lessons learned within and between emergency responses.

Coordinate cluster partners in providing a rapid and effective holistic response to education-related needs of children and young people resulting from major emergencies as they arise, in collaboration with the relevant national and local authorities.

Although the Global Education Cluster and its related Education Cluster Working Group were established to create structures for building consensus/coordination for EiE, this has not precluded a number of agencies contributing separately to advocacy, policy and funding on their own, such as UNHCR, the Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE), GPE and UNESCO. In addition to this, the Global Education Cluster focuses mainly on immediate humanitarian education response, meaning that development agencies focusing on longer-term education provision have not been deeply involved. Thus, it has been argued that with such a myriad of actors and aims, significant gaps have appeared across and between existing coordination mechanisms. This has prompted the recent development of a new EiE platform entitled *Education Cannot Wait* (ECW), which was launched in 2016 and aims to bring together and support humanitarian and development actors to deliver a more ambitious, integrated education response in emergency contexts.

Developed in consultation with a wide range of relevant organisations and agencies, the Education Cannot Wait platform seeks to generate greater shared political, operational, and financial commitment for existing and new donors, philanthropists, and private sector actors. Its five core functions include:

1. **Inspire political commitment** so that education is viewed by both governments and funders as a top priority during crises.
2. **Plan and respond collaboratively**, with a particular emphasis on enabling humanitarian and development actors to work together on shared objectives.
3. **Generate and disburse additional funding** to close the \$8.5 billion funding gap needed to reach 75 million children and youth.
4. **Strengthen capacity to respond to crises**, nationally and globally, including the ability to coordinate emergency support.
5. **Improve accountability** by developing and sharing knowledge, including collection of more robust data, in order to make better-informed investment decisions, and knowledge of what works and does not.

It is clear that ECW has made a good start on achieving its first and third aims, as ECW has gained high level commitment from a number of aid organisations and donors (of which DFID is one, with a commitment of £30 million<sup>2</sup>). However, there is little discussion or evidence of how it will achieve its other aims of collaboration, strengthening capacity and accountability. At this early stage, ECW appears only to be a very large challenge fund, providing I/NGOs and international agencies with two funding mechanisms to apply for: a 'Breakthrough Fund' for programmes aiming to support countries where emergencies and protracted crises have disrupted education and learning and have targeted programmes to improve delivery of education and learning; and an 'Acceleration Facility' for global or regional programmes designed to increase the scale, efficiency, and effectiveness of existing humanitarian and development initiatives including evidence, policy, and delivery<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-countries-set-to-benefit-from-funding-to-ensure-children-get-an-education-in-times-of-crisis>

<sup>3</sup> In 2017, grants have been disbursed to projects in Chad, Syria, Yemen and Ethiopia

Although ECW has so far proven to be a good mechanism for gaining consensus in the form of a global basket fund for EiE, this platform seems far removed from the consensus and coordination that a DFID adviser may be seeking at country level. Thus, the next section discusses mechanisms for this and how they may potentially be used to bridge the humanitarian and development divide.

## 2.2 CONSENSUS AND COORDINATION STRUCTURES AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

Depending on context, there are several structures that can be used to build EiE consensus and coordination at the country level. These include<sup>4</sup>:

1. **Government-led Education Working Groups:** typically led by the Ministry of Education, these working groups exist prior to a crisis and have a broader mandate for coordinating development aid and support to the sector.
2. **Education clusters** are active in emergencies and coordinate the EiE response by actors in-country. The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children are global co-leads and often take on this role at country level.
3. **Refugee education coordination mechanisms** coordinate refugee operations under the mandate of UNHCR, given the particular international protection requirements for refugees.
4. **Education in emergencies working groups** are active in both emergencies and protracted crises where neither the relevant Education Cluster or refugee education coordination mechanisms have a mandate to operate. These might be led by the government or by another agency that volunteers to coordinate.
5. **Local education groups (LEGs)** coordinate education in development situations and can also address protracted crises needs. They are typically led by the government and supported by UNESCO, donors, or other organisations in areas such as crisis-sensitive education, sector analysis, planning, and capacity development.

As discussed, coordination structures within a country will vary: however, all of the above groups, especially Education Clusters, will generally be comprised of stakeholders who are seen as critical to an effective education sector response to an emergency. These stakeholders often include:

1. Principal national and subnational government partners, including disaster management bodies
2. Existing sector working groups, UN agencies and NGOs with established presence in-country
3. Donors with an expressed interest or tradition in supporting education in emergencies
4. UN agencies and NGOs with reliable access to financial, human, and material resources without dependence on pooled funding
5. UN agencies, NGOs, national and local organisations with proven experience in the sub-sectors of education that are crucial to an effective response
6. Other clusters and cross-cutting issues thematic working groups whose activities will complement or potentially overlap with education

A range of other stakeholders within and outside the education sector may also strengthen preparedness, response, and recovery activities. They are often included in Education Clusters and include:

1. Traditional authorities, elders, and religious leaders
2. Academic and research-based institutions
3. Civil society and professional associations (such as teachers' unions)

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<sup>4</sup> (Nicolai, Hine, & Wales, 2015)



4. Faith-based organisations
5. Police and customs agencies
6. Media organisations

The presence of multiple and diverse partners within a working group or cluster means that a variety of perspectives and power dynamics abound. The Education Cluster Coordinator Handbook<sup>5</sup> outlines several common-sense strategies for gaining consensus and maintaining relationships amongst such a diverse set of stakeholders. The Handbook states<sup>6</sup>:

1. Without the opportunity to express concerns and influence the cluster, partners will lose interest. Offer meaningful opportunities for involvement and feedback, e.g. through working groups, information, and data-sharing, etc.
2. Cluster partners may resent continued decision-making 'on their behalf'. Devolve cluster decision-making where possible, e.g. rotate the Cluster chair, rotate involvement in advisory or working groups, rotate venue so that all partners have the opportunity to host, avoid creating a cluster 'elite'.
3. Regularly ask for, and respond to, feedback, and acknowledge the contributions – big and small – of all cluster partners. Consider periodic surveys to assess partner satisfaction.
4. Cluster partners will already have multiple and diverse demands for information: keep information demands to a minimum.
5. Ensure that information provided by partners is clearly used in reports, situation reports, and in the 3W matrix.
6. Providing interpreting and translated materials, accessible information, and consultation forums at local level will be crucial to enabling the ongoing participation of local cluster partners.
7. Meeting partners individually, preferably at their offices, can be very effective in creating a strong relationship, overcoming misconceptions and the unequal power dynamic that often exists in large meetings, where smaller agencies can find it difficult to contribute.

Although these strategies have not been researched or tested for their 'effectiveness', they have been drawn from seasoned practitioner experience and provide practical strategies that would likely facilitate consensus and coordination amongst all stakeholders. The Education Cluster Coordinator Handbook also discusses different ways in which the Cluster can interface with the Ministry of Education Sector Working Group, and although it does not explicitly discuss how this interface could be used to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development actors, the following section extrapolates based upon this possibility.

### **2.3 BRINGING HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS TOGETHER ON LONG-TERM EDUCATION DELIVERY**

As discussed, Education Clusters are the predominant coordination mechanism for EiE and are generally initiated through a humanitarian response to an emergency; thus, issues of immediate education delivery (as opposed to longer-term, systemic delivery) are usually most prominent. However, the Education Cluster Coordinator Handbook does discuss two ways in which the Education Cluster can and should interface with the Ministry of Education Sector Working Group (if the MoE is indeed functional), which traditionally deals with issues surrounding long-term education delivery. Thus, it would appear that the interface between these two

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<sup>5</sup> The Handbook is a rich resource that provides details on all aspects of implementing and running an Education Cluster

<sup>6</sup> Although these strategies are specifically designed for the Cluster Coordinator, it would seem to be good practice for all major stakeholders in the Cluster to also use these strategies in order to mitigate tensions and unequal power dynamics.

structures would also allow for the bridging of humanitarian and development efforts, as well as building consensus on both immediate and long-term education delivery. The two models the Handbook discusses include:

1. **Cluster as a sub-group of education sector working group:** During the onset of an emergency, the Education Cluster can be initiated as a sub-group of the education sector working group and would have limited interaction with the working group at its onset. However, over time the level of interaction should steadily increase until all cluster functions are ultimately mainstreamed within the working group. For example, contingency planning and disaster preparedness should be mainstreamed into the education sector working group particularly after emergency and recovery efforts, thus ensuring sustainability and the inclusion of elements of education in emergencies in medium- to longer-term education sector planning.

Unfortunately, the Handbook does not give any examples or case studies for this model, thus remaining highly abstract: however, in principle, it would seem that education sector working group members (such as DFID advisers) would have the opportunity to interface with (and participate in) the Education Cluster sub-group, in order to allow for the bridging of humanitarian and development education agendas.

2. **Cluster as separate but intersecting with the education sector working group:** In cases where the government is considered to be taking sides or complicit in a conflict, an Education Cluster may start as a separate entity in order to maintain its neutrality and purpose. If the Ministry's Education Sector Working Group is still functioning, the cluster and working group will likely have separate roles yet overlap in key areas, which means that interaction between the two structures might include information exchange, and asking members of the working group to attend and participate in cluster meetings, planning and action (and vice versa).

Again, the Handbook does not give any examples or case studies of this model, leaving descriptions highly abstract and theoretical. The Handbook does emphasise that ideally, coordination of the education sector response should be a collaborative activity led by government (if possible) with support from the cluster. In practice however, this will depend on the emergency context and the capacity and willingness of government education authorities to lead or participate in education in emergencies activities. In many emergency contexts, both government infrastructure and staffing capacity may be severely compromised, and the degree of collaboration will come down to personal relations, both internally and externally.

This is the extent to which the Handbook discusses working with governments, offering a departure point for an exploration of the political settlement literature and the strategies it offers for understanding more thoroughly the informal power relationships (both internal and external to government) that affect education delivery in an EiE context.

#### 2.4 WORKING WITH NATIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

Political settlements generally occur in lower- to middle-income countries where transparency surrounding the actors and functions of state institutions is often opaque. As discussed in the introduction, a political settlement is an informal understanding or agreement forged amongst political, social, or economic elites that can have varying effects on the governance and service delivery of state institutions. More specifically, DFID produced a practice paper that defined political settlements in the following terms:

Political settlements are the expression of a common understanding, usually forged between elites, about how power is organised and exercised. They include formal institutions for managing political and economic relations, such as electoral processes, peace agreements, parliaments, constitutions

and market regulations. But they also include informal, often unarticulated agreements that underpin a political system, such as deals between elites on the division of spoils<sup>7</sup>.

This definition would imply that it is the political settlements that are instrumental in shaping developmental trajectories. Thus, political settlement analysis (PSA) is essential for understanding how power is organised in a particular context, as this can help shape effective development interventions, assess the potential impact of those interventions and to avoid doing harm<sup>8</sup>. More specifically, an ODI think piece on political settlements and education entitled 'How does political context shape education reforms and their success?' states:

Firstly, that the application of political settlements analysis can help to explain patterns of progress in education access and quality, and to identify the political incentives underlying them. Education systems therefore need to be understood and researched in the light of their political context, rather than in isolation from it. Secondly, it demonstrates that there are benefits from tailoring donor and international agency approaches to education programming to the context of the political settlement in question<sup>9</sup>.

The political settlement analysis literature has generated a number of typologies of political settlements<sup>10</sup>, as well as theories that link different political settlement types to levels of political will, state capability, the success or failure of various policy initiatives and, ultimately, development outcomes. To date, most PSA work has taken the form of small comparative case study analysis, in which cases are selected to provide examples of the different types of political settlements and contextualise and explain their development outcomes. The aim for this is to allow policy-makers to extrapolate from what has worked well in countries with a similar political settlement type to their own, and apply lessons learnt. While the complexity of any political settlement makes generalisation and extrapolation difficult, PSA can at least provide policy makers a good starting point.

In order for DFID advisers to gain a better understanding of the political settlement in their context, there should be an analysis of the three main characteristics that are associated with political settlements<sup>11</sup>. These include:

1. **Degree of inclusion** – With regard to education, this would entail whether a minority of elites control the education system or if there is scope for more stakeholders' voice and participation (such as unions, parents, CSOs, etc) to be included.
2. **Aims/motivation of those in power** – This entails whether elites are motivated by spoils or a share of them (such as resources, ministerial positions, urban teaching posts, etc.) or are whether they are coordinated around a common aim, such as national development or the right to education.
3. **Type of bureaucracy/governance** – This focuses on the norms that shape the behaviours and relationships of those in power, which at one end could entail nepotism and meritocracy at the other.

The previously discussed ODI think piece attempts to contextualise some of these characteristics, and outlines three broad types of political settlements, two of which represent the ends of a spectrum and the third representing the vast majority in between. These three types include:

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<sup>7</sup> (DFID, 2010)

<sup>8</sup> PSA is closely related to a political economy analysis, but is more centrally concerned with understanding the formal and informal power relationships between elites, and between elites and their respective groups of followers. Where existing political economy approaches have tended to focus either on long-term structural drivers or the political dynamics of policy adoption, PSA approaches provide something that is complementary, yet slightly different.

<sup>9</sup> (Wales, Magee, & Nicolai, 2016)

<sup>10</sup> See: (Levy & Walton, 2013) (ESID, 2014) (DFID, 2010)

<sup>11</sup> (Kelsall, 2016)

1. **Development state:** In which the most important elites have been included and the state is both stable and free of political violence. The political settlement (and MoE by extension) is inclusive of all parties/stakeholders (including civil society). With this type of political stability, elites that can commit to long-term goals and a rules-based bureaucracy should lead to effective policy-making and provision of public goods. Examples include China, Ethiopia, and Rwanda.

*Implications for education service provision:* Donors can work from a 'government-supporting role' and can help strengthen education service delivery through interventions and initiatives to improve its supply (such as training on new pedagogies, strengthening policy/institutions, etc.) and/or through interventions to strengthen information sharing and stakeholder involvement in order improve community demand. However, the potential for mobilising stakeholders can be constrained by political concerns over loss of social control. Generally, in stable development states, education sector working groups should be firmly embedded within MoEs, and thus Education Clusters that may be initiated due to an emergency will likely be formed as a sub-group with a view to eventual mainstreaming into the working group.

2. **Predatory settlement:** In which a small minority of elites are included in this political settlement (which is usually autocratic and controlled by one-party), leading to a constant danger of conflict and instability that can collapse the state into conflict. Such a settlement is characterised by corruption-driven elites and a bureaucracy with ubiquitous patron-client relations. This combination of instability, short-sighted elites, and corruption means that these settlements are unlikely to achieve developmental gains or adequately provide public goods. Examples include the Democratic Republic of Congo.

*Implications for education service provision:* In general, little can be done and donors often take a 'government-substituting role' leading to the delivery of education that the state system and actors are unable to provide. Generally, in unstable predatory settlements, MoEs and/or education sector working groups may not exist and thus Education Clusters will likely be formed as its own entity.

3. **Hybrid settlement:** In which a broad range of the most powerful elites are included. Political contestation is largely peaceful, but some elites are excluded and actors may be willing to use political violence as a result. Corruption and patron-client relations exist, but the degree varies depending on context. Developmental gains are possible in these settlements, but the potential varies across sectors, particularly the MoE. Examples include Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria.

*Implications for education service provision:* Donors can work from a 'government-connecting role' in which the multi-stakeholder governance provides a structured way of thinking about how change can be effected – through external stakeholder mobilisation, political connectivity, and links to internal organisational stakeholders. If elitism is prevalent, it is more difficult to get broad education service delivery in the absence of larger democratic changes that make poorer groups important for elites. Generally, in hybrid settlement states, education sector working groups are established within MoEs and thus Education Clusters that may be initiated due to an emergency, will likely be formed as a sub-group: however, the extent of collaboration by government authorities will vary.

Political settlements can also exist at different levels of the polity (state, province, cities, villages, and so on). It is thus conceivable that at the level of central government, there might be a stable and inclusive developmental state, whilst unstable and fragile settlements co-exist at the regional and/or local levels. Afghanistan is an example where the diversity and heterogeneity of its elites and their interests has prompted the elucidation of three additional levels of political settlements that can occur in a state<sup>12</sup>:

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<sup>12</sup> (AREU, 2016)

1. **Primary settlement:** in reference to the agreement/settlement amongst elite actors in central government and MoE
2. **Secondary settlement:** defined as the arrangements among powerful local elites to control political competition and governance below the national level
3. **Sectoral elite bargains:** denoting the specific strategic interactions of actors and their interests within the specific education sector

It is important to note that education actors, whether in government, civil society, or the development community, have little to no influence over the political settlement (whether it is at the primary, secondary or sectoral level), at least in the short term. However, knowing how the political settlement affects political commitment to education should help actors design strategies that result in policy pathways, funding solutions and governance arrangements that not only complement each other but also either build on the strengths of the political settlement or help mitigate some of its weaknesses. Although no documents provide an example or case study of an actual political settlement analysis, the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) research group provide some key elements to consider<sup>13</sup>:

1. 'Unit of analysis': the more narrowly specified the better;
2. A common focus on performance in provision of the service;
3. An exploration of the sectoral manifestation of the political settlement;
4. A diagnosis of the drivers of organisational behaviour;
5. An assessment of the exercise of citizenship;
6. The implications for policy.

Although this ESID document states that a key strength of this analytical approach is that policy lessons will derive directly from this political and organisational analysis, there are no concrete examples of this, which leaves this guidance at a very conceptual and hypothetical level.

### 3 LIMITATIONS OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEWED

Although there were some thoughtful strategies found within the documents reviewed, it is worth noting the gaps and limitations that were still present:

1. **Political settlement evidence does not discuss refugee crises or natural disasters:** Many of these documents did discuss political tensions that may be the cause of hot conflict. However, there was no discussion about refugees who may have crossed borders into a political settlement or on how political settlements interface with natural disasters.
2. **There are no concrete strategies on engaging with political settlements:** Although political settlement analysis tools are provided in some documents, there is no clear-cut description of how to engage with a political settlement once its characteristics are determined. Only one EiE Education Cluster Coordinator Handbook provides concrete strategies for building consensus/coordination amongst stakeholders: however, it does not provide strategies with regard to incorporating a political settlement analysis.
3. **There are no concrete strategies on engaging with global consensus mechanisms:** Although there are strategies for building consensus with stakeholders at the country level, there is a dearth of

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<sup>13</sup> (ESID, 2014)

concrete guidelines on how to engage with global level structures, such as the Global Education Cluster or the Education Cannot Wait platform.

4. **Evidence from contexts of DFID interest:** Regarding this research question, there are some DFID focus countries that are discussed as case studies (Afghanistan, Lebanon, South Sudan, Ethiopia), however, there remain gaps regarding other locations, such as Syria, Jordan, Turkey and Somalia, amongst others.
5. **Evidence that is research based on 'what works':** As discussed, there are no empirical research studies on what works to build consensus in EiE or political settlement contexts.
6. **Evidence on bridging humanitarian and development efforts:** There were several acknowledgements of the fact that there is a divide between humanitarian and development actors in education (and in general), but there was no evidence or concrete discussion on exactly how to bridge this gap.

Some of these gaps will be filled by the lessons learnt and guidance gleaned through interviews with DFID advisers who have worked/are working in EiE contexts.

## 4 CONCLUSION

The Evidence Brief has aimed to answer the following research question regarding education in emergencies:

*How can DFID build more consensus and coordination amongst all stakeholders surrounding immediate and long-term education delivery in political settlement contexts?*

Evidence reviewed regarding building general consensus and coordination in EiE contexts found that at global level, the Global Education Cluster has been the main structure for immediate coordination of humanitarian education response. However, in 2016 the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) fund was launched, which aims to bring together humanitarian and development actors to deliver a more joined-up response in emergency contexts. At this early stage, no evidence is available yet about the Fund's effectiveness. At country level, Education Clusters and various Education Technical Working Groups are used for coordination between government partners, UN agencies, (I)NGOs, CSOs and donors. The Education Cluster Coordinator Handbook provides details on how to run an Education Cluster.

The review found that the Education Cluster Coordinator Handbook also discusses ways for the Education Cluster to interface with Sector Working Groups within Ministries of Education, that typically have a longer-term focus. This interface provides an entry point for bridging education humanitarian and development efforts at country level. The Cluster can function as a sub-group or as a separate structure to the Sector Working Group.

Understanding and engaging with political settlements in general should be based on an analysis of its three main characteristics: degree of inclusion; aims of those in power; and type of governance. The evidence found three types of political settlements, the Development State, a Predatory Settlement, and a Hybrid Settlement. In most cases, education actors have little influence over the political settlement in the short term. However, political settlement analysis is relevant to education as it enables the design of education strategies that build on the strengths of the settlement and mitigate some of its weaknesses.

It is clear that there is no robust evidence that provides concrete examples of 'what works' with regard to this Brief's research question. The evidence that does exist consists of:

1. High-level descriptive documents that discuss global EiE consensus/coordination structures (such as the Global Education Cluster and the Education Cannot Wait platform), but do not provide any concrete strategies for how stakeholders at this level might gain consensus on long-term education delivery, particularly with regard to political settlements.
2. A very practical Education Cluster Coordinator Handbook that describes how to build consensus and coordination for EiE at the country level, but not specifically surrounding long-term education delivery or political settlements.
3. Very academic documents that discuss the general concept of political settlements and political settlement analysis; and more practical versions of these that attempt to apply political settlement analysis to the education or health sector.

This latter group of documents has attempted to provide broad strategies regarding what type of role donors could play (i.e. supporting the government, replacing the government, or connecting the government), but these suggestions do not seem to provide any concrete guidance or ways forward.

Thus, the strategies that the reviewed documents provide seem only to be general starting points for thinking and analysis. Interviews with DFID advisers and other key informants may yield more concrete strategies, particularly with regard to:

1. How to bridge the humanitarian/development divide, particularly regarding long-term, system-led education provision.
2. Validation of whether the interface of EiE Education Clusters with Education Sector Working Groups is one way to do this.
3. Specific pitfalls, challenges, lessons learnt for engaging with different types of political settlements.

## 5 ANNEX 1 – SUMMARIES AND LINKS TO DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

**Please note that the titles for the following summaries contain hyper-links to the full-length documents that can be found online. To access a hyper-link, press 'Ctrl' and click on the bolded title.**

### 5.1 CONSENSUS AND COORDINATION DOCUMENTS

**Education Cluster Coordinator Handbook** (Global Education Cluster, 2010)

The purpose of this Handbook is to provide Education Cluster Coordinators with supporting information to guide their role in facilitating a predictable, coordinated, and effective response to education needs in emergencies. It highlights the overarching principles and standards applicable to education in emergencies and suggests how the coordinated and collaborative efforts of cluster partners, in partnership with government, can contribute to an effective and efficient education sector response. Intended for use as a reference rather than a narrative, the handbook provides guidance, tips, and practical tools and resources, and reinforces information provided as part of the Education Cluster Coordinator training. It draws on Global Education Cluster, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), and other policy documents and good practice, including lessons learnt from operationalising the Education Cluster at country level. Designed for application in different emergency and country contexts, the handbook includes information, guidance, and resources relevant to rapid-onset, conflict-related, and complex emergencies. However, it does not address all the issues that may be specific to different contexts.

### **Coordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction: challenges and responsibilities (Sommers, 2004)**

This book predates the launch of the ECW fund, and explores why the coordination of humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction activities is so difficult to accomplish in the education sector. It also suggests ways to overcome barriers to effective co-ordination. The book reviews the roles and responsibilities that key actors hold in the coordination of education during emergencies. It considers the associated barriers to coordination that arise from the differing roles and viewpoints of different actors (for example NGOs, UN, civil society, and local and national governments). Poor coordination is strongly linked to issues of power, mistrust, competition for resources, a limited understanding of accountability, insufficient time, and mismatched priorities. The book examines humanitarian co-ordination structures and the problem of the education sector remaining on the side-lines of such activity. It advocates for the establishment of education as a featured component of humanitarian work, and demonstrates that responsibility for the co-ordination of the education sector is often shared amongst many parties. The book proposes, as a way forward, that there is need for better clarification of roles and stronger leadership. Government education authorities are best placed as leaders and they can achieve this effectively through development of emergency educational priorities and plans. The book also suggests that since education is a long-term endeavour it is best coordinated as one; thus, the time horizon should be expanded and associated cost that should be budgeted just like any other activity.

### **Principles for good International engagement in fragile states & situations (OECD, 2007)**

These principles aim to complement the partnership commitments set out in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. They are designed to support existing dialogue and coordination processes, not to generate new ones. As experience deepens, the Principles will be reviewed periodically and adjusted as necessary. The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers to build effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of engaging productively with their people to promote sustained development. Realisation of this objective requires taking account of, and acting according to, the following principles:

1. Take context as the starting point;
2. Do no harm;
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective;
4. Prioritise prevention;
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives;
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies;
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts;
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors;
9. Act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance;
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion.

### **Education Cannot Wait - Proposing a fund for education in emergencies (ODI, 2016)**

This paper outlines the potential operation of Education Cannot Wait, a fund designed to transform the global education sector for children affected by crises. It is about taking decisive action on behalf of children and young people in emergencies and protracted crises. It addresses one of the greatest development challenges of our day; that of restoring the hope and futures of new generations whose lives have been shattered by crises. The Education Cannot Wait proposal is framed to deliver early, cost-effective results while building for the future. Rather than create a new institution and more fragmentation, it harnesses and weaves together the expertise, energy and capabilities of a range of actors. The two financing mechanisms – an Acceleration Facility and a Breakthrough Fund – provide clear added value. They will enable agencies to do more of what they currently do well, while mobilising and disbursing new funds and leveraging additional support. The flexibility built into the proposal will enable financing to be calibrated against the needs and circumstances of individual countries.



## **Education Cannot Wait - Frequently Asked Questions** (Education Cannot Wait, 2017)

An informative fact sheet found on the Education Cannot Wait website that provides concise answers to questions regarding why the fund exists, where the funds will come from, how ECW differs to and overlaps with GPE, how ECW is governed, how it will report on results, working modalities, funding windows, etc.

## **5.2 POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS DOCUMENTS**

### **Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper** (DFID, 2010)

A step change in international approaches is required. There remains a tendency to work 'around' conflict and fragility and focus on traditional development activities. Our engagement in these states must be targeted towards a set of objectives that address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility head-on. In conflict-affected and fragile countries, state-building and peace-building objectives are the necessary building blocks towards achieving poverty reduction and the MDGs. This paper sets out an integrated approach that puts building peaceful states and societies at the centre of our efforts in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Drawing on evidence, it brings state-building and peace-building together into a single framework, and is based on four closely linked objectives:

1. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms;
2. Support inclusive political settlements and processes;
3. Develop core state functions;
4. Respond to public expectations.

This approach is intended to increase the impact of international assistance in fragile countries, and should be used to prioritise interventions rigorously. It will help ensure that state-building and peace-building initiatives are complementary, provide greater policy and operational coherence, and increase synergies between the development, diplomatic and defence communities.

### **A review of the evidence informing DFID's "Building Peaceful States and Societies" practice paper** (Evans, 2012)

This paper is one of four exploring and analysing the evidence that underpins DFID's 2010 "Building Peaceful States & Societies" Practice Paper, referred to hereafter as the 'PB/SB (Peace-Building/State-Building) framework'. Taking each of the PB/SB framework's four guiding objectives, it appraises and synthesises the cited research evidence in that framework to offer guidance on the degree to which the core concepts and propositions are 'evidence based'. This study offers the following key findings:

1. The PB/SB framework's consideration of elites, and their criticality to the political settlement, is based on a substantial body of persuasive research.
2. A combination of conceptual research and empirical evidence seems to support the claim that peacebuilding and state-building is underpinned by the formation of inclusive political settlements, where the political settlement refers to the elite bargains at its heart.
3. The evidence relating to the ability of non-elites (i.e. wider society) to shape the political settlement is typically more empirical, but also more mixed. Based on the research surveyed, non-elites' capacity to change political settlements is uncertain.
4. The PB/SB fails to adequately consider the historical process of institutional change in its treatment of political settlements. Greater understanding of this process is required in order to appreciate why wider society's inclusion in the political settlement is often so difficult to achieve.
5. Whilst this study suggests that many of the core components of the PB/SB framework are based on research findings, the framework is generally inadequately supported by footnotes and references demonstrating exactly which research evidence underpins particular concepts.

### **The Concept of Political Settlement in Development Policy, and Why it's Useful** (Ingram, 2014)

This is a two-page summary that aims to provide clarity on the concept of political settlements and why political settlement analyses are important. The adoption of political settlement as a framing concept highlights the quintessentially political character of state building and development more broadly.

### **The Political Economy of Education Systems in Conflict-Affected Contexts** (Novelli, Higgins, Ugur, & Valiente, 2014)

This report is a rigorous literature review on the political economy of education systems in conflict-affected contexts and is aimed at education advisers and agencies, development practitioners, and Ministry of Education policy makers working in conflict-affected contexts. The report seeks to provide theoretically informed and policy relevant insights on the global, national, and local governance of education systems in conflict-affected contexts garnered from a rigorous review of the academic and policy literature on the political economy of education in conflict-affected contexts. The report points to 10 key policy challenges that emerged out of the review and require careful attention:

1. The global security/peacebuilding agenda marginalises or undermines the potential of education to contribute to sustainable peacebuilding.
2. There is a disconnect between peacebuilding and conflict practitioners and education specialists: both groups lack knowledge of each other's fields, leading to silo approaches and missed opportunities.
3. There is a disconnect between actors in the humanitarian, development, and security sectors, all of which have different approaches to the role of education.
4. There is a disjunction between a global educational agenda influenced by access/quality/efficiency and the peacebuilding needs of conflict-affected societies, e.g. addressing inequity, social cohesion, and economic and political exclusion.
5. The framing of educational interventions in narrowly educationist technical terms that bypass the cultural, political, religious, and social contexts of implementation can undermine effectiveness in achieving sustainable peacebuilding aims, and may jeopardise the capacity of education to contribute to peacebuilding.
6. Lack of cross-sector collaboration between the education departments within government and other agencies prevents leveraging change on key cross-cutting issues linked to peacebuilding.
7. Inattention to the agency and voices of national/local actors undermines the possibility of sustainable outcomes and of addressing conflict-related social justice issues.
8. Imbalances of power between global, national, and local actors undermine the potential for local ownership of interventions and therefore opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding.
9. A disjuncture between different types of political economy analysis results in different evaluations of the significance of global and local actors, and local political and cultural contexts.
10. The complexity of factors influencing the success of educational interventions revealed by political economy analysis is difficult for practitioners to address and to use to inform policies and programming. However, failure to do so is likely to undermine technical solutions.

### **Thinking and working with political settlements** (Kelsall, 2016)

This note aims to give some advice to development practitioners, especially those working in-country, on how to use Political Settlements Analysis (PSA) as a diagnostic tool for country programming. In recent years, Political Settlements Analysis (PSA) has become increasingly influential in academic and policy circles, though despite its intuitive appeal, it seems difficult to use in practice. PSA has a natural affinity with Adaptive Development, Thinking and Working Politically, and Doing Development Differently approaches, and by answering the simple diagnostic questions supplied here, development partners can identify the types of political settlements in which they work, and draw some broad operational implications.

### **How does political context shape education reforms and their success? Lessons from the Development Progress project (Wales, Magee, & Nicolai, 2016)**

This report addresses this gap by drawing on evidence from eight education-focused country case studies conducted by ODI's Development Progress project and applying PSA to explore how political context can shape opportunities and barriers for achieving progress in education access and learning outcomes. It gives an introduction to political settlements theory and presents a basic model for applying it to education. It then classifies the case study countries into three broad groups (developmental, mixed hybrid and spoils-driven hybrid) and explores the common features and differences in their progress stories. This report concludes that immediate priorities for the future must include a movement from theory into practice and outlines a series of potential entry points for reform in different types of political settlements. The emerging strategies are not definitive, but provide a set of ideas for donors and international agencies to test and experiment with as they work to improve education systems.

### **Political settlements and pathways to universal health coverage (Kelsall, Hart, & Laws, 2016)**

With the recent ratification of Sustainable Development Goal Target 3.8, universal health coverage (UHC) has consolidated its position atop the global public health agenda. However, as a growing body of technical and political analysis reveals, uncertainties remain over the ability of all countries to achieve UHC, and the pathways they should take to get there. This paper reviews some of the existing political economy analysis (PEA) of UHC, before presenting political settlements analysis (PSA) as an alternative, yet complementary, approach. It outlines a model that links political settlement type to UHC progress via political commitment, policy pathways, funding, and governance arrangements, and provides some hypotheses about how fast progress to UHC will be under different political settlement types. It also argues that UHC champions should adapt their ways of working to fit the political settlement, distinguishing between 'government-supporting', 'government-substituting', and 'government-connecting' strategies. It then presents case study evidence from six low- and lower-middle-income countries to help assess these claims. It concludes that, while the evidence of a relationship between political settlement and UHC progress is quite strong, the hypothesis about political settlement type and ways of working requires further research.

### **The Political Economy of Education and Health Service Delivery in Afghanistan (AREU, 2016)**

This report tests the proposition that the character of political settlements at various levels (primary, secondary, and sectoral) may help explain the different delivery outcomes in education and health in Afghanistan's Badghis, Wardak, and Balkh provinces, in particular whether political settlements influenced: a) Badghis' poor access to health services; b) Wardak's performance in immunisation and birth care; c) Wardak's low female enrolment rates and declining attendance rates in schools; and d) Balkh's comparatively modest performance in health delivery. Extensive desk reviews that included existing literature and reports, as well as qualitative field research, were the basis of the key findings of the study. The first finding of the study is how, depending on their economic resources and nature of political settlement, provincial powerholders are able to take advantage of the primary settlement (at the national level). A province like Balkh, characterised by a strong secondary settlement around a charismatic and resourceful strongman as well as a flourishing economy, was able to exert considerable influence on Kabul. A second finding is that the nature of secondary settlements at the provincial level varies greatly, thus altering their impact on the delivery of services. The third finding of this study is that sectoral bargains are essential to allow services to function in a conflict area. In all of the three provinces, sectoral bargains came into being to allow the delivery of health and education services even in areas controlled by the insurgency. By and large the Taliban saw it in their interests to respond positively to community demand for services, particularly where they could shape the way services were being delivered, e.g. by increasing the religious content of the education curriculum.

### **The politics of what works in service delivery: An evidence-based review** (Mcloughlin & Batley, 2012)

This paper examines the evidence on the forms of politics likely to promote inclusive social provisioning and enable – as opposed to constrain – improvements in service outcomes. It focuses on eight relatively successful cases of delivery in a range of country contexts and sectors (roads, agriculture, health, education) where independent evaluations demonstrate improved outcomes. The paper traces the main characteristics of the political environment for these cases, from the national political context, to the politics of sector policymaking, to the micro politics of implementation. The findings indicate that it is possible to identify connections between good performance and better outcomes at the point of delivery and the main forms of politics operating at local, sector and national levels. A number of common factors underpinning successful delivery emerge strongly but need to be tested through further research. In particular, the paper highlights the relationship between inclusive delivery and periods of crisis and transition; the nature of the political settlement; the types of calculations of political returns being made by political actors at all levels; and the extent to which the state derives or seeks to enhance its legitimacy through the provision of a particular service.

### **Researching the politics of service provision: A new conceptual and methodological approach** (ESID, 2014)

This paper extends and politicises the 'accountability framework' of relations between citizens, clients, and service providers, set out in the World Bank's 2004 World Development Report, to incorporate different levels of analysis, while highlighting the linkages between them. Employs a political settlements approach to investigate the main drivers of political and organisational behaviour from national-level policy making through to front line service provision. Adopts a relational view of the actors engaged in service provision and proposes an organisation-specific diagnosis of the nature of the principal-agent (and often multi-stakeholder) relationships within service delivery. Offers policy lessons derived from political and organisational analysis.

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